"x x x.
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,[37] the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”[38] filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.”[39] The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, “by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,” that –
(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accusedpendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.[42]
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,[46] where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.[47] It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.[48]
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.[49] Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged “defect in the information,”[50] which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the State.[51] The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.[52]
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure[53] that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.[54]
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days,[55] the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust.[56] In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
x x x."
