MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko.
Petitioners also argue that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Atiko as the summons was received by its cashier, Cristina Figueroa. They maintain that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the defendant is a domestic corporation like Atiko, summons may be served only upon its president, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
We are not persuaded. True, when the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.[20] However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal,[21] Memorandum of Appeal,[22] Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review,[24] it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez,[25] this Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.”
Moreover, petitioners’ contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum[26] filed with this Court where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with summons. In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. Failing to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to obtain such relief.[28]
It may not be amiss to state too that in our February 13, 2006 Resolution,[29] we reminded the parties that they are not allowed to interject new issues in their memorandum.
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie.
Petitioners likewise challenge the validity of the service of summons upon Cheng Lie, thru Atiko. They claim that when the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
On this score, we find for the petitioners. Before it was amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC,[30] Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.[31]that when the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon:
1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;
2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does not have a resident agent; or,
3. Any of the corporation’s officers or agents within the
In the case at bench, no summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed above. It should be recalled that Atiko was not properly served with summons as the person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina Figueroa, is not one of the corporate officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko not thru valid service of summons but by the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus, there being no proper service of summons upon Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. To rule otherwise would create an absurd situation where service of summons is valid upon the purported principal but not on the latter’s co-defendant cum putative agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru said agent. Indeed, in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private juridical entity under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service of summons upon the agent of such defendant.
Also, the records of this case is bereft of any showing that cashier Cristina Figueroa is a government official designated by law to receive summons on behalf of Cheng Lie or that she is an officer or agent of Cheng Lie within the Philippines. Hence, her receipt of summons bears no significance insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned. At this point, we emphasize that the requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed,[32] lest we ride roughshod on defendant’s right to due process.[33]
With regard to Cheng Lie’s filing of numerous pleadings, the same cannot be considered as voluntary appearance. Unlike Atiko, Cheng Lie never sought affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. From the very beginning, it has consistently questioned the validity of the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.
It does not escape our attention though that Cheng Lie’s pleadings do not indicate that the same were filed by way of special appearance. But these, to our mind, are mere inaccuracies in the title of the pleadings. What is important are the allegations contained therein which consistently resisted the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, Cheng Lie cannot be considered to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts.[34]
In fine, since the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie, its decision insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned is void.[35]
Cheng Lie was improperly declared in default.
Applying the above disquisition, the MeTC likewise erred in declaring Cheng Lie in default. Settled is the rule that a defendant cannot be declared in default unless such declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons.[36]
