Failure to file brief - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/6910.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/july2012/6910.pdf

"x x x,


The failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief for
complainant within the reglementary period constitutes gross negligence
in violation of the Code of  Professional Responsibility. In Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, this Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest
to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del
Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to
file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107)
The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the
duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to
delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v.
Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent’s
failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a  special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the
members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence of the public.

x x x ."

Corona petition mooted

Supreme Court of the Philippines

"x x x.

The Supreme Court, by a unanimous vote, has dismissed on the ground of mootness the petition of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona assailing the impeachment case initiated against him by the members of the House of Representatives and trial conducted by the Senate. In a 15-page decision penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., the Court En Banc held that the constitutional issues raised by former Chief Justice Corona “had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.”

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. did not take part in the deliberations, while Justice Arturo D. Brion was on leave.

Chief Justice Corona was convicted on May 29, 2012 by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court. The Court noted that he immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. The Judicial and Bar Council is at present interviewing candidates for the next Chief Justice.

The Court explained that “[a]n issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.”

In his petition, former Chief Justice Corona argued that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by the lower house which complaint was constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause. He added that there was grave abuse of discretion also when the Impeachment Court did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay.

Likewise, former Chief Justice Corona contended that the Impeachment Court abused its discretion when it allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II of the complaint did not mention “graft and corruption,” and second, it was clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and “betrayal of public trust.” Lastly, the former Chief Justice questioned the issuance of subpoena for the production of his alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of RA 6426, Foreign Currency Deposits Act, which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. (GR No. 200242, Chief Justice Corona v. Senate, July 17, 2012)

x x x."

Learning beyond bars | Inquirer Opinion

Learning beyond bars | Inquirer Opinion

"x x x.

Just because they’re behind bars doesn’t mean they can’t have any more hope. On this proposition, the Department of Education, a few years back, introduced into our country’s prison houses one of its innovative programs. This proposition the DepEd has since shown to be no mere rhetoric.

From the DepEd’s Alternative Learning System (ALS), the thousands of Filipinos currently in jail, yearning to improve themselves and make a change for the better, and looking forward to a new life after their release, can now look to flesh-and-blood models that they can closely identify with, for assurance and inspiration.

The ALS is aimed at addressing the needs of those who have fallen through the cracks of the formal school system. By using flexible modules and accreditation tests, and through the use of multiple languages, the ALS aims to provide everything—from basic literacy to the equivalent of elementary and secondary educational certification. Mobile teachers are deployed to the prisons, which donate the use of their facilities for the learning sessions.

The most crucial element in the ALS is the use of Accreditation and Equivalency (A&E), which determines the learning level of the test-takers who have already passed the basic literacy courses. While the ALS covers everyone from out-of-school youth to indigenous peoples, it achieves a particular resonance with its extension to those locked away behind bars. It assures them that they haven’t been forgotten—and the bars become new openings.

Though incarcerated and fallen from the ranks of society, with the ALS, they can choose not to rot idly in jail. Instead of picking up bad habits, they can take the A&E test and then pursue studies through the years of their sentences. The ALS is open to both the already convicted and detainees still awaiting their day in a court system burdened by overwhelmed dockets.

The most surprising result is just how high the A&E scores have gotten. In 2010, the passing rate for elementary equivalency was 48 percent. This year, every single one of the inmates who took the test passed—yes, 100 percent! The high school equivalency scores jumped as well, from a passing rate of 29 percent in 2010 to 49 percent in 2012.

How did they achieve this? The DepEd actually discovered that there are former teachers behind bars. It asked these mentors to apply their skills for the benefit of their fellow inmates.

“They are actually licensed teachers and college professors but, due to some circumstances, they are serving time in prison,” says Education Secretary Armin Luistro. “As part of their rehabilitation program, they were given the task of teaching their fellow inmates.” The jailed teachers are given special training before they start to teach again.

ALS bureau staff Carolina Guerrero says, “It helps them retain their professional competence and gives them a chance to earn the recognition of their peers,” adding that “…just because you killed someone, you can no longer teach. We’re not judging them for that.”

In Mandaluyong City’s Correctional Institution for Women, 21 jailed teachers tutored 252 inmates who earned good scores in their examinations. Mandaluyong City ALS Supervisor Josefina Espeso explains that “the ALS program for both learners and instructional managers is beneficial to them because they are given merits and commendable credits.

“The ALS program started in 2008 and the progressive results of the A&E tests for three consecutive years attest to the effectiveness of the program.”

The idea of recruiting jailed former teachers to teach their fellow inmates is now being widely practiced in many places of incarceration. In the Oriental Mindoro Provincial Jail in Calapan, a 21-year-old murder convict, a fourth-grade dropout, was able to obtain elementary and high school certificates. Now he dreams about taking vocational courses, courtesy of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority. In San Fernando City, an inmate, Charisse Consulta, also passed her elementary and high school equivalency in 2010. “I was so happy,” she said. “Now I have education. Education is wealth, right?” What a difference a successful test makes.

“ALS in prison houses,” in a way, lends credence to the government’s avowals to provide education for all. It also gives emphasis to the Philippine prison system’s shift from punishment to rehabilitation. By teaching the inmates life skills, the prisons play an important part in the redemption of those whose lives are generally viewed to have been wasted.

For Filipino detainees, not only does the ALS inspire hope, it offers a second best chance.

x x x."

Fire insurance; fraudulent claim voids the insurance contract - G.R. No. 198588

G.R. No. 198588

"x x x.

 In the present case, arson and fraud are two separate grounds based on two different sets of evidence, either of which can void the insurance claim of UMC. The absence of one does not necessarily result in the absence of the

other. Thus, on the allegation of fraud, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals.

          Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy provides that all the benefits under the policy shall be forfeited, if the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, to wit:

15. If the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting in his behalf to obtain any benefit under this Policy; or if the loss or damage be occasioned by the willful act, or with the connivance of the Insured, all the benefits under this Policy shall be forfeited.

          In Uy Hu & Co. v. The Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd.,[32]  the Court held that where a fire insurance policy provides that “if the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting on his behalf to obtain any benefit under this Policy,” and the evidence is conclusive that the proof of claim which the insured submitted was false and fraudulent both as to the kind, quality and amount of the goods and their value destroyed by the fire, such a proof of claim is a bar against the insured from recovering on the policy even for the amount of his actual loss.

In the present case, as proof of its loss of stocks in trade amounting to P50,000,000.00, UMC submitted its Sworn Statement of Formal Claim together with the following documents: (1) letters of credit and invoices for raw materials, Christmas lights and cartons purchased; (2) charges for assembling the Christmas lights; and (3) delivery receipts of the raw materials. However, the charges for assembling the Christmas lights and delivery receipts could not support its insurance claim. The Insurance Policy provides that CBIC agreed to insure UMC’s stocks in trade. UMC defined stock in trade as tangible personal property kept for sale or traffic.[33] Applying UMC’s definition, only the letters of credit and invoices for raw materials, Christmas lights and cartons may be considered.

The invoices, however, cannot be taken as genuine. The invoices reveal that the stocks in trade purchased for 1996 amounts to P20,000,000.00 which were purchased in one month. Thus, UMC needs to prove purchases amounting to P30,000,000.00 worth of stocks in trade for 1995 and prior years. However, in the Statement of Inventory it submitted to the BIR, which is considered an entry in official records,[34] UMC stated that it had no stocks in trade as of 31 December 1995. In its defense, UMC alleged that it did not include as stocks in trade the raw materials to be assembled as Christmas lights, which it had on 31 December 1995. However, as proof of its loss, UMC submitted invoices for raw materials, knowing that the insurance covers only stocks in trade. 

                       

          Equally important, the invoices (Exhibits “P”-“DD”) from Fuze Industries Manufacturer Phils. were suspicious. The purchases, based on the invoices and without any supporting contract, amounted toP19,550,400.00 worth of Christmas lights from 20 January 1996 to 23 February 1996. The uncontroverted testimony of Cabrera revealed that there was no Fuze Industries Manufacturer Phils. located at “55 Mahinhin St., Teacher’s Village, Quezon City,” the business address appearing in the invoices and the records of the Department of Trade & Industry. Cabrera testified that:

A: Then we went personally to the address as I stated a while ago appearing in the record furnished by the United Merchants Corporation to the adjuster, and the adjuster in turn now, gave us our basis in conducting investigation, so we went to this place which according to the records, the address of this company but there was no office of this company.

Q: You mentioned Atty. Cabrera that you went to Diliman, Quezon City and discover the address indicated by the United Merchants as the place of business of Fuze Industries Manufacturer, Phils. was a residential place, what then did you do after determining that it was a residential place?

A: We went to the owner of the alleged company as appearing in the Department of Trade & Industry record, and as appearing a certain Chinese name Mr. Huang, and the address as appearing there is somewhere in Binondo. We went personally there together with the NBI Agent and I am with them when the subpoena was served to them, but a male person approached us and according to him, there was no Fuze Industries Manufacturer, Phils., company in that building sir.[35]

            In Yu Ban Chuan v. Fieldmen’s Insurance, Co., Inc.,[36] the Court ruled that the submission of false invoices to the adjusters establishes a clear case of fraud and misrepresentation which voids the insurer’s liability as per condition of the policy. Their falsity is the best evidence of the fraudulent character of plaintiff’s claim.[37] In Verendia v. Court of Appeals,[38] where the insured presented a fraudulent lease contract to support his claim for insurance  benefits, the Court held that by its false declaration, the insured forfeited all benefits under the policy provision similar to Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy in this case.

          Furthermore, UMC’s Income Statement indicated that the purchases or costs of sales areP827,670.00 for 1995 and P1,109,190.00 for 1996 or a total of P1,936,860.00.[39] To corroborate this fact, Ebora testified that:

Q: Based on your 1995 purchases, how much were the purchases made in   1995?

A: The purchases made by United Merchants Corporation for the last year 1995 is P827,670.[00] sir

Q: And how about in 1994?

A: In 1994, it’s P608,986.00 sir.

Q: These purchases were made for the entire year of 1995 and 1994 respectively, am I correct?

A: Yes sir, for the year 1994 and 1995.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

In its 1996 Financial Report, which UMC admitted as existing, authentic and duly executed during the 4 December 2002 hearing, it had P1,050,862.71 as total assets and P167,058.47 as total liabilities.[41]

          Thus, either amount in UMC’s Income Statement or Financial Reports is twenty-five times the claim UMC seeks to enforce. The RTC itself recognized that UMC padded its claim when it only allowedP43,930,230.00 as insurance claim. UMC supported its claim of P50,000,000.00 with the Certification from the Bureau of Fire Protection stating that “x x x a fire broke out at United Merchants Corporation located at 19-B Dag[o]t Street, Brgy. Manresa, Quezon City incurring an estimated damage of Fifty- Five Million Pesos (P55,000,000.00) to the building and contents x x x.” However, this Certification only proved that the estimated damage of P55,000,000.00 is shared by both the building and the stocks in trade.

           

            It has long been settled that a false and material statement made with an intent to deceive or defraud voids an insurance policy.[42]  In Yu Cua v. South British Insurance Co.,[43] the claim was fourteen times bigger than the real loss; in Go Lu v. Yorkshire Insurance Co,[44] eight times; and inTuason v. North China Insurance Co.,[45] six times. In the present case, the claim is twenty five timesthe actual claim proved.

          The most liberal human judgment cannot attribute such difference to mere innocent error in estimating or counting but to a deliberate intent to demand from insurance companies payment for indemnity of goods not existing at the time of the fire.[46] This constitutes the so-called “fraudulent claim” which, by express agreement between the insurers and the insured, is a ground for the exemption of insurers from civil liability.[47]

          In its Reply, UMC admitted the discrepancies when it stated that “discrepancies in its statements were not  covered by the warranty such that any discrepancy in the declaration in other instruments or documents as to matters that may have some relation to the insurance coverage voids the policy.”[48]

          On UMC’s allegation that it did not breach any warranty, it may be argued that the discrepancies do not, by themselves, amount to a breach of warranty. However, the Insurance Code provides that “apolicy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof shall avoid it.”[49] Thus, in fire insurance policies, which contain provisions such as Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy, a fraudulent discrepancy between the actual loss and that claimed in the proof of loss voids the insurance policy. Mere filing of such a claim will exonerate the insurer.[50]

         

          Considering that all the circumstances point to the inevitable conclusion that UMC padded its claim and was guilty of fraud, UMC violated Condition No. 15 of the Insurance Policy. Thus, UMC forfeited whatever benefits it may be entitled under the Insurance Policy, including its insurance claim.

          While it is a cardinal principle of insurance law that a contract of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer company,[51] contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used.[52] If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Courts are not permitted to make contracts for the parties; the function and duty of the courts is simply to enforce and carry out the contracts actually made.[53]

x x x."

Open spaces in subdivisions beyond the commerce of men - G. R. No. 189755

G. R. No. 189755

"X X X.

The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for public use and are beyond the commerce of man.[37] As such, these open spaces are not susceptible of private ownership and appropriation. We therefore rule that the sale of the subject parcel of land by the subdivision owner or developer to petitioner’s late husband was contrary to law. Hence, we find no reversible error in the appellate court’s Decision upholding the HLURB Arbiter’s annulment of the Deed of Sale.

Petitioner attempts to argue in favor of the validity of the sale of the subject parcel of land by invoking the principle of indefeasibility of title and by arguing that this action constitutes a collateral attack against her title, an act proscribed by the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioner is mistaken on both counts.

First, the rule that a collateral attack against a Torrens title is prohibited by law[38] finds no application to this case.

There is an attack on the title when the object of an action is to nullify a Torrens title, thus challenging the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed.[39] In the present case, this action is not an attack against the validity of the Torrens title, because it does not question the judgment or proceeding that led to the issuance of the title. Rather, this action questions the validity of the transfer of land from Marcelo to petitioner’s husband. As there is no attack – direct or collateral – against the title, petitioner’s argument holds no water.

Second, the principle of indefeasibility of title is not absolute, and there are well-defined exceptions to this rule.[40] In Aqualab Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Pagobo,[41] we ruled that this defense does not extend to a transferee who takes the title with knowledge of a defect in that of the transferee’s predecessor-in-interest.

In this case, Spouses Liwag were aware of the existence of the easement of water facility when Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to them. Hermogenes even executed an Affidavit dated 10 August 1982 attesting to the sufficiency of the water supply coming from an electrically operated water pump in the Subdivision.[42] It is undisputed that the water facility in question was their only water source during that time. As residents of the Subdivision, they had even benefited for almost 30 years from its existence. Therefore, petitioner cannot be shielded by the principle of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title, as she was not an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.

From the discussion above, we therefore conclude that the appellate court committed no reversible error in the assailed Decision and accordingly affirm it in toto.

x x x."

PD 1216; "open space" includes the land where the water system of the subdivision is located. - G. R. No. 189755

G. R. No. 189755

"x x x.

 The term “open space” is defined in P.D. 1216 as “an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangaycenters and other similar facilities and amenities.[33]

The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory construction to determine whether these areas fall under “other similar facilities and amenities.”

The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or to be restricted to – things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.[34]

Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner.

Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic need in human settlements,[35] without which the community would not survive. We therefore rule that, based on the principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy environment in human settlements,[36] the location of the water facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open space.

 x x x."

Jurisdiction of HLURB - G. R. No. 189755

G. R. No. 189755

"x x x.

The jurisdiction of the HLURB is outlined in P.D. 1344, “Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957,” viz:

Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature.

A.                Unsound real estate business practices;

B.                Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C.                Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.

When respondent Association filed its Complaint before the HLURB, it alleged that Marcelo’s sale of Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes was done in violation of P.D. 957 in the following manner:

12. Through fraudulent acts and connivance of [T.P. and Ernesto Marcelo] and the late Liwag and without the knowledge and consent of the complainants all in violation of P.D. 957 and its implementing regulations, respondents T.P. and Ernesto Marcelo transferred the same lot where the deep well is located which is covered by TCT No. C-41785 in favor of spouses Hermogenes Liwag and Emeteria Liwag to the great damage and prejudice of complainants x x x.[22] (Empasis in the original)

We find that this statement sufficiently alleges that the subdivision owner and developer fraudulently sold to Hermogenes the lot where the water facility was located. Subdivisions are mandated to maintain and provide adequate water facilities for their communities.[23] Without a provision for an alternative water source, the subdivision developer’s alleged sale of the lot where the community’s sole water source was located constituted a violation of this obligation. Thus, this allegation makes out a case for an unsound real estate business practice of the subdivision owner and developer. Clearly, the case at bar falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

It is worthy to note that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the Subdivision a better place to live in.[24] This interpretation is in line with one of P.D. 957’s “Whereas clauses,” which provides:

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers. x x x.

P.D. 957 was promulgated to closely regulate real estate subdivision and condominium businesses.[25] Its provisions were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums.[26] The decree aimed to provide for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which aggrieved parties in transactions involving subdivisions and condominiums may take recourse.[27]

x x x."

Vested right; definition and limitation of - G.R. No 176556

G.R. No 176556

"x x x.

Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: “As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses.  If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”[59]  In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”[60]  Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.

However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone.  In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained “vested right” in the following manner:

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.  The term “vested right” expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)

In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.  Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.[64]  (Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.  First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.[65]  In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.[66]  Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67]  Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's “vested right” is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code.  This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits.  The said provision says:

Art. 176.  In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage.  However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case.  Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.

x xx."

Forfeiture of guilty of guilty spouse - G.R. No 176556

G.R. No 176556

":x x x.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's “vested right” is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code.  This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits.  The said provision says:

Art. 176.  In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage.  However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case.  Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.

More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:

[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.  The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.  Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugalpartnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)

 x xx."

Time to appeal is 15 days - G.R. No 176556

G.R. No 176556

"x x x.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.  Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

            The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.  No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.”[26]

In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.  We also said, “The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.”[27]  In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.  Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.

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