"x x x.
Notwithstanding her acquittal, Emilia is civilly liable.
“The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required”[27] in civil cases. On this basis, Emilia insists that the MTCC dismissed the BP 22 cases against her not on the ground of reasonable doubt but on insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the civil liability should likewise be extinguished. Emilia’s Demurrer to Evidence, however, betrays this claim. Asserting insufficiency of evidence as a ground for granting said demurrer, Emilia herself argued therein that the prosecution has not proven [her] guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[28] And in consonance with such assertion, the MTCC in its judgment expressly stated that her guilt was indeed not established beyond reasonable doubt, hence the acquittal.[29]
In any case, even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based on insufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of the bank’s dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence.
Emilia also avers that a court’s determination of preponderance of evidence necessarily entails the presentation of evidence of both parties. She thus believes that she should have been first required to present evidence to dispute her civil liability before the lower courts could determine preponderance of evidence.
We disagree.
“Preponderance of evidence is [defined as] the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence’. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”[30] Contrary to Emilia’s interpretation, a determination of this quantum of evidence does not need the presentation of evidence by both parties. As correctly reasoned out by the CA, Emilia’s interpretation is absurd as this will only encourage defendants to waive their presentation of evidence in order for them to be absolved from civil liability for lack of preponderance of evidence. Besides, Emilia should note that even when a respondent does not present evidence, a complainant in a civil case is nevertheless burdened to substantiate his or her claims by preponderance of evidence before a court may rule on the reliefs prayed for by the latter. Settled is the principle that “parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.”[31]
Lastly, we see no reason to disturb the ruling of the CA anent Emilia’s civil liability. As may be recalled, the CA affirmed the lower courts’ factual findings on the matter. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, will not be disturbed.[32] Also, “[i]t is a settled rule that in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of [Court], only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.”[33] Moreover, “it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. A check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction.”[34] While Emilia is acquitted of violations of BP 22, she should nevertheless pay the debt she owes.
x x x."
