EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD
SAN LUIS, G.R.
No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6,
2007.
“x
x x.
Anent
the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a
Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved
a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.[53]
As
to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just.Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[54] (Emphasis
added)
This principle was
thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect
or cast obloquy on the other.[56]
Likewise,
in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the
Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.[58] Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in
1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The
significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[59] In Garcia
v. Recio,[60] the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.[61]
In
the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the
historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of
the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces
its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis
added)
As
such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
Indeed,
when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.[64] Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners
cite Articles 15[65] and
17[66] of
the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in
the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[67] In Alonzo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a
law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part
of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so we are warned,
by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them.
x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian
defined justice as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due.That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.[69]
X
x x.”
