The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her.

"Xxx.

The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

Xxx."

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,v s. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Respondents. G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976.

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

"Xxx.

Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that ejectment, being an action involving recovery of real property, is a real action which as such, is not extinguished by the defendant's death.

. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.12

There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party, which death did not extinguish the deceased's civil personality.13 More significantly, a judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.14 Thus, we have held that:

. . . In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because of this relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the subject lot to their names. . . . Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding and enforceable against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action (Section 49 [b] Rule 39, Rules of Court). Furthermore, . . . judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the successors-in-interest . . . .15

Xxx."

ABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995.

The defendant in an ejectment case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process.

"Xxx.

The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any proceeding.8 The rationale underlying this requirement in case a party dies during the pendency of proceedings of a nature not extinguished by such death, is that

. . . the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause implicitly presupposes in the trial court, amongst other essentials, jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That jurisdiction was inevitably impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process.9

We are not unaware of several cases10 where we have ruled that a party having died in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all, are these particular circumstances which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible claim of violation of her rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in this light, the Court of Appeals, in the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, thus expounded:

Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements. The original party having died, he could not continue to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him. For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance. Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death:

1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was rendered;

2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest and those of her children were involved;

3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that an appeal had been made);

4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein petitioner appear;

5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de Gonzales, et al.) cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention relative to non-acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita Gonzales was not served notice and, more importantly, she never appeared in court, unlike herein petitioner who appeared and even testified regarding the death of her husband.11

Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the defendant in an ejectment case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process.

Xxx."

FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

"Xxx.

Thus, this petition for review where the only issue is whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere. Petitioner alleges that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs because of its failure to order their substitution pursuant to Section 17,4 Rule 3 of the Rule of Court; hence, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the trial court are null and void.

The petition must fail.

When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.

The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.

The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party.5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.6

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.7 The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process.8 It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.9 Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.11

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.14

In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process as would nullify the proceedings and the judgment thereon can be invoked only by the heirs whose rights have been violated. Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have been allegedly violated.15 Petitioner, who had every opportunity and who took advantage of such opportunity, through counsel, to participate in the trial court proceedings, cannot claim denial of due process.

Xxx."

CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,v s. AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, Respondents. G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.

Death of a party - a complaint for recovery of possession of real property is an action which survives the death of a party.

"Xxx.

Petitioners assert that the trial court failed to comply with the clear language of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court which provides as follows:

"Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs."16

Petitioners allege that, as there was no appointed administrator for the estate of the deceased defendant, the trial court should have ordered the heirs to appear personally before it and manifest whether they were willing to substitute Glicerio. Petitioners further aver that if none of the heirs appeared or manifested to act as substitutes, the trial court should have ordered the adverse party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased who should appear for and on behalf of the deceased's interest.

Petitioners also harp on their failure to receive a copy of the Spouses Mariano's motion for substitution of Glicerio as well as the Order of the trial court admitting the motion. Petitioners argue that, even if they received a copy of the Order, the same did not grant the Spouses Mariano's motion for substitution. Since they were not aware of the purported substitution because of the lack of service on them of the motion and the Order, petitioners insist that the entire proceedings in the trial court were void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons.

It must be pointed out that, contrary to the Spouses Mariano's view, their complaint for recovery of possession of real property is an action which survives the death of a party.17 Such being the case, the rule on substitution of a deceased party is clearly applicable.

Under the express terms of Section 17 of the old Rules, in case of the death of a party and due notice is given to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to order the deceased's legal representative or heir to appear for the deceased.18 Otherwise, "the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after trial, are null and void."19

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other words, a party's right to due process is at stake, as we enunciated in Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals,20 thus —

"We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein." (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving a notice of Glicerio's death, failed to order the appearance of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Order merely admitting respondents' motion for substitution. There was no court order for Glicerio's legal representative to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the respondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did Glicerio's heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court failed to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, no valid substitution transpired in the present case.21

Thus, we rule that the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are void as to Felicidad, Glicerio, Jr., Bener and Julito. There is no iota of proof that they were apprised of the litigation against Glicerio. There is no indication that they authorized Atty. Pardalis to represent them or any showing that they appeared in the proceedings. Given these facts, the trial court clearly did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Such being the case, these heirs cannot be bound by the judgment of the trial court, as we have pronounced in Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,22 thus —

"Inasmuch as Manolita Gonzales was never validly served a copy of the order granting the substitution and that furthermore, a valid substitution was never effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over Manolita Gonzales for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as legal representative of the estate of her mother Manuela."

However, despite the trial court's failure to adhere to the rule on substitution of a deceased party, its judgment remains valid and binding on the following heirs, namely, Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, shared in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant.23 This is precisely because, despite the court's non-compliance with the rule on substitution, the heirs' right to due process was obviously not impaired.24 In other words, the purpose of the rule on substitution of a deceased party was already achieved. The following facts indicate plainly that there was active participation of these heirs in the defense of Glicerio after his death.

First, Salvador and Concepcion were among the original defendants in the case. Needless to state, the trial court, even before Glicerio's death, already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of these heirs. Hence, the rule on substitution of a deceased party is no longer required as to Salvador and Concepcion because they were already impleaded as defendants. In fact, Salvador, a lawyer son of Glicerio, was also one of the counsels for defendants.

Second, the lengthy testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto show that they defended their deceased father. Both Concepcion and Salvador testified in defense not only of themselves but also of their deceased father. As to Ernesto, while he was dropped as a defendant, he testified and admitted that he was one of the substitutes of Glicerio, thus —

"INTERPRETER: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

WITNESS: ERNESTO BRIOSO, 45 years old, widower, farmer and residing at Puro-Batia, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.

INTERPRETER: Your witness is now ready.

ATTY. PARDALIS: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

COURT: Proceed.

Q: Are you one of the defendants in this case who was substituted for the late Glicerio R. Brioso?

A: Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx"25

This shows that Ernesto understood that he was a substitute defendant in the case.

Third, Atty. Pardalis continued to represent Glicerio even after the latter's demise. Acting on Glicerio's behalf, Atty. Pardalis presented the testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, to prove, among others, that Glicerio no longer had any interest in the Properties. These pieces of evidence clearly negate petitioners' contention that Atty. Pardalis ceased to be Glicerio's counsel upon the latter's death.

Assuming that Atty. Pardalis no longer represented Glicerio after his death, he remained as counsel for Salvador, Concepcion and Marcos. He should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal substitution of Glicerio. Yet, despite the court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of his clients, Atty. Pardalis never bothered to challenge the same, not until after the trial court rendered its adverse decision.

Lastly, Atty. Pardalis received a copy of respondents' motion for substitution and the trial court's Order admitting the motion. Upon receipt of the motion and the Order, Atty. Pardalis should have immediately opposed the same for failure to comply with the rule on substitution. However, Atty. Pardalis did not question the motion and the Order, not until after the trial court rendered its decision. His long silence, which certainly binds his clients, can be construed as defendants' submission to the court's jurisdiction. The acquiescence of defendants and their counsel on the trial court's jurisdiction effectively precluded them from questioning the proceedings in the trial court.

In Ferreria et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,26 Manolita Gonzales (one of the heirs of deceased defendant) was not served notice and, more importantly, never appeared in court, unlike Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto who appeared and even testified regarding their father's interest in the Properties. In sum, with the active participation of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Accordingly, the proceedings and the decision of the trial court are valid with respect to these heirs.

As regards Marcos Nolasco, he was impleaded as a defendant primarily because he and Concepcion were among the actual possessors of the Properties. It was even defendants' contention that the complaint was defective for failure to implead Marcos as he was an indispensable party.27 Accordingly, the Spouses Mariano impleaded Marcos as a defendant, without whom no final determination can be had of the action.28 With Marcos' inclusion as a party, it is beyond dispute that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are valid and binding upon Marcos.

Xxx."

GLICERIO R. BRIOSO, substituted by FELICIDAD Z. BRIOSO, BENER Z. BRIOSO, JULITO Z. BRIOSO, GLICERIO Z. BRIOSO, JR., and ERNESTO Z. BRIOSO, CONCEPCION B. NOLASCO, MARCOS NOLASCO and SALVADOR Z. BRIOSO, petitioners, vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO and LEONARDO C. MARIANO, Respondents. G.R. No. 132765, January 31, 2003.