"x x x.
In the present case, arson and fraud are two separate grounds based on two different sets of evidence, either of which can void the insurance claim of UMC. The absence of one does not necessarily result in the absence of the
other. Thus, on the allegation of fraud, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy provides that all the benefits under the policy shall be forfeited, if the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, to wit:
15. If the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting in his behalf to obtain any benefit under this Policy; or if the loss or damage be occasioned by the willful act, or with the connivance of the Insured, all the benefits under this Policy shall be forfeited.
In Uy Hu & Co. v. The Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd.,[32] the Court held that where a fire insurance policy provides that “if the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting on his behalf to obtain any benefit under this Policy,” and the evidence is conclusive that the proof of claim which the insured submitted was false and fraudulent both as to the kind, quality and amount of the goods and their value destroyed by the fire, such a proof of claim is a bar against the insured from recovering on the policy even for the amount of his actual loss.
In the present case, as proof of its loss of stocks in trade amounting to P50,000,000.00, UMC submitted its Sworn Statement of Formal Claim together with the following documents: (1) letters of credit and invoices for raw materials, Christmas lights and cartons purchased; (2) charges for assembling the Christmas lights; and (3) delivery receipts of the raw materials. However, the charges for assembling the Christmas lights and delivery receipts could not support its insurance claim. The Insurance Policy provides that CBIC agreed to insure UMC’s stocks in trade. UMC defined stock in trade as tangible personal property kept for sale or traffic.[33] Applying UMC’s definition, only the letters of credit and invoices for raw materials, Christmas lights and cartons may be considered.
The invoices, however, cannot be taken as genuine. The invoices reveal that the stocks in trade purchased for 1996 amounts to P20,000,000.00 which were purchased in one month. Thus, UMC needs to prove purchases amounting to P30,000,000.00 worth of stocks in trade for 1995 and prior years. However, in the Statement of Inventory it submitted to the BIR, which is considered an entry in official records,[34] UMC stated that it had no stocks in trade as of 31 December 1995. In its defense, UMC alleged that it did not include as stocks in trade the raw materials to be assembled as Christmas lights, which it had on 31 December 1995. However, as proof of its loss, UMC submitted invoices for raw materials, knowing that the insurance covers only stocks in trade.
Equally important, the invoices (Exhibits “P”-“DD”) from Fuze Industries Manufacturer Phils. were suspicious. The purchases, based on the invoices and without any supporting contract, amounted toP19,550,400.00 worth of Christmas lights from 20 January 1996 to 23 February 1996. The uncontroverted testimony of Cabrera revealed that there was no Fuze Industries Manufacturer Phils. located at “55 Mahinhin St., Teacher’s Village, Quezon City,” the business address appearing in the invoices and the records of the Department of Trade & Industry. Cabrera testified that:
A: Then we went personally to the address as I stated a while ago appearing in the record furnished by the United Merchants Corporation to the adjuster, and the adjuster in turn now, gave us our basis in conducting investigation, so we went to this place which according to the records, the address of this company but there was no office of this company.
Q: You mentioned Atty. Cabrera that you went to Diliman, Quezon City and discover the address indicated by the United Merchants as the place of business of Fuze Industries Manufacturer, Phils. was a residential place, what then did you do after determining that it was a residential place?
A: We went to the owner of the alleged company as appearing in the Department of Trade & Industry record, and as appearing a certain Chinese name Mr. Huang, and the address as appearing there is somewhere in Binondo. We went personally there together with the NBI Agent and I am with them when the subpoena was served to them, but a male person approached us and according to him, there was no Fuze Industries Manufacturer, Phils., company in that building sir.[35]
In Yu Ban Chuan v. Fieldmen’s Insurance, Co., Inc.,[36] the Court ruled that the submission of false invoices to the adjusters establishes a clear case of fraud and misrepresentation which voids the insurer’s liability as per condition of the policy. Their falsity is the best evidence of the fraudulent character of plaintiff’s claim.[37] In Verendia v. Court of Appeals,[38] where the insured presented a fraudulent lease contract to support his claim for insurance benefits, the Court held that by its false declaration, the insured forfeited all benefits under the policy provision similar to Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy in this case.
Furthermore, UMC’s Income Statement indicated that the purchases or costs of sales areP827,670.00 for 1995 and P1,109,190.00 for 1996 or a total of P1,936,860.00.[39] To corroborate this fact, Ebora testified that:
Q: Based on your 1995 purchases, how much were the purchases made in 1995?
A: The purchases made by United Merchants Corporation for the last year 1995 is P827,670.[00] sir
Q: And how about in 1994?
A: In 1994, it’s P608,986.00 sir.
Q: These purchases were made for the entire year of 1995 and 1994 respectively, am I correct?
A: Yes sir, for the year 1994 and 1995.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
In its 1996 Financial Report, which UMC admitted as existing, authentic and duly executed during the 4 December 2002 hearing, it had P1,050,862.71 as total assets and P167,058.47 as total liabilities.[41]
Thus, either amount in UMC’s Income Statement or Financial Reports is twenty-five times the claim UMC seeks to enforce. The RTC itself recognized that UMC padded its claim when it only allowedP43,930,230.00 as insurance claim. UMC supported its claim of P50,000,000.00 with the Certification from the Bureau of Fire Protection stating that “x x x a fire broke out at United Merchants Corporation located at 19-B Dag[o]t Street, Brgy. Manresa, Quezon City incurring an estimated damage of Fifty- Five Million Pesos (P55,000,000.00) to the building and contents x x x.” However, this Certification only proved that the estimated damage of P55,000,000.00 is shared by both the building and the stocks in trade.
It has long been settled that a false and material statement made with an intent to deceive or defraud voids an insurance policy.[42] In Yu Cua v. South British Insurance Co.,[43] the claim was fourteen times bigger than the real loss; in Go Lu v. Yorkshire Insurance Co,[44] eight times; and inTuason v. North China Insurance Co.,[45] six times. In the present case, the claim is twenty five timesthe actual claim proved.
The most liberal human judgment cannot attribute such difference to mere innocent error in estimating or counting but to a deliberate intent to demand from insurance companies payment for indemnity of goods not existing at the time of the fire.[46] This constitutes the so-called “fraudulent claim” which, by express agreement between the insurers and the insured, is a ground for the exemption of insurers from civil liability.[47]
In its Reply, UMC admitted the discrepancies when it stated that “discrepancies in its statements were not covered by the warranty such that any discrepancy in the declaration in other instruments or documents as to matters that may have some relation to the insurance coverage voids the policy.”[48]
On UMC’s allegation that it did not breach any warranty, it may be argued that the discrepancies do not, by themselves, amount to a breach of warranty. However, the Insurance Code provides that “apolicy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof shall avoid it.”[49] Thus, in fire insurance policies, which contain provisions such as Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy, a fraudulent discrepancy between the actual loss and that claimed in the proof of loss voids the insurance policy. Mere filing of such a claim will exonerate the insurer.[50]
Considering that all the circumstances point to the inevitable conclusion that UMC padded its claim and was guilty of fraud, UMC violated Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy. Thus, UMC forfeited whatever benefits it may be entitled under the Insurance Policy, including its insurance claim.
While it is a cardinal principle of insurance law that a contract of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer company,[51] contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used.[52] If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Courts are not permitted to make contracts for the parties; the function and duty of the courts is simply to enforce and carry out the contracts actually made.[53]
x x x."
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