Posted: September 7, 2011; By Jen T. Tuazon
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that statements regarding one of its decisions published by the Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) do not constitute indirect contempt.
The Court's First Division, through Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, unanimously dismissed the special civil action for contempt filed by Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, Oceanic Container Lines, Inc., Solid Shipping Lines Corp., Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al (LSC, et al) against DMAP. Concurring were Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Martin S. Villarama.
The Court held that LSC, et al failed to show that the statements in the DMAP publication Sea Transport Update fell under any of the acts constituting indirect contempt under Sec. 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. It found that the intent behind the statements that a decision of the Supreme Court dismissing DMAP's petition had been based on technicalities and that the decision had been issued faster than the “normal lead time of three to six months,” was not to criticize the Court or to incite DMAP's members to defy the Court's ruling but only to inform the members of the developments of the case and on the next steps DMAP plans to take.
Citing the leading case of In Re: Almacen, GR No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, the Court held that the test for criticizing a judge's decision is whether or not the criticism is done in good faith. It found that the statements in the Sea Transport Update were not “disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.” It stressed that it has “long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.”
The Court concluded that while the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system, it is exercised “on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.”
Contempt of court, broadly defined as a disregard of rules or orders by a legislative or judicial body or interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior, has two kinds: direct and indirect. The former is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; while the latter consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. Among the acts of indirect contempt under Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, are, following a charge in writing has been filed: disobedience of a lawful court order; improper conduct tending to impede or degrade the administration of justice; assuming to be an officer of the court and acting without such authority; and failure to obey a subpoena duly served. DMAP had been charged under the foregoing provision.
On July 2, 2001, DMAP challenged before the Court of Appeals the constitutionality of EO 213, Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates, and MC 153 issued by the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) mandating a 20% increase on freight rates . The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that determining the propriety of the 20% increase is under the jurisdiction of MARINA. DMAP appealed the ruling before the Supreme Court which, however, dismissed the same for DMAP's failure to file within the reglementary period and to pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's fee under the rules. After the Court denied their petition with finality, DMAP acting through its President, Lorenzo Cinco and consultant Cora Curay, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update which included the statements alleged as contemptuous by LCS, et al. (GR No. 155849, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. DMAP, August 31, 2011)
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