On the second issue, the Court reiterates the rule, even in expropriation cases, that “questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.”[5]
In another expropriation case, it was stressed that “only questions of law may be raised in petitions to review decisions of the CA filed before this Court. The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive. They cannot be reviewed by this Court, save only in the following circumstances: (1) when the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case in making its findings, which are further contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the CA's findings of fact, supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record.”[6]
In this case, the petitioner has failed to show that the present case falls under any of the aforecited exceptions. An evaluation of the facts and evidence presented does not persuade the Court to deviate from the findings of fact of the two courts below. The lower courts properly appreciated the evidence submitted by both parties as regards the true value of the expropriated lots at the time of taking.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use. It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the State’s existence; it is a power the State cannot do without. As an inherent power, it does not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights – that part of the Constitution whose provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads "No private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.") provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be "just" as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance – property is not to be taken for public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of the individual is the reason for the Bill of Rights’ being; to keep the exercise of the powers of government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.
The concept of "just compensation" is not new to Philippine constitutional law, but is not original to the
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[7]
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 (An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastracture Projects and for Other Purposes) provides, as follows:
Section 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvement on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) Th[e] size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
Regarding the findings of a committee, it has been written that:
The duty of the court in considering the commissioners’ report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and to fulfill its duty in this respect, the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case may require. Rule 67, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that the trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners’ report in any of the following ways: (1) it may accept the same and render judgment therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it may [a] recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or [b] set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.[8] [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the Report reads as follows:
In order to arrive at a fair and reasonable appraisal of the just compensation of the properties in question to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants, the committee did not confine itself with the documents submitted to the court by both parties, but made verifications from the proper offices of Magalang, Mabalacat and Angeles City and on two (2) instances conducted ocular inspection of the premises in question to satisfy itself of the actual condition/situation of the subject premises.
From the ocular inspection, the committee found out that:
The subject matter of the instant case are parcels of land affected by the impending relocation of the North Expressway, Angeles City Entry/Exit and the widening/expansion along the said expressway, subject matter of this case, located in the City of Angeles, Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga, more particularly situated within the vicinity of the North Expressway and Provincial Road leading to Magalang, Pampanga as well as Don Bonifacio Blvd.
Having inspected the properties and investigated the local market conditions, and having given consideration to the extent, description of properties, character, location, identification, neighborhood data, facilities and utilities, progression/regression, increasing and diminishing returns, highest and best use of its properties, and varying development in the immediate vicinity of each propert[y], the two (2) commissioners in the persons of the City Assessor of Angeles City, Mr. Alberto Y. Murillo, and the licensed real estate broker, Mr. Rommel Suarez, submitted to the chairperson, their respective appraisal, xxx.
The Court affirms the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Report is founded on evidence. The uniform findings of fact upon the question of just compensation reached by the CA and the RTC are entitled to the greatest respect. They are binding on the Court in the absence of a strong showing by the petitioner that the courts below erred in appreciating the established facts and in drawing inferences from such facts.[9]
This Court would like to stress that the petitioner is silent on the undisputed fact that no less than its witness, Cleofe Umlas, Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, testified and certified that the prevailing fair market value of land located at Pulung Maragul,
The petitioner’s tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation and the deeds of sale it presented are not the only proof of the fair value of properties. Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis of “just compensation” in expropriation cases.[10]
Various factors come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values assigned by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of thepoblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts or other crops. Very often land described as ‘cogonal’ has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.[11]
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the CA decision except on the point that it is immediately executory. Any disposition in this case becomes executory only after its finality.
