Here are selected August 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of registration. Vilando’s assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, likewise failed. Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. He failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling. Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichong’s mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; natural-born citizen. With Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of a certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET was, thus, found to have ruled correctly in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Constitutionality of statutes; writ of certiorari and prohibition. Writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes and the acts of the other branches of government. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. The 1987 Constitution vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. However, such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles,G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
International law; UNCLOS III; RA 9522. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ contention that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory” because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. The Court said that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], and exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. In other words, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). In sum, UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
International law; archipelagic waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. To this the Supreme Court held: Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
International law; rights of innocent passage. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that, for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More important, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
Judgment; law of the case. The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rule was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. In G.R. No. 137285 (which was the predecessor of this case), the Supreme Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled. The SC ratiocinated that it is notable that it mentioned nothing in the said case about the invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Court’s acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434’s value in 1981). Export Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez,G.R. No. 188995. August 24, 2011.
Moot and academic principle; exception. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, which has also rendered this case moot and academic. However, citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deemed it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits based on the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did, for public office, hence, capable of repetition. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
NPC Charter; prescription. The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and action for damages; distinction. An action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from an action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, is intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. The two actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value. The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. Reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is warranted. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals. In this case, the CA upheld the RTC’s granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of Php30,000.00/month “from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum” by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. However, the SC found that the granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated. Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in its place prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; limitations. The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations: (a) the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) just compensation must be paid to the owner. In addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of taking until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred. In this case, it is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner. In view of this, the SC found the CA’s fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum as insufficient for that rate would not ensure that compensation was just in the face of the long delay in payment. Accordingly, it imposed a 12% per annum legal interest, from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just compensation is paid, instead. Export Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking. There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. In this case, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPC’s construction adversely affected the owners’ rights and interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage. This was considered by the SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) “never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctor” despite his call on 8 July 2003 “to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad,” Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance. Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011.
Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is that public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. This is otherwise known as the “no work-no pay” principle. However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension must be unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were present. The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with. The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand. In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to his former position – i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
Election Law
Election contest; preliminary conference. The questioned notice of preliminary conference issued in the instant election protest was defective in that (1) the notice issued by the MCTC clerk of court was a generic notice of hearing without any mention that it was for preliminary conference, and (2) it was served on the party himself despite being represented by counsel in contravention of Rule 9, Section 21 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. For this reason the Supreme Court disagreed with the RTC’s finding that impliedly ascribed all fault to petitioner in failing to timely file his preliminary conference brief. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.
Election contest; COMELEC’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found no merit in petitioner’s argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. According to the Supreme Court, said provision, taken together with the succeeding section, undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest is within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.
(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her assistance in the preparation of this post.)"
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