Simple theft and qualified theft explained; proper penalty. - G.R. No. 177761

G.R. No. 177761

"x x x.

Courts below correctly held appellant liable for qualified theft

            “The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was] done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.”[40] 

            As to the first and second elements, we quote with approval the CA’s discussion on the matter:

Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by direct evidence the first and basic element of the offense – that is, the taking of the sum of Php417,922.90 during the period from May 2000 up to May 8, 2001.  She claims that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that would prove that the accused actually received the alleged amounts handed to her for the processing of various documents.

x x x x

Regarding x x x the prosecution’s failure to present direct evidence to prove the accused-appellant’s taking of the questioned amount, it is Our view that the absence of direct evidence proving accused-appellant’s stealing and carrying away of the alleged Php417,922.90 from private respondent would not matter as long as there is enough circumstantial evidence that would establish such element of ‘taking’.  After all, Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence if more than one circumstance is involved, the facts of which, inferring said circumstances have been proven, and provided that the combination of all such circumstances would suffice to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

There is no doubt, as held by the trial court, that the prosecution was able to establish the following circumstances:

1.              Accused-appellant was the legal secretary and liaison officer of private complainant from June 1999 to April 18, 2001.  She was the only person working for the private complainant during said period.

2.              As legal secretary and liaison officer, accused-appellant was tasked to process land titles of private complainant’s clients.  Her duties included the payment of taxes (documentary stamp taxes, capital gains taxes, transfer tax) for the transfer of title from previous owners to new owners/buyers of the property.

3.              Because of the nature of accused appellant’s work and the trust reposed in her by private complainant, the latter confidently gave her considerable amounts of cash without need of receipts.  The accused-appellant even admitted that she often received money from private complainant for payment of capital gains and transfer taxes.

4.              There were also instances when accused-appellant was authorized by private complainant to collect money from her clients especially when the accused-appellant ran out of money needed in the processing of titles.

5.              The accused-appellant was given a free hand in liquidating her expenses in her own handwriting.

6.              Upon verification from banks and government agencies with which the accused-appellant transacted in relation to her tasks, the private complainant discovered that what the accused-appellant submitted were handwritten ‘padded’ liquidation statements because her reported expenses turned out to be higher than what she actually spent; and worse, the ‘official’ receipts she submitted to private complainant were fake. x x x.

x x x x

7.              The accused-appellant did not specifically deny her submitting altered or fake receipts in liquidating her expenses for said taxes.

8.              And conceding her guilt, the accused-appellant suddenly disappeared leaving some of her tasks, unfinished.

x x x x

[These] pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the private complainant. x x x[41]

Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of appellant and “justify a conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”[42]  In other words, “[f]or circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”[43] Here, we agree with the CA that the circumstances above enumerated lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of money from Rebecca.

With regard to the third element, “[i]ntent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of asportation.”[44]  In this case, it was established that appellant padded her expenses and submitted fake receipts of her supposed payment for the processing of the transfer of land titles, to gain from the money entrusted to her by Rebecca.  Her intentional failure to properly and correctly account for the same constitutes appropriation with intent to gain.

Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebecca’s lack of consent, same is manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job on April 18, 2001 that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money.  Her subsequent acts of confirming the payment or non-payment of fees and of verifying from different banks the issuance of the purported ORs presented to her by appellant in liquidating the amounts she entrusted to the latter, negates consent on Rebecca’s part.

With regard to the fifth element, it is clear from the facts that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

From these, it is clear that all the elements of theft are obtaining in this case.  The next crucial question now is, did appellant commit the crime with grave abuse of confidence as to make her liable for qualified theft?  “Under Article 310 of the [RPC], theft [becomes] qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence. x x x”[45]  The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.[46]

            Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer.  The latter position necessarily entails trust and confidence not only because of its nature and the functions attached to it, but also because appellant makes representations on behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties.  By reason of this, all matters essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant.  This included the safekeeping of important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebecca’s clients.  It is thus safe to assume that Rebecca relied on appellant when it comes to the affairs of her law office as to create a high degree of trust and confidence between them.  And as Rebecca trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any paper to evidence her receipt thereof.  She also allowed appellant to liquidate the expenses incurred through mere handwritten liquidation statements solely prepared by appellant and treated them, as well as the official receipts presented, as true and correct.  It thus becomes clear that it is because of the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence.  Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebecca’s allegations against her as well as the evidence supporting the same since what she advanced during trial were mere bare denials.  The Court has “oft pronounced that x x x denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.”[47] The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebecca’s confidence in her when she appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose.  The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence.  Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft.

            With respect to appellant’s contention that she could not have taken the alleged amount of money until May 8, 2001 since her employment with Rebecca lasted only until April 18, 2001, same fails to impress.  The Information alleged that the crime was committed “during the period from October 2000 to May, 2001”.  The word “during” simply means “at some point in the course of”[48] or “throughout the course of a period of time”[49] from October 2000 to May 8, 2001.  In the Information, “during” should therefore be understood to mean at some point from October 2000 to May 8, 2001, and not always until May 8, 2001.  Further, the period alleged in the Information, which is from October 2000 to May 8, 2001 is not distant or far removed from the actual period of the commission of the offense, which is from October 2000 to April 17, 2001. 

            As to the total amount unlawfully taken by appellant, we hold that the sum ofP407,711.68 which the trial court came up with has no basis.  After a thorough review of the records, we find as correct instead the result of the detailed computation made by the CA as to the total amount of money that appellant stole or padded as expenses, which is only P248, 447.75.

The Proper Penalty

            Article 310 of the RPC provides that the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Art. 309. Under paragraph 1, Art. 309 of the RPC, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is to be imposed if the value of the thing stolen is more thanP12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00.  But if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in said paragraph [prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods], and one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.  In such cases and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the RPC, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.  Here, the amount stolen by appellant, as correctly found by the CA, is P248,447.75.   Since the said amount exceeds P22,000.00, “the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.”[50] To determine the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 must be deducted from the said amount and the difference should then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less thanP10,000.00.  Hence, we have twenty-two (22) years that should be added to the basic penalty.  However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years.  Thus, had the appellant committed simple theft, the penalty for this case would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.  But as the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the proper penalty as correctly imposed by both lower courts is reclusion perpetua.[51] 

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