The Court’s Ruling
We sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.
Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that while, generally, the defense of alibi is frowned upon by the court, it assumes significance when it is corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.[48] Accused-appellant claims that Calimag’s testimony was categorical, concise and persistent in affirming that he was innocent of the crimes charged.[49] Accused-appellant also maintains that although he was not able to adduce any evidence to corroborate his stand that it was his wife, motivated by revenge and anger, who ultimately caused the filing of the criminal charges against him, this should not be entirely taken against him.[50]
In People v. Estoya,[51] this Court laid down the jurisprudential guidelines in assessing the proffered defense of alibi. Particularly:
Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense. One, alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless patently and clearly inconsistent — must be accepted.[52] (Emphasis supplied.)
Measured against the foregoing yardstick, accused-appellant’s defenses of alibi and denial cannot prosper. As mentioned above, alibis and denials are inherently weak defenses. This is understandably so because said defenses can be easily fabricated by an accused in order to escape criminal liability.[53]
Likewise, it was stated in Estoya that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Notably, these defenses crumble in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.[54] An alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving, and, thus, cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[55] In the present case, AAA positively identified accused-appellant in her testimony as the very perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against her, to wit:
Q: While you were sleeping, do you remember any untoward incident that happened to you?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: What was that?
A: Somebody carried me, ma’am.
Q: Who carried you?
A: My father, ma’am.
Q: Where did he bring you?
A: From the bed, he brought me to the floor.
Q: Why do you have light in the room?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: What is that light?
A: Electric light, ma’am.
Q: After carrying you and brought [sic] you to the floor, what did he do to you?
A: He removed his t-shirt and tied my mouth.
Q: You mean to say he used his t-shirt in tying your mouth?
A: He tied his t-shirt covering my mouth.
Q: After removing his t-shirt and tying your mouth, what did he do next?
A: He removed my t-shirt and short[s], ma’am.
Q: When he undressed you, what happened next?
A: He also removed his short[s] and brief, ma’am, and he also removed my panty.
Q: After undressing himself and undressed [sic] you, what happened next?
A: He inserted his pennis [sic] into my vagina, ma’am.
Q: While inserting his pennis [sic] into your vagina, did he utter something to you?
A: He ordered me not to report the incident to my mother because they just quarell [sic].
Q: Did your two (2) sisters wake up?
A: No ma’am.
Q: Can you estimate what time was that?
A: Its [sic] already late at that time, ma’am.
Q: Aside from putting his pennis [sic] into your vagina, what are the things that he do [sic] to you?
Atty Doran: That is assuming the fact, your honor.
Prosecutor Ugale: I will reform my question, your honor.
Prosecutor Ugale:
Q: Is that all the things that he did to you?
A: Not only that, ma’am.
Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He out my shorts and panty and my t-shirt, he dressed himself [sic] and then he put me back to be beside my sister then he untied me.
Q: What did you feel when your father inserted his pennis [sic] into your vagina?
A: I felt pain, ma’am.
Q: Did he also kiss you?
A: He kissed my cheek, ma’am.
Q: Did he kiss your lips?
A: No ma’am.
Q: How about your neck?
A: No ma’am.
Q: What did you feel when your papa inserted his pennis [sic] into your vagina?
A: It is hard and I felt pain.[56] (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed as he must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[57] As correctly observed by the trial court, a distance of three (3) kilometers does not make it physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[58] Calimag himself admitted during cross-examination that the house of accused-appellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour. Significantly, even if accused-appellant indeed stayed in Calimag’s house on the dates that he committed rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home and commit the said crime at the time it was said to have been committed.
Also, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. In this regard, it should be noted that alibi becomes unworthy of merit not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA but also in cases where it is established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends and comrades-in-arms,[59] and not by credible persons.[60]
Finally, as mentioned in Estoya, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and that the assessment made by the trial court must be accepted unless it is patently and clearly inconsistent.
Indeed, “it is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.”[61] In People v. Lusabio, Jr., this Court held:
All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by accused-appellant. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[62] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Since accused-appellant failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been
established beyond reasonable doubt
After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[63] Nonetheless, it also bears stressing that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus.[64]
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.[65]
In People v. Orillosa,[66] this Court held that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice.[67] Thus, in order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this jurisdiction, only two (2) elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old.[68]
In the present case, it is undisputed that the victim, AAA, was below twelve (12) years old when the crime was committed. A copy of AAA’s birth certificate to prove her age was duly presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October 14, 1994.[69] Concomitantly, AAA was only seven (7) years old when the crime of rape was first committed against her in 2001, and was only nine (9) years old when the accused once again succeeded in committing the same crime in 2003.[70] Also, it is undisputed that accused-appellant is the father of AAA, as stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference and as also indicated in AAA’s birth certificate.[71] Thus, what only remains to be proved is the fact of carnal knowledge by the accused of the victim.
Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently established the foregoing element, thus proving that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape.
When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of how she was sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-year-old girl to concoct. As aptly observed by the CA, “[AAA] was able to describe in detail how her father carried her through the window, laid her down the floor, tied her mouth, removed her clothes and inserted his penis inside her vagina. She even described that she felt pain while her father was performing the carnal act against her.”[72]
Pertinently, “it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.”[73]
Moreover, the fact that AAA’s testimony was able to withstand scrutiny during cross-examination bolsters her credibility and makes her statements more credible.[74]
Further, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Simangan corroborate the testimony of AAA. In this regard, while a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for its successful prosecution, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAA’s testimony.[75]
In addition, this Court is not convinced that a child of a tender age would concoct a story as sordid as in the instant case due to her mother’s alleged ill motive. In People v. Padilla, We held that accused-appellant’s imputation of ill motive on the victim’s mother for being jealous of another woman is clearly unmeritorious, for no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows the crime of rape only because she is consumed with hatred and revenge. Specifically:
Appellant, nonetheless, imputes ill-motive on Laiza and her mother Elisa in charging him with rape contending that the latter was jealous when she found that he was courting a woman in their place.
Again, appellant’s excuse is simply too frail to cause resentment and ill will on the part of Laiza and her mother against him. Though one may be consumed with much hatred and revenge, it takes nothing less than psychological depravity for a mother to concoct a story too damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Certainly, no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows a despicable crime of rape. We are convinced that the victim and her mother boldly initiated the present case to seek justice for the abominable act committed by appellant. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
All told, We accordingly sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.
Award of Damages
The Decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified.
In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death.[76] However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited.[77] In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[78]
Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is “the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.”
Pertinently, as early as July 9, 1998, this Court has held that when the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000,[79] racionating that “[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”[80]
Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted,[81] without need of pleading or proving them.[82] In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim’s injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[83]
Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances,[84] to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good.[85]
