The Procedural Due Process Issue
Procedural due process is the constitutional standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard.[17] A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary.
In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order), Garcia’s decision of February 21, 2007 duly considered and discussed the defenses raised in Atty. Molina’s pleadings, although the answer was ordered expunged from the records because it was unverified and because Atty. Molina failed to submit a letter of authority to represent the petitioner.
What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioner’s case.[18]Again, Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration when he rendered the
Findings of facts of administrative bodies accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence
Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.[20] A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present.[21] Otherwise, a misconduct is only simple.
No doubt exists in our mind that the petitioner committed misconduct in this case. The records clearly show that the petitioner committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-99. After a careful review of the records, however, we disagree with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the petitioner’s acts constituted grave misconduct. While we accord great respect to the factual findings of administrative agencies that misconduct was committed, we cannot characterize the offense committed as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of “corruption,” “clear intent to violate the law” or “flagrant disregard of established rule” that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave.
We are aware that to the CSC, the mere act of approving the loan applications on several occasions proves the element of flagrant disregard of established rules to constitute grave misconduct. Thus, it said:
The act of the appellant in approving salary loan applications of his subordinates over and above the prescribed rates under the GSIS policy, not only once but several times, indicates his flagrant and wanton transgression of the said policy. He, in fact, abused his authority in doing so.[22]
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule;[23] in the repeated voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies;[24] in the practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages;[25] when several violations or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds were committed;[26] and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities that were clearly beyond her given duties.[27] The common denominator in these cases was the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we do not see the type of open defiance and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSC’s findings on the petitioner’s actions prior to the approval of the loans negate the presence of any intent on the petitioner’s part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan applications beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient practice in the approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before acting on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires.
Thus, the petitioner’s liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct. As Branch Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies, guidelines and procedures in carrying out the agency’s mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did not fully meet the required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of judgment sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.
The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules)classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense. Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, the commission of simple misconduct is penalized by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While records show that this is not the petitioner’s first offense as he was previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect of duty, we believe that his dismissal would be disproportionate to the nature and effect of the transgression he committed as the GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through the loans he extended; these loans were for GSIS employees and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple misconduct, we impose on the petitioner the penalty of suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by GSIS up to the finality of this Decision.[28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition for review on certiorari and MODIFY the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Monico K. Imperial, Jr. is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the time the preventive suspension that GSIS imposed lapsed, up to the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
x x x."
