Sunday, December 31, 2023

To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagor’s name.

 "Validity of the mortgage


One of the requisites of a valid mortgage contract is ownership of the property being mortgaged.[77] Article 2085 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a mortgage contract:


Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:


(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation;


(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;


(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.


Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.


Applying this provision and having established that Marietta acquired no valid title or ownership from Enrique over the undivided portions of the property, this court finds that no valid mortgage was executed over the same property in favor of DBP. Without a valid mortgage, there was also no valid foreclosure sale and no transfer of ownership of petitioners’ undivided portions to DBP.


In other words, DBP acquired no right over the undivided portions since its predecessor-in-interest was not the owner and held no authority to convey the property.


As in sales, an exception to this rule is if the mortgagee is a “mortgagee in good faith.”[78] This exception was explained in Torbela v. Rosario:


Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.[79]


DBP claims that it is covered by this exception. DBP is mistaken. The exception applies when, at the time of the mortgage, the mortgagor has already obtained a certificate of title under his or her name.[80] It does not apply when, as in this case, the mortgagor had yet to register the property under her name.[81]


The facts show that DBP disregarded circumstances that should have aroused suspicion. For instance, at the time of the mortgage with DBP, Marietta only had a tax declaration under her name to show that she was the owner of the property. A tax declaration, by itself, neither proves ownership of property nor grants title. Yet, DBP agreed to accept the property as security even though Marietta’s claim was supported only by the tax declaration, and a certificate of title was yet to be issued under her name.


Granting that Marietta was in possession of the property, DBP should have inquired further as to Marietta’s rights over the property since no certificate of title was issued to her. DBP took the risks attendant to the absence of a certificate of title. It should bear the burden of checking the ownership as well as the validity of the deed of sale. This is despite the eventual issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Marietta.


The rule on “innocent purchasers or [mortgagees] for value” is applied more strictly when the purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank. Banks are expected to exercise higher degree of diligence in their dealings, including those involving lands. Banks may not rely simply on the face of the certificate of title.


Thus, in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,[82] this court ruled that:


Respondent . . . is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.[83] (Citations omitted)


DBP failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of banks when it accepted the unregistered property as security for Marietta’s loan despite circumstances that should have aroused its suspicion.


Citing Blanco v. Esquierdo, DBP argued that since it did not participate in the dealings between Enrique and Marietta, it should be considered as an innocent mortgagee for value.


Blanco involves an alleged widow of the deceased who adjudicated to herself the deceased’s property and thereafter mortgaged the property to DBP.[84] The brothers and sisters of the deceased filed an action for the annulment of the affidavit executed by the alleged widow and the cancellation of the certificate of title under her name.[85] The trial court ordered the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to the alleged widow, including the registration of the mortgage deed.[86]


In Blanco, this court declared that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith, thus:


The trial court, in the decision complained of, made no finding that the defendant mortgagee bank was a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Fructuosa Esquierdo. Indeed, there is nothing alleged in the complaint which may implicate said defendant mortgagee in the fraud, or justify a finding that it acted in bad faith. On the other hand, the certificate of title was in the name of the mortgagor Fructuosa Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to the defendant bank. Such being the case, the said defendant bank, as mortgagee, had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. (De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso, 95 Phil., 185; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4838; Joaquin vs. Madrid, et al., 106 Phil., 1060). Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto thru fraud.[87]


DBP’s reliance on Blanco is misplaced. In Blanco, the certificate of title had already been issued under the name of the mortgagor when the property was mortgaged to DBP. This is not the situation in this case.


To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagor’s name.


Therefore, the Regional Trial Court did not err in ordering the nullification of the documents of sale and mortgage. Contracts involving the sale or mortgage of unregistered property by a person who was not the owner or by an unauthorized person are void."


SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 193551. November 19, 2014 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/59904


“The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.”[76] It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of Deeds.

"We have consistently upheld the principle that “no one can give what one does not have.”[61] A seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer. [62]

This principle is incorporated in our Civil Code. It provides that in a contract of sale, the seller binds himself to transfer the ownership of the thing sold, thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

The seller cannot perform this obligation if he or she does not have a right to convey ownership of the thing. Hence, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.

Title or rights to a deceased person’s property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death.[63] The heirs’ rights become vested without need for them to be declared “heirs.”[64] Before the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.[65]

In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez’s property were automatically passed to her sons — Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922.[66] Since only Teodoro was survived by children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopez’s sons died.[67] The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.

Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorio’s one-fourth share, and Simplicio’s and Severino’s respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the property.[68]

The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Since Enrique’s right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.

Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided one-fourth share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is because Marietta obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no title or interest over the rest of the property that he could convey.

This is despite Enrique’s execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication wherein he declared himself to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Lopez. The affidavit of self-adjudication is invalid for the simple reason that it was false. At the time of its execution, Enrique’s siblings were still alive and entitled to the three-fourth undivided share of the property. The affidavit of self-adjudication did not have the effect of vesting upon Enrique ownership or rights to the property.

The issuance of the original certificate of title in favor of Marietta does not cure Enrique’s lack of title or authority to convey his co-owners’ portions of the property. Issuance of a certificate of title is not a grant of title over petitioners’ undivided portions of the property.[69] The physical certificate of title does not vest in a person ownership or right over a property.[70] It is merely an evidence of such ownership or right.[71]

Marietta could acquire valid title over the whole property if she were an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value purchases a property without any notice of defect or irregularity as to the right or interest of the seller.[72] He or she is without notice that another person holds claim to the property being purchased.[73]

As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of the seller.[74] He or she need not look “beyond what appears on the face [of the certificate of title].”[75] However, the ordinary buyer will not be considered an innocent purchaser for value if there is anything on the certificate of title that arouses suspicion, and the buyer failed to inquire or take steps to ensure that there is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the property being sold.

Marietta cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent purchasers for value because the circumstances do not make this available to her.

In this case, there was no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the property from Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still unregistered. What was available was only a tax declaration issued under the name of “Heirs of Lopez.”

“The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.”[76] It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of Deeds.

At the very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted Marietta to inquire further as to Enrique’s right over the property. She did not. Hence, she was not an innocent purchaser for value. She acquired no title over petitioners’ portions of the property."

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193551. November 19, 2014 ]
HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/59904




Thursday, November 30, 2023

We have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

 "Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.


Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from where petitioners'TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.


What makes petitioners' cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is part timberland,7 a finding not even once disputed by petitioners. It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated.8 A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found.9 Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.10 chanrobles virtual law library


All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA, affirming that of the trial court.


WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.


No pronouncement as to costs."


FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php


 


No court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered.



"We DENY.


Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140) is already indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year after the CA granted its reconstitution in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Citing the second paragraph of Section 31 of P.D. No. 15294 which reads:


The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "to all whom it may concern",


petitioners contend that the two courts below were without authority to annul TCT No. 2574 issued in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.


Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law. As correctly pointed out by the CA to which we are in full accord:


xxx the Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been within the operation of the Land Registration Act because of the irregularities attending the issuance of the reconstituted title. As found by the trial court:


TCT No. RT-40 (140) supposedly reconstituted from TCT no. 140 in the name of Florencio Mora consists of 2,394 hectares supposedly situated in Buhi, Camarines Sur. It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed only in 11 days, which according to Engr. Antonio Rodriguez was quite impossible considering the rugged terrain and the mountainous features of the area. Moreover, it covers timberland.


Significantly, from the exhibits presented by the plaintiff it can be seen that the resurvey plan (Exh. A) shows that the survey of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was based on TCT No. 140 and it covered an area of 23,944,635 square meters and appeared to have been surveyed on January 20, to January 31, 1953 or a period of 11 days. Exh. "B" shows that the area supposedly covered by TCT 2574 is within the timberland, Project 12, Block B, L.C. 646 and Project 19, Block ALC 761, Exh. "C", the official map of Legaspi City shows that the land covered by TCT 140, which was issued on the basis of the resurvey (Exh. "A") is a land situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, while the land covered by TCT No. 40 (140) is a vast tract of land in Buhi, Camarines Sur; that it further appears that the lots covered by TCT No. 40 (140) were supposedly registered in GRLO Sp. Proceedings No. 112 with an area of 23,944,635 square meters but records of the LRC revealed that GRLO records No. 112 refers to a land registration case in Iloilo, and not in Camarines Sur. Exh "D" also shows that Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of title covering a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur, and that plan RS-383-D (without the suffix capital letter D) involving Lots 1 and 2 situated in the Municipality of Calawag, Quezon, was the subject of Land Registration Case No. 322, GRLO Record No. 13804 with Maximina Zepeda as applicant.


The stench of anomaly became at once pervading when we consider the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The land practically covers the Municipality of Buhi and are being claimed and possessed by claimants, who appeared as intervenors in this case. The Venturanzas never materially and physically occupied the property because there are actual occupants and possessors. The Venturanzas only asserted ownership over the property in papers but not in physical possession.5


As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:


The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived its existence from RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which was a reconstituted title based on TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation. The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the OCT number or LRC Record Number.6


Corollarily, petitioners' argument that the Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the State is barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R has no leg to stand on.


Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's title over the property which has never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the Republic's action because there was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.


The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence in Special Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by him for the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26. The questions of ownership and whether or not the property or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were never put at issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived, nor the non-registrability of the timberland included in the area in question which constitute Republic's cause of action against the  herein petitioners, were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R."


FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php



Tuesday, October 31, 2023

Duties of lawyers as officers of the courts: "Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law."

 "As can be gleaned from the above excerpts, however, and as duly pointed out by Atty. Tadena, Afable made no declaration as to the alleged intimidation and participation of Atty. Tadena in the forceful opening of the condominium unit. In fact, nowhere in the aforequoted police reports, made on two (2) separate days, was Atty. Tadena's name even stated. In both accounts, Afable merely identified Dr. Leo Ortega as the perpetrator of the break-in, with the help of his man." He even mentioned the names of Teddy, Sally Ortega, and Maribel, as those who accompanied Dr. Leo Ortega inside the subject premises. But again, he made no statement as to the participation, if any, of Atty. Tadena therein. As such, the Court finds it rather difficult to reasonably admit as true Afable's allegations in his affidavit on Atty. Tadena's alleged indiscretions of threats and breaking into private property. If, indeed, Atty. Tadena scolded Afable and forcefully opened Zenaida's unit, he should have, at least, mentioned her name in the police reports he made on two separate days - on the day of the alleged incident on December 7, 2011 and on the day Zenaida arrived from Davao City on December 21, 2011 - and not merely on the Affidavit19 he executed on January 25, 2012, almost two (2) months after the event.


Thus, while we have, in the past, suspended lawyers who wrongfully asserted their clients' rights outside the bounds of the law,20 we cannot do so if the allegations against them are not satisfactorily proven by the complainants. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence21 or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.22 In the present case, it cannot be denied that complainant Zenaida failed to discharge that burden. As previously discussed, her bodyguard and witness curiously failed to declare Atty. Tadena's alleged misconduct in his police reports. Neither did he explain the reason for his omission. Apart from this, what cast more doubt on Zenaida's claims are the photographs she presented, supposedly showing Atty. Tadena in the act of breaking into her condominium unit.23 But these photographs are, at best, mere abstract illustrations that are extremely blurred. There is, therefore, an undeniable uncertainty surrounding the issues of whether Atty. Tadena, indeed, threatened Zenaida's bodyguard and whether she actually participated in the forceful opening of the subject condominium unit.


The Court is, however, one with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Tadena must, nonetheless, be admonished with warning that a repetition of the same acts will be dealt with more severely. What have been established by the records are the facts that Leonardo has been living separately from Zenaida since January 2011 and that he has, in fact, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in November 2011. These show that the parties have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was pending. Verily, said court had jurisdiction to consider and rule upon the property relations of the spouses which necessarily include the subject condominium unit. All questions, therefore, pertaining to the administration, possession, and ownership thereof had to be addressed before said court by way of filing a pleading and/or arguing before the judge and certainly not before the building administrator, police officer, or personal bodyguard in a condominium lobby. Accordingly, while it cannot be ruled with certainty that Atty. Tadena truly engaged in threats, intimidation, and the forcible entry into the subject property, the Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner when he held that at the very least, Atty. Tadena could have advised her client to file and make the proper representation before the court, instead of surreptitiously entering the premises.24


Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.25


In response to the Show Cause Resolution,26 dated March 25, 2019, against Attys. Tadena, Reginaldo and Cariaga requiring them to explain why they should not be held administratively liable for an apparent collusion, Atty. Tadena reiterated that the charge of collusion, that is prohibited by law, must relate to the grounds of annulment that the parties agree to use in the petition for nullity of marriage. But the subject e-mail communication between her and the counsels involved cannot constitute collusion because it was merely about a split of legal expenses duly allowed under the law. Atty. Tadena went on to add that the annulment case they filed, which has now attained finality, was duly approved by the Public Prosecutor to have no collusion and had, subsequently, gone through the rigorous trial in the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, she insists that she cannot be held administratively liable for collusion.27 The same arguments were interposed by Atty. Reginaldo in his response,28 while Atty. Cariaga has yet to comply with the Show Cause Resolution.


WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 27, 2017. Thus, Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena is hereby ADMONISHED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.


Further, the Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to INITIATE administrative proceedings against Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena, Atty. Eric Reginaldo and Atty. Neil F. Cariaga for their apparent collusion in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage of spouses Leonardo Ortega, Jr. and Zenaida Martin-Ortega.


Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.


SO ORDERED."


A.C. No. 12018 - ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS


A.C. No. 12018, January 29, 2020


ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.


https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2020januarydecisions.php?id=19


Saturday, September 30, 2023

Interests and attorney's fees

 "Aside from the principal amount of P248,449.63, petitioner also seeks recovery of interests thereon. As to computation of legal interest, the seminal ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals49 controls, to wit:


x x x x


II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:


1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.


2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.


3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.50


In the present case, respondent's obligation does not constitute a loan or forbearance of money. Hence, the principal amount owed to petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per annum to be computed from the time extrajudicial demand for payment was made on February 10, 199551 until finality of this decision. Thereafter, the amount due shall earn interest of 12% per annum computed from such finality until the same is fully paid.


The award of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.52 They may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other party.53


In the instant case, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees. First, Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code provides that attorney's fees may be recovered in cases where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Second, there is a stipulation in the subject invoices allowing petitioner to recover attorney's fees in case it is compelled to file an action to enforce collection. Third, Article 2208 (5) of the same Code provides that attorney's fees may also be recovered where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. In the instant case, it is established that respondent's refusal to satisfy petitioner's claim is unreasonable and is, in fact, without basis which compelled petitioner to resort to the instant case to recover what is due it.


The subject invoices stipulate that in case of judicial proceedings to enforce collection, respondent shall pay petitioner an amount equivalent to not less than 20% of the amount due for and as attorney's fees, in addition to costs of suit. However, the Court finds that the rate of 20% is excessive. Accordingly, the award for attorney's fees is reduced to a more reasonable rate of 10% of the total amount due.54


WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 24, 2003 and the Resolution of June 4, 2003 of the Court of Appeals as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 3, 1998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner: (1) the amount of Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Nine Pesos and Sixty-Three Centavos (P248,449.63) plus legal interest of 6% per annum from February 10, 1995 until this Decision becomes final and executory; (2) the legal interest of 12% per annum on the total amount due from such finality until fully paid; (3) 10% of the total amount due as and by way of attorney's fees, and (4) the costs of suit.


SO ORDERED."


ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html


Payment: Burden of Evidence

 "The next question is: whether the evidence presented by respondent supported its claim of payment.


First, the Court does not agree with the finding of the CA that petitioner no longer questioned the ruling of the RTC regarding the probative value of the duplicate copies of the invoices presented in evidence by petitioner, more specifically the six invoices marked as Exhibits "A-2," "A-5," "A-30," "A-31," "A-32" and "A-33," the original copies of which were not produced by respondent as part of its evidence. A perusal of petitioner's appeal brief shows that petitioner specifically raised the issue of whether the RTC erred in failing to accord evidentiary weight to the invoices presented in evidence by petitioner.


Moreover, the RTC correctly admitted Exhibits "A" to "A-33" in its Order dated August 1, 1997.32 Contrary to the claim of respondent that these pieces of evidence presented by petitioner to prove respondent's indebtedness are mere duplicate copies, the same are considered as original copies because they are carbon copies of the invoices which are in the possession of respondent and they may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the other copies.33 Hence, they serve as sufficient proof of the indebtedness of respondent.


Respondent's main evidence consists of 28 original copies of invoices showing the transactions that it had with petitioner. Stamped on the face of each original invoice are the words "PAID" and "AUDITED," duly initialed.


Are these original invoices sufficient to prove payment or, at the least, do the same raise a disputable presumption that respondent had indeed discharged its obligations to petitioner? The Court rules in the negative.


An invoice or bill is a commercial document issued by a seller to the buyer indicating the products, quantities and agreed prices for product or services the seller has provided the buyer.34 An invoice indicates the buyer must pay the seller according to the payment terms.35 From the point of view of a seller, an invoice is a sales invoice.36 From the point of view of a buyer, an invoice is a purchase invoice.37 The document indicates the buyer and seller, but the term "invoice" indicates money is owed or owing.38 The context of the term "invoice" is usually used to clarify its meaning, such as "We sent them an invoice" (they owe us money) or "We received an invoice from them" (we owe them money).39


In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation,40 "sales or commercial invoice" is defined as a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services. On the other hand, the same case defines "receipt" as a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services, and client or customer.41


Black's Law Dictionary42 defines an invoice as an itemized list of goods or services furnished by a seller to a buyer, usually specifying the price and terms of a sale; a bill of costs.


From the foregoing definitions, an invoice, in and by itself, and as opposed to a receipt, may not be considered evidence of payment. In addition, it does not mean that possession by a debtor of an invoice raises the presumption that it has already paid its obligation. An invoice is simply a list sent to a purchaser, factor, consignee, etc., containing the items, together with the prices and charges, of merchandise sent or to be sent to him; a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost or price of the things invoiced.43


A close examination of the invoices reveals that the words "PAID" and "AUDITED" were stamped on each of them. However, Adora, who is an employee of respondent in charge of all paid accounts, testified that the word "PAID" were stamped on the documents by the accounting department of respondent and not by the petitioner, and that the word "AUDITED" was stamped by respondent's auditor.44 This is not rebutted by respondent. Thus, the Court finds that the trial court committed a serious error in appreciating the evidence when it discredited petitioner’s claim that its purpose in sending the subject invoices to respondent was only to collect the latter's debt, not to evidence payment by the latter.


Furthermore, respondent's defense of payment is made more untenable by its failure to present any supporting evidence, such as official receipts or the testimony of its employee who actually paid or the one who had direct knowledge of the payment allegedly made in petitioner's favor, to prove that it had indeed paid its obligations to the latter. Respondent is a corporation engaged in the business of importation and local sale of duty-free sporting goods and similar products. It is presumed that it takes ordinary care of its concerns. In fact, as part of its evidence, respondent presented Official Receipt No. 5271545 for the amount of P4,472.00 which it paid as advance freight payment in favor of petitioner. Respondent also presented other copies of official receipts for payments it made to another company, PAC-Atlantic Lines (Philippines) Inc. for the amounts of P10,152.12 and P21,144.92, respectively.46 On this basis, it is difficult to see why respondent did not present any receipt or at least show that it had demanded an official receipt as proof of its payment with respect to the 34 transactions for which payment is being claimed by petitioner. Some of the amounts involved in said transactions were larger than the payments respondent made for which it was issued official receipts. Respondent's witness, Adora, failed to sufficiently explain why it did not have receipts in its possession to prove payment. The witness simply reasoned out that even in the absence of any receipt, she assumed that an account was paid once the accounting department of respondent forwarded to her the original invoice which was stamped "PAID".47 Such testimony, as well as the invoices which were stamped paid, are all self-serving and do not, by themselves, prove respondent's claim of payment.


Settled is the rule that in the course of trial in a civil case, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert the plaintiff’s prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the plaintiff.48 In the instant case, respondent's indebtedness to petitioner has been established. However, respondent failed to meet its burden of proving payment. Hence, judgment must be rendered in petitioner's favor."


ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html



Proof of Payment

 "At the outset, it should be noted that respondent's defense of payment was only raised during the testimony of its first witness, Adora Co (Adora) on August 7, 1997. In its Answer, respondent merely alleged that, except for a transaction it had with petitioner sometime in May 1994, it never engaged the services of the latter for the importation of various products between April and July 1994; and that for the goods it imported in May 1994, it had given petitioner the amount of P44,710.00 to answer for the customs duties and taxes due thereon. Respondent further asserted that the goods were seized by Customs authorities because of petitioner's alleged falsification of receipts covering the payment of customs duties and taxes on the said goods; that by reason of such seizure, the goods, which were kept in open air, lost their commercial value amounting to P200,000.00. Respondent claims that it was not able to recover the value of its seized property nor did petitioner return the amount of P44,710.00 given to it by respondent.


Moreover, it is significant to note that the only issues raised by respondent in its Pre-Trial Brief are the following:


(a) Has plaintiff (herein petitioner) been engaged by defendant (herein respondent) at any time prior to the filing of the present Complaint in the "importation of various products"?


(b) Is [petitioner] guilty of gross negligence on account of the seizure of [respondent's] products due to fake or spurious receipt of payment of customs duties and taxes?


(c) Is [petitioner] liable to refund [respondent] the amount of P44,710.00, received by the former from the latter for the payment of customs duties and taxes assessed on said imported goods?


(d) Is [petitioner] liable to reimburse the amount of P44,710.00 to [respondent] after the latter has paid the said amount to the Bureau of Customs for the release of the imported goods which [petitioner] undertook to release and deliver to [respondent's] customer in Makati City? and


(e) Is [petitioner] liable to defendant for damages and attorney's fees incurred by the latter due to [petitioner's] gross negligence?23


Nowhere in its Answer or in its Pre-Trial Brief did respondent raise the defense that it had already paid petitioner its obligations. As earlier mentioned, respondent denied having entered into the subject transactions for which petitioner seeks payment. To repeat, it was only during the testimony of respondent’s witness, Adora, that respondent claimed payment by presenting in evidence 28 original copies of the subject invoices which Adora claimed to have found two days before she was due to testify in court.


Preliminarily, it is necessary to discuss the effect of failure of petitioner to plead payment of its obligations.


Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:


Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.


In the present case, despite failure of the respondent to raise the defense of payment in its answer, the trial court cannot be faulted for admitting the testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent to prove payment, over the objection of petitioner. The trial court's action is in consonance with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to wit:


Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. - When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.


Interpreting Section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court prior to its amendment in 1997, the provisions of which were essentially the same as the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 10, the Court in Co Tiamco v. Diaz24held that:


x x x when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence.25


The above pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Ong v. Court of Appeals.26


In the instant case, there is no showing that the admission of respondent's evidence would unduly prejudice petitioner in maintaining his claims. Besides, petitioner was given ample opportunity to refute the evidence presented by respondent.


Furthermore, even if respondent's answer was not amended to conform to the evidence it presented, it does not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the issue of payment. Citing of Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation27 and Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc.,28 this Court held in Mercader v. Development Bank of the Philippines (Cebu Branch)[29]that:


The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings. x x x Although, the pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but also on the issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of the trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been actually amended. x x x Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair play had been met, as where the litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.30 (Emphasis supplied)


This principle is in consonance with the one enunciated by the Court in Sy v. Court of Appeals,31 that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial, the court may treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence."



ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html


Question of Law vs. Question of Fact

 "The Court shall deal first with the question of whether the issues raised by petitioner are factual.


An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.15 On the other hand, an issue is one of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.16


In the present case, the main issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether respondent, who is the debtor, has the burden of proving payment; and (2) whether the subject invoices prove such payment or at least raise a disputable presumption that payment has been made. Clearly, the first issue is not factual as it does not require calibration of evidence. However, the second issue is factual because it requires an examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.


The settled rule is that issues of fact are not proper subjects of a petition for review before this Court.17 Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.18 The Court finds that petitioner was able to demonstrate that the instant case falls under the fourth exception as will be discussed forthwith.


As to the first issue raised, the settled rule is that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.19 Even where the creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the onus rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment.20 The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.21 Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence – as distinct from the general burden of proof – shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.22


Since respondent claims that it had already paid petitioner for the services rendered by the latter, it follows that the former carries the burden of proving such payment."


ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html



Official Receipt is the best evidence to prove Payment.

 "We have reviewed the records of the case and we are more convinced with the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Rosita P. Lee (Lee), respondent’s Treasurer, explained that it is the company practice to prepare four copies of SALES INVOICES. Respondent’s delivery personnel would bring two copies of the Sales Invoices at the time of the delivery – the original and a duplicate copy. Both copies were supposed to be signed by petitioner’s representative. Respondent’s delivery personnel would leave the duplicate copy with petitioner and retain the original copy of the Sales Invoice. Whenever respondent made a collection, it would prepare a STATEMENT  OF ACCOUNT and it would send the Statement of Account, together with the original copies of the SALES INVOICES, to petitioner.8


Considering this practice, it is impossible for respondent to present the original or duplicate copies of the Sales Invoices which bore the signatures of petitioner’s representative because they are both in petitioner’s possession. The Sales Invoices accepted by the trial court, which bore the signatures of petitioner’s representatives, were retained by respondent and not delivered to petitioner because they were not yet due at the time the Statement of Account was prepared.


The Court also notes that the SALES INVOICES state: "PAYMENT NOT VALID WITHOUT OUR OFFICIAL RECEIPT."9 The SALES INVOICES are NOT EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT . They are only evidence of the RECEIPT OF THE GOODS. The BEST EVIDENCE TO PROVE PAYMENT of the goods is the OFFICIAL RECEIPT. Petitioner failed to present any official receipt to prove that it had already paid the goods to respondent.


We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that petitioner DID NOT OBJECT to the entries in the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT. Petitioner did not do anything despite the clear reminder in the Statements of Account which states: "IMPORTANT: If this statement does not agree with your record, please notify us at once."10 Petitioner remained SILENT for FOUR YEARS from the time it received the Statements of Account until the filing of the case against it. Petitioner did not even bother to respond to the DEMAND LETTER sent by respondent. Petitioner’s SILENCE is uncharacteristic of persons who have just been asked to pay an obligation to which they are not liable.11 In one case,12 the petitioner RECEIVED a STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT from the respondent WITHOUT PROTEST, and the petitioner DID NOT CONTROVERT the respondent’s demand letter. The Court applied ESTOPPEL IN PAIS where one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own SILENCE when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.13 We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s SILENCE for FOUR YEARS is TANTAMOUNT TO ADMISSION of the entries in the Statements of Account sent by respondent."


EL ORO ENGRAVER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EVERETT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 125267, February 18, 2008. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_125267_2008.html

Statement of Accounts and Estoppel

 "We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that petitioner did not object to the entries in the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT. Petitioner did not do anything despite the clear reminder in the Statements of Account which states: "IMPORTANT: If this statement does not agree with your record, please notify us at once."10 Petitioner remained silent for four years from the time it received the Statements of Account until the filing of the case against it. Petitioner did not even bother to respond to the demand letter sent by respondent. Petitioner’s silence is uncharacteristic of persons who have just been asked to pay an obligation to which they are not liable.11 In one case,12 the petitioner received a statement of account from the respondent without protest, and the petitioner did not controvert the respondent’s demand letter. The Court applied ESTOPPEL IN PAIS where one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.13 We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s SILENCE FOR FOUR YEARS is TANTAMOUNT TO ADMISSION of the entries in the Statements of Account sent by respondent.


The Court of Appeals did not even have to rely on estoppel. Petitioner RECEIVED the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT as well as the SALES INVOICES as evidenced by the handwritten statement of petitioner’s representative, Alicia Alcaraz,14 who wrote the words "rec’d original" on the Statements of Account.15 Lee testified:


Atty. Meris:


Do you have a proof that the originals of the said invoices are already in the hands of the defendant?


Witness:


Yes, we have given them the statements of accounts which together with the originals as shown by the signature of their employee Alicia Alcaras.


x x x x


Atty. Meris:


(to witness)


How do you know that this is the signature of Miss Alcaras?


Witness:


Because I am very familiar with her signature as I have been receiving communications with her frequently during the time that we are having business transaction with the defendant.16


Petitioner failed to rebut that it received the Statements of Accounts and the Sales Invoices attached to them. In sum, respondent PROVED during the trial that it DELIVERED d the goods, and that it had NOT RECEIVED PAYMENT for the goods so delivered.


In its Answer With Counterclaim,17 petitioner alleged that all its purchases from respondent had already been fully paid and satisfied. Petitioner alleged:


and by way of SPECIAL and AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, defendant avers:


4. That there is no cause of action;


5. That the claim is unenforceable under the statute of fraud;


6. That the claim or demand had been paid, waived and/or otherwise extinguished;


7. That in the alternative, granting arguendo that the defendant received some of the said construction materials, the same are defective and not suitable for the purpose of which they have been purchased and/or some of these materials were not received by the defendant corporation. Consequently, it should not be obliged to pay for the same[.]


x x x x18


During the trial, petitioner did not show which of the materials covered by the Sales Invoices had been paid, waived or extinguished, which materials were defective, and which materials were not received. Petitioner only insisted that it had no obligation to respondent. Thus, petitioner FAILED TO PROVE  that it did not receive the goods, or that it already paid respondent for the goods delivered.


WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 29 February 1996 Decision and 13 June 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44782. Costs against petitioner.


SO ORDERED."


EL ORO ENGRAVER CORPRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EVERETT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 125267, February 18, 2008. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_125267_2008.html

Monday, July 31, 2023

Robbery with Homicide

 "Time and time again, this Court has ruled that when conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all.26 As shown above, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that conspiracy had attended the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide. Despite the protestations of appellant that he did not conspire to rob and kill, but only to rob, the victim, we hold that appellant is liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.


The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.27


The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements are present in the case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of Aragon’s uncle;28 took the victim’s wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces of jewelry amounting to P67,000;29 and, in the course of the robbery, stabbed and killed the victim.


As aforesaid, whenever a homicide is committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the asportation will be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did not all actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears that those who did not do so endeavored to prevent the killing.30


Appellant, upon hearing the groaning emanating from the bedroom, did not do anything to check on what was happening. Thinking that his cohorts were stabbing the victim,31 appellant simply allowed them to finish their dastardly deed. He hid for two years – first in the house of his grandmother32 and, later on, in that of his mother.33 On January 6, 1994, a barangay official apprehended and brought him to the Mandaluyong jail.34


It is therefore clear that appellant did not do anything to prevent his co-conspirators from stabbing and ultimately killing the victim. When he left the scene of the crime; he could have gone to the police to report the crime, but he hid and tried to escape the arm of the law. Because he did not do anything to prevent the homicide, he is therefore equally guilty of robbery with homicide.


We affirm the awards of actual damages which were duly proven.


WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.


SO ORDERED."



G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html


Conspiracy

 "The second paragraph of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code defines conspiracy, as follows:


"A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."


The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.12"



G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html


Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide

 "When conspiracy is proven in a case of robbery with homicide, all those who participated in the robbery will be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if not all of them actually took part in the homicide perpetrated by just one of them on the occasion or as a consequence of the asportation."



G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html


Friday, June 30, 2023

If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

 "Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?


It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.


Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29


Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:


[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.


The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner ₱25,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.


We affirm the Regional Trial Court.


The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.


IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.


SO ORDERED."


G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009


CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_159310_2009.html


Adulterous cohabitation

 "Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply."


G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009


CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_159310_2009.html


Wednesday, May 31, 2023

Secondary evidence


Rule 130, Section 5, etc. 

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE


2. Secondary Evidence


Section 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (5a)


Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he or she must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he or she fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (6a)


Section 7. Summaries. - When the contents of documents, records, photographs, or numerous accounts are voluminous and cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole, the contents of such evidence may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.


The originals shall be available for examination or copying, or both, by the adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court. (n)


Section 8. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (7)


Section 9. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (8)

Original document rule


Rule 130

A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC

RULE 130

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE


1. Original Document Rule


Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:


(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;


(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures;


(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;


(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and


(e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)


Section 4. Original of document. —


(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."


(b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.


(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a)

What need not be proved

 RULE 129

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED


Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)


Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.


Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall hear the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter.


Before judgment or on appeal, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (3a)


Section 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, oral or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made.


A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE



Sunday, April 30, 2023

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.



"Second Issue: Prescription


The instant action for reconveyance, restitution, and accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by the decedent during his lifetime, more particularly for conspiring with the main defendants to prejudice the Republic. An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription, as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.[17] Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:

“Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.”

The intendment of the foregoing constitutional provision -- exempting actions to recover ill-gotten wealth from the operation of the general rules of prescription -- presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances and the primordial state interests involved in cases of such nature.


From the preceding discussion, it is clear that any action involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties against Licaros or his transferees, may not be deemed to have prescribed. The language of the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal. Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions denying, for lack of merit, petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss."


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 157438. October 18, 2004 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS; NAMELY, CONCEPCION B. LICAROS AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, PETITIONERS, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.govph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/46207


Cause of action



"A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect and not to violate that right; and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[12]


The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly and unequivocally outlines its cause of action against Defendant Licaros as follows:

“The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described below, all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of the plaintiff and the Filipino people.


x x x x x x x x x


“Former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, now deceased, had facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets x x x General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC) worth over P688-Million at that time, to favor the Marcoses and the Lucio Tan group who acquired said GBTC’s assets for a measly sum of P500,000.00. Hence, his Estate represented by his heirs must be impleaded as a party defendant for the purpose of obtaining complete relief.”[13]

The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that Licaros, during his lifetime, had conspired with the main defendants -- particularly former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Lucio Tan and Philippine National Bank President Panfilo O. Domingo -- in facilitating the allegedly questionable transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan.


This charge of “conspiracy” casts a wide net, sufficiently extensive to include all acts and all incidents incidental, related to or arising from the charge of systematic plunder and pillage against the main defendants in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0005. The assailed role of Licaros as Central Bank governor in the questioned GBTC deal is not excluded therefrom. If proven, the allegation of conspiracy may make him liable with his co-defendants.


The alleged conspiracy to defraud the Republic put the case against the Estate/Heirs of Licaros squarely under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Said the Court:

“Under Section 2 of the President’s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding the ‘Funds, Moneys, Assets and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, their close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or Nominees’ whether civil or criminal are lodged with the ‘exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan’ and

necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to the review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.”[14] (Emphasis supplied). "


THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 157438. October 18, 2004 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS; NAMELY, CONCEPCION B. LICAROS AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, PETITIONERS, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/46207


Friday, March 31, 2023

Citizenship requirement for elective officials


"In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations."


Source  - 

GR No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jun1996/gr_120295_1996.html

 

Saturday, March 11, 2023

Unlawful possession of firearm


"Unlawful possession of firearm is punishable under Section 28 (a), Article V of REPUBLIC ACT 10591, otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT" which provides that:

"SEC. 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:

"(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm." 

The elements of Unlawful Possession of Firearm were enumerated and explained by the Court in the case of CASTIL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 253930, JULY 13, 2022, where the Supreme Court speaking through Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando stated that:

"Section 28 penalizes unlawful possession of a firearm. The elements of the offense are: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and, (b) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. If the firearm is loaded with ammunition, the penalty is increased one degree higher. xxx

"Under contention is the second element of lack of license. The CA ruled that petitioner's JUDICIAL ADMISSION proves the existence of the second element. Petitioner, however, contends that his admission is insufficient for a conviction as there is a need for the prosecution to submit a NEGATIVE CERTIFICATION from the PNP to prove the second element.

"The Court agrees with the CA. Petitioner's own JUDICIAL ADMISSION of his lack of license to carry a firearm is SUFFICIENT to establish the second element of the crime.

"To be clear, there is no exact way of proving the second element of Illegal Possession of Firearms. What matters is that the courts, including this Court, are convinced that the element is proven beyond reasonable doubt regardless of the kind of evidence offered to prove it. Notably, RA 10591 and case law do not provide for specific modes to prove the element of lack of license to carry a firearm.

"Hence, as proof of the second element, the Court usually accepts the presentation of a certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP showing that the accused is not a licensed or registered holder of a firearm, or the testimony to that effect of a representative therefrom.

... There is no exact way to prove the element of lack of corresponding license to possess or carry firearm and the "Negative Certification" from the FEO is not the only acceptable evidence to prove lack of corresponding license for the firearm. The testimony of the officer from the said office may be accepted to support the second element of lack of license..."


Source - 

https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/03/10/legal-advice/illegal-possession-of-firearm/1882085

Saturday, February 11, 2023

On "premature campaigning" under the automated election system



"xxx.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified."1

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:

SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about one’s being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

x x x x

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

x x x

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states —

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED."


EN BANC
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J.: