Friday, December 9, 2011

Entrapment vs. Instigation; explained - G.R. No. 173485

G.R. No. 173485

"x x x.


Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we shall first distinguish between entrapment and instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-principals themselves.[23]

Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.[24]

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very relevant in anti-narcotics operations. It has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders.[25] This Court, elaborating on the concept of a buy-bust operation within the context of entrapment and instigation, has said:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause. x x x.[26]

Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense.[27] Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu.

We find, however, that Legaspi’s defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up:

(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or

(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or

(3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission. [28]

The foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police officer.[29]

In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-bust operation to test the veracity of the report and to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell 200.00 worth of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a “scorer”; and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.[30]

The RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers, especially since Legaspi failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against her.[31] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust operation team were inspired by improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.[32]

Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.[33] In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.[34] Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present concurrently. Besides, this Court has consistently held that:

[B]are denials are weak forms of defenses, especially in this case where the accused-appellant’s testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The uncorroborated denial by the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of the arresting officer and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the arresting team and the other prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, prevaricating just to cause damnation to him. Thus, their affirmative statements proving accused-appellant’s culpability must be respected and must perforce prevail.[35]

x x x."