Friday, July 20, 2012

Whether the CIAC had jurisdiction to order the reformation of the Water Supply Contract - G.R. No. 172438

G.R. No. 172438

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Whether the CIAC had jurisdiction to order the reformation of the Water Supply Contract                             
         
The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law.[50] It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties to the dispute, nor can it be expanded or diminished by stipulation or agreement. [51] The text of Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008 is broad enough to cover any dispute arising from, or connected with, construction contracts, whether these involve mere contractual money claims or execution of the works. This jurisdiction cannot be altered by stipulations restricting the nature of construction disputes, appointing another arbitral body, or making that body’s decision final and binding.[52]

Thus, unless specifically excluded, all incidents and matters relating to construction contracts are deemed to be within the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Based on the previously cited provision outlining the CIAC’s jurisdiction, it is clear that with regard to contracts over which it has jurisdiction, the only matters that have been excluded by law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships, which continue to be governed by the Labor Code of the Philippines. Moreover, this is consistent with the policy against split jurisdiction.

In fact, in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[53] it was held that the CIAC had jurisdiction over the dispute, and not the contract. Therefore, even if the contract preceded the existence of the CIAC, since the dispute arose when the CIAC had already been constituted, the arbitral board was exercising current, and not retroactive, jurisdiction. In the same case, it was held that as long as the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute to the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law.

This is consistent with the principle that when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction, as stated iPeña v. Government Service Insurance System.[54]

In Peña, the Court held that although the complaint for specific performance, annulment of mortgage, and damages filed by the petitioner against the respondent included title to, possession of, or interest in, real estate, it was well within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB), a quasi-judicial body, as it involved a claim against the subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

          This case was later cited in Badillo v. Court of Appeals,[55] where the Court concluded that the HLURB had jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of title. The Court also held that courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion, such as that of the HLURB, the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It was further pointed out that the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends on the provisions of the statute creating such agency.
The ponencia further quoted from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:[56]
         The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.

            In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.

In Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao,[57] the Court ruled that the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues involving the same subject matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property, since the DENR assumed jurisdiction over the lot in question, pursuant to its mandate.

          In National Housing Authority v. First United Constructors Corporation,[58] the Court held that there was no basis for the exclusion of claims for business losses from the jurisdiction of the CIAC because E.O. No. 1008 “excludes from the coverage of the law only those disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which are covered by the Labor Code, conveying an intention to encompass a broad range of arbitrable issues within the jurisdiction of CIAC.”[59] Section 4 provides that “(t)he jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to  x  x  x,” underscoring the expansive character of the CIAC’s jurisdiction. Very clearly, the CIAC has jurisdiction over a broad range of issues and claims arising from construction disputes, including but not limited to claims for unrealized profits and opportunity or business losses. What E.O. No. 1008 emphatically excludes is only disputes arising from employer-employee relationships.[60]

Where the law does not delineate, neither should we. Neither the provisions of the Civil Code on reformation of contracts nor the law creating the CIAC exclude the reformation of contracts from its jurisdiction. Jurisprudence further dictates that the grant of jurisdiction over related and incidental matters is implied by law. Therefore, because the CIAC has been held to have jurisdiction over the Contract, it follows that it has jurisdiction to order the reformation of the Contract as well.

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