We removed items that refer to the personal identities of the parties and the like.
“X
X X.
1. Basically, the
defenses of the aforenamed co-respondents consist of (a) general denial
and (b) passing and tossing of criminal and civil liabilities to their lead
respondents Xxx Xxx and Xxx Xxx . We hereby rebut their allegations
one by one hereinbelow.
2. Before
proceeding any further, it should be noted that the general defense of DENIAL,
like the defense of alibi, is weak, unbelievable and incredible in the light of
the concrete, convincing and detailed allegations and positive identification,
thus:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AGRIPINO GUEVARRA y MULINGTAPANG alias
“BOY DUNGGOL”, G.R. No. 182192, October 29, 2008,
X x x.
Denial is inherently a weak
defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest
of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.[1] Denial and alibi must be proved by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[2] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for
the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must likewise prove that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[3]
X x x.
TOMMY FERRER vs.
PEOPLE OF THE HILIPPINES, GR No. 143487, February 22, 2006.
X x x.
Against the positive identification of Ricardo,
Roque and Leonila, all that petitioner could interpose as defense is denial,
which, under settled jurisprudence, could not prevail over the positive
testimony of witnesses.[4][83]
Denial is intrinsically a weak defense which must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[5][84]
To be sure, it is negative, self-serving evidence that cannot be given
evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[6][85]
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of pxxx cution
witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably
deserve more credence and evidentiary weight.[7][86]
X x x.
X x x.
3.
Under
the Corporation Code (BP Blg. 68), unless otherwise provided in the Code, “the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised,
all business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and
held by the board of directors or trustees.” (Sec. 23).
4. Sec. 31 (Liability
of directors, trustees or officers) of the Corporation Code provides that “directors or trustees x x x who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire
any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members
and other persons.”
5.
It
will be noted that Sec. 45 (ultra vires
acts of Corporations) of the said
Code provides that “no corporation under this Code shall possess or exercise
any corporate powers except those conferred by this Code or by its articles of
incorporation and except such as are necessary or incidental to the exercise of
the powers so conferred.” An example of an ultra
vires (and criminal) act is the public solicitation of investments without
complying with the Revised Securities Act.
6. Sec. 144 (violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code provides that “violations
of any of the provisions of this Code or its amendments not otherwise
specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not less than one
thousand (P1, 000.00) pesos but not more than ten thousand (P10, 000.00) pesos
or by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days but not more than five
(5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the violation is committed
by a corporation, the same may, after notice and hearing, be dissolved in
appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission: x x x.”
7.
In the case of MAM Realty Dev.
Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 114787, June 2, 1995, officers or directors of a
corporation are personally liable in the following instances:
7.1.
When directors and trustees or in appropriate cases, the officers of a
corporation:
7.2.
When they vote for a assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation;
7.3.
When they act is bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the
corporate affairs;
7.4.
When they are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the
corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons. (Sec. 31, Corp. Code);
7.5.
When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered
stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary his written objection thereto. (Sec. 65, Corp. Code);
7.6.
When a director, trustee, or officer has contractually agreed or
stipulation to hold himself personally and solidarity liable with the
corporation (De Asis & Co., Inc. vs.
CA, 136 SCRA 599).
7.7.
When a director, trustee, or officer is made by specific provision of
law, personally liable for his corporate action. (Exemplified in Art. 144, Corp. Code, P.D. No. 115 (Trust receipts Law).
8. Stockholders who are actively engaged in
the management or operation of the business or affairs of a "close
corporation" shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the
corporation has obtained a reasonably adequate liability insurance (Naguiat
v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564).
9. The
complainants submit that CONSPIRACY existed among the respondents to defraud
them. In the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 13 (1995), it was held, thus:
“There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken
together, however, the evidence thereof must reasonably be strong enough to
show a community of criminal design.”
9.1.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy need
not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of all
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. RALPHY ALCANTARA,
ET AL, G.R. Nos. 112858-59, March 6, 1996).
X X X.”
1. It must be stressed that LOAN per se does not exempt a criminal from
indictment for estafa so long as it can be proved, as is the factual mileu
in the instant case, that the motive behind such a transaction was deceit,
swindling and malice on the part of the debtor/respondent. We repeat
hereinbelow what we had argued in our previous pleadings before this Honorable
Office. In the case of LIBERATA
AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO
AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, it was held that in the pxxx cution
for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,[8]
it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant; and
that false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induces the offended party to part with his money. Thus:
“x x x.
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false
pretenses or concealment, are the following – (a) that there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c) That the offended party must
have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.[9]
In the pxxx cution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
RPC,[10]
it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at
least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.
The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the absence of such requisite, any
subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might
appear, cannot serve as basis for pxxx cution for estafa under the said
provision.[11]
In the case at bar, the records
would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the
unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners’
banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon,
Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment
to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs
correspond to the purchase cost of the machineries and equipment that
co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as evidenced by the Sales Invoices
presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and
secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In
fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendor-purchaser
business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as
depositor-depository. It is likewise established that petitioners
employed deceit when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the
aforementioned machineries and equipment through down payments paid either in
cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in
PSI’s name with interest thereon. It was
later found out that petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks
under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance
of CCTDs to PSI was not recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy
Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank of the Philippines even corroborated
this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony during the trial. [12]
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations were outright
distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing
PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever
made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as represented by the subject
CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the
machineries. PSI was an innocent victim
of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted
in its pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts’ finding that
petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Documents.
X x x.”
Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code on deceit/swindling (estafa) provides any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned therein shall be punished by the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years; provided
that the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating
or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
(a)
By pretending to
have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended
party may deem
proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
(b)
By post-dating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic
Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
10.1.
Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
three times such value, shall be imposed upon “any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any
fictitious contract.”
10.2. Article 318 (other
deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by “any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter.”
In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P.
MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31,
2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged
that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia
(Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of
false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make
and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all
having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing
fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks
were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on
reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay
the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the
aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
X
x x.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).
– Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of
the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds
shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the
payee.[13]
In the said case, the pxxx cution sufficiently established appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. According to
Solis’s clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to him the 10
postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5, 000.00 or a
total of P50, 000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis
would not have given P50, 000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for
her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks.
These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce
Solis to part with his cash. However,
when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank
because the account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was
received by appellant’s husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks
had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action
from Solis. Appellant did not comply
with the demand nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks
within three days from receipt of notice.
This gave rise to a prima facie
evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph
2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
X x x.
In the case of BETTY GABIONZA
AND ISABELITA TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, LUKE ROXAS AND EVELYN
NOLASCO, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. No. 161057, September 12, 2008], it was held that “to be
clear, it is possible to hold the borrower in a money market placement liable
for estafa if the creditor was induced to extend a loan upon the false or
fraudulent misrepresentations of the borrower”; that “such estafa is one by means of deceit”; that
“the borrower would not be generally liable for estafa through misappropriation
if he or she fails to repay the loan, since the liability in such instance is
ordinarily civil in nature”, except when deceit is present, of course. Thus:
“x x x.
We
can thus conclude that the DOJ Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) has been
committed against petitioners. Does it also establish a prima facie finding that there has been a violation of the then-Revised Securities
Act, specifically Section 4 in relation to Section 56 thereof?
Section
4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 176, or the Revised Securities Act, generally requires
the registration of securities and prohibits the sale or distribution of
unregistered securities.[29] The DOJ extensively concluded that private respondents
are liable for violating such prohibition against the sale of unregistered
securities:
Respondents Roxas and Nolasco do not dispute that in 1998, ASB borrowed
funds about 700 individual investors amounting to close to P4 billion, on
recurring, short-term basis, usually 30 or 45 days, promising high interest
yields, issuing therefore mere postdate checks. Under the circumstances, the
checks assumed the character of "evidences of indebtedness," which
are among the "securities" mentioned under the Revised Securities
Act. The term "securities" embodies a flexible rather than static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of
profits (69 Am Jur 2d, p. 604). Thus, it has been held that checks of a debtor
received and held by the lender also are evidences of indebtedness and
therefore "securities" under the Act, where the debtor agreed to pay
interest on a monthly basis so long as the principal checks remained uncashed,
it being said that such principal extent as would have promissory notes payable
on demand (Id., p. 606, citing Untied States v. Attaway (DC La) 211 F
Supp 682). In the instant case, the checks were issued by ASB in lieu of the
securities enumerated under the Revised Securities Act in a clever attempt, or
so they thought, to take the case out of the purview of the law, which requires
prior license to sell or deal in securities and registration thereof. The scheme
was to designed to circumvent the law. Checks constitute mere substitutes for
cash if so issued in payment of obligations in the ordinary course of business
transactions. But when they are issued in exchange for a big number of
individual non-personalized loans solicited from the public, numbering about
700 in this case, the checks cease to be such. In such a circumstance, the
checks assume the character of evidences of indebtedness. This is especially so
where the individual loans were not evidenced by appropriate debt instruments,
such as promissory notes, loan agreements, etc., as in this case. Purportedly,
the postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the indebtedness. A
different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme, whereby companies
without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot be countenanced.
The subsequent repeal of the Revised Securities Act does not spare respondents
Roxas and Nolasco from pxxx cution thereunder, since the repealing law,
Republic Act No. 8799 known as the "Securities Regulation Code,"
continues to punish the same offense (see Section 8 in relation to Section 73,
R.A. No. 8799).[30]
The Court of Appeals however
ruled that the postdated checks issued by ASBHI did not constitute a security under
the Revised Securities Act. To support this conclusion, it cited the general
definition of a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable
on demand," and took cognizance of the fact that "the issuance of
checks for the purpose of securing a loan to finance the activities of the
corporation is well within the ambit of a valid corporate act" to note
that a corporation does not need prior registration with the SEC in order to be
able to issue a check, which is a corporate prerogative.
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI's activities were actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been permitted at all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain pxxx cution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing out that the definition of "securities" set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes "commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another."[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor's existing investment with ASBHI, they most definitely take on the attributes of traditional stocks.
This analysis is highly myopic and ignorant of the bigger picture. It is one thing for a corporation to issue checks to satisfy isolated individual obligations, and another for a corporation to execute an elaborate scheme where it would comport itself to the public as a pseudo-investment house and issue postdated checks instead of stocks or traditional securities to evidence the investments of its patrons. The Revised Securities Act was geared towards maintaining the stability of the national investment market against activities such as those apparently engaged in by ASBHI. As the DOJ Resolution noted, ASBHI adopted this scheme in an attempt to circumvent the Revised Securities Act, which requires a prior license to sell or deal in securities. After all, if ASBHI's activities were actually regulated by the SEC, it is hardly likely that the design it chose to employ would have been permitted at all.
But was ASBHI able to successfully evade the requirements under the Revised Securities Act? As found by the DOJ, there is ultimately a prima facie case that can at the very least sustain pxxx cution of private respondents under that law. The DOJ Resolution is persuasive in citing American authorities which countenance a flexible definition of securities. Moreover, it bears pointing out that the definition of "securities" set forth in Section 2 of the Revised Securities Act includes "commercial papers evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity, irrespective of maturity, issued, endorsed, sold, transferred or in any manner conveyed to another."[31] A check is a commercial paper evidencing indebtedness of any person, financial or non-financial entity. Since the checks in this case were generally rolled over to augment the creditor's existing investment with ASBHI, they most definitely take on the attributes of traditional stocks.
We should be clear that the
question of whether the subject checks fall within the classification of
securities under the Revised Securities Act may still be the subject of debate,
but at the very least, the DOJ Resolution has established a prima facie case for pxxx cuting private respondents for such offense. The thorough
determination of such issue is best left to a full-blown trial of the merits,
where private respondents are free to dispute the theories set forth in the DOJ
Resolution. It is clear error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss
such finding so perfunctorily and on such flimsy grounds that do not consider
the grave consequences. After all, as the DOJ Resolution correctly pointed out:
"[T]he postdated checks themselves serve as the evidences of the
indebtedness. A different rule would open the floodgates for a similar scheme,
whereby companies without prior license or authority from the SEC. This cannot
be countenanced."[32]
This conclusion quells the
stance of the Court of Appeals that the unfortunate events befalling
petitioners were ultimately benign, not malevolent, a consequence of the
economic crisis that beset the Philippines during that era.[33] That conclusion would be agreeable only if it were
undisputed that the activities of ASBHI are legal in the first place, but the
DOJ puts forth a legitimate theory that the entire modus operandi of ASBHI is illegal under the Revised Securities Act and if that were
so, the impact of the Asian economic crisis would not obviate the criminal
liability of private respondents.
X x x.
It is ineluctable that the DOJ Resolution established a prima facie case for violation of Article 315
(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and Sections 4 in relation to 56 of the
Revised Securities Act. X x x
X x x.”
2.
IN FINE, respondents must be indicted at the
least for the felony of ordinary/regular
ESTAFA under Art. 315, Rev. Penal Code, if and when this Department does
not see the viability of an indictment for SYNDICATED ESTAFA, in the interest
of justice, plus other violations as may
be proved in the course of the preliminary investigation and as alleged in
the Complaint.
NOTHING FOLLOWS
X x x.
[1] People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006 , 510 SCRA
642, 661-662.
[2] Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil.
171, 184 (2001); People v. Lustre,
386 Phil. 390, 400 (2000).
[3] Id.
[4][83] People
v. Macalaba, 443 Phil. 565, 578 (2003).
[5][84] People
v. Alagon, 382 Phil. 179, 192 (2000).
[6][85] People
v. Matore, 436 Phil 421, 430 (2002).
[8]
Art.
315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below . . .
x
x x
2. By means of any of the following
false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
[9]
R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No.
156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 393.
[10]
Art.
315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below . . .
x
x x
2. By means of any of the following
false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
[11]
Aricheta v. People, G.R. No. 172500,
September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 695, 704.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 184-187.
[13]
Cajigas v. People,
G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
