"x x x.
The respondents categorically stated that they seek to register the subject property in their name under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
For the respondents to rightfully claim that they have acquired an imperfect title worthy of judicial confirmation under the aforecited provision, it is incumbent upon them to prove that: (a) the land is alienable and (b) their possession and occupation must be in the manner and for the period prescribed by law.[21] The respondents must prove by means of clear and convincing evidence that since June 12, 1945 or earlier, they and their predecessors-in-interest performed acts of dominion as anyone would naturally do over his property.[22]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. It is clear under Section 48(b) thereof, which applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain,[23] that possession is not enough. In order to emphasize the necessity for actual possession and exclude fictional or constructive possession, Section 48(b) speaks of possession and occupation. As explained by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba:[24]
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.[25] (Citations omitted)
It does not matter whether the applicant for registration has been in possession and occupation only after June 12, 1945 for the requirements for confirmation of title is deemed complied with as his predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation that date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier are tacked to his. Thus, it is of great importance that there exists “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence that the applicant’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation of the property sought to be registered since June 12, 1945.
This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals, rather unfortunately, that Feliciano’s purported possession and occupation of the subject property had not been convincingly established to have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The only evidence that the respondents were able to present to prove that Feliciano occupied and possessed the subject property from 1940 until he sold the same to Doroteo in 1952 is the tax declaration for the year 1947, which bears the note to the effect that realty tax payments were paid under the same declaration since 1940. This annotation cannot be relied upon in the absence of an explanation why the tax declarations for the years previous to 1947 cannot be presented. Without the need for an elaborate extrapolation, this annotation, by itself, is far from being the credible and competent evidence that the law requires in proving when possession and occupation actually started. A tax declaration, much less a tax declaration the existence of which is proved by means of an annotation, is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, which is, at best, only a basis for inferring possession.[26] However, inference cannot support a claim of imperfect title as it is far from the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence required under prevailing jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, even assuming that Feliciano had been in possession and occupation of the subject property since 1940, this Court finds that the respondents had not sufficiently demonstrated that his supposed possession and occupation were of the nature and character contemplated by law. None of the witnesses presented by the respondents testified as to what specific acts of ownership were exercised by Feliciano on the subject property and their general statements on the matter are mere conclusions of law and do not qualify as competent evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.
Alconaba[27] was resolved against the applicants as their claim of possession and occupation that began in 1940 is based on unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions. Specifically:
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita) or since 1949 (as testified to by Mauricio and declared in respondents' application for registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. They cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Even granting that the possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28] (Citations omitted)
This Court finds no reason to decide this case differently. Similar to the parties in Alconaba, the respondents failed to account for any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property done by Feliciano for the length of time that he was supposedly in possession. The respondents may have alleged that there are various plants and fruit-bearing trees on the property but they did not present any proof that these supposed manifestations of ownership are attributable to Feliciano. Neither the existence of these plants and trees – their numbers unspecified – decisively show that the subject property was actively and regularly cultivated and maintained – not merely casually or occasionally tended to.
The CA and the MTCC clearly erred in relying on pieces of evidence that are clearly wanting. It is plainly patent and there is no gainsaying that the respondents failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Considering the proven tendency of the courts to be imprudent and their lack of sagacity when it comes to land registration cases, the advice at circumspection previously issued by this Court deserves reiteration:
Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus.[29] (Citations omitted)
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the State promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators.[30] (Citation omitted)
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