"x x x.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: “As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained “vested right” in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right” expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's “vested right” is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
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