"x x x.
The Court reiterates the ruling of the CA that what has been rendered by the RTC is not a judgment on the pleadings. Rather, it is a summary judgment.
Pertinent provisions of Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court state that:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x
On the other hand, Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the same Rules provide:
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.16 In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue.17 The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.18 If an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.19
In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist ― i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer ― but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.20
In the present case, a perusal of the Amended Answer as well as the Pre-Trial Brief filed by Solid Builders would readily show that it denied the material allegations in First Leverage's Complaint and that defenses were raised to refute these allegations. Stated differently, Solid Builders' pleadings tendered factual issues. Hence, the CA correctly held that the RTC rendered a summary judgment and not a judgment on the pleadings.
The Court agrees with the CA, however, that even a summary judgment is not proper in the instant case.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays where the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried.21 A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.22There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.23 A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.24
It must be stressed that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.25 As already stated, the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact rests upon the movant, in this case First Leverage, and not upon Solid Builders who opposed the motion for summary judgment. Any doubt as to the propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must thus be resolved against First Leverage.
In the present case, the Court agrees with the CA that genuine issues exist which call for a full blown trial. The CA held as follows:
First Leverage asserted in its amended complaint that there was no such valid perfected contract to sell. PNB Republic, however, insisted in its answer that the LARBC, duly authorized by the Bank's board of directors, validly approved the award of the properties to Solid Builders, and that even assuming that the LARBC was not fully authorized to approve the sale, the said action of LARBC was subsequently duly ratified and confirmed by the board of directors. Its co-defendant, Solid Builders, maintained also in its answer that the perfection, approval and execution of the deed of promise to sell in its favor were legal and not ultra vires. Thus, PNB Republic's and Solid Builders' respective answers to the complaint tendered an issue.26
Indeed, in its Amended Complaint, First Leverage contended that “[b]y [PNB] Republic's execution of a Deed of Promise to Sell with Solid [Builders], [PNB] Republic is determined to award the sale of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 4050 and TCT No. 4211 to the damage and prejudice of [First Leverage] as well as the Government, in spite of the illegality of the approval of the offer of Solid [Builders] by the Loans and Assets Recovery Board Committee of [PNB] Republic. There is a compelling necessity, therefore, for a declaration of the nullity of the approval by said Committee of Solid [Builder's] offer to purchase the aforecited parcels of land.”27
On the other hand, in its Amended Answer, [Solid Builders] averred that “[PNB] Republic acts through duly authorized officers and the perfection, approval and execution of the Deed of Promise to Sell by [PNB] Republic in favor of Solid [Builders] was in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank pursuant to its corporate mandate. [PNB] Republic has always maintained that the Deed of Promise to Sell the litigated property in favor of Solid [Builders] was legal and not ultra vires and up to this very moment [PNB] Republic and Solid [Builders] have been faithfully performing their respective obligations under the Deed of Promise to Sell the litigated property.”28 In the same manner, respondent, in its Pre-Trial Brief, contended that “[t]he perfected contract by and between Defendant Solid [Builders] and PNB [Republic] was made in good faith and is not tainted by illegality, ultra vires act, nor infirmed by and for whatever reason, but is perfectly valid, legal and in full force and effect.”29
Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA that genuine issues of fact were properly raised before the RTC, particularly with regard to the validity and existence of a perfected contract to sell, and that these issues could only be resolved through a full-blown hearing.
