We rule to affirm the appealed Decision.
It has been held that in a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies.[43] Since it was the trial court that had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment while testifying, the rule is that the trial court's assessment of their credibility is entitled to great respect,[44] and even finality, unless facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[45]
In arriving at its Decision, the trial court reasoned:
The testimony of the accused is replete with material inconsistencies and incredible statements which render it unworthy of belief. Thus, at one point, he claims that when he was picked up by the police a plastic sachet was shown to him by PO2 Capsule and the latter told him it will be used as evidence against him. (TSN, October 9, 2007, p. 4). Later, however, he testified that the plastic sachet was shown to him only when he was brought to the City Hall for inquest. (TSN, October 9, 2007, p. 9). Being contradictory of each other, it is indicative of accused's propensity to prevaricate. (Decision, p. 4)
We have gone over the transcripts and note that the trial court was referring to the following portion of accused-appellant's testimony:
Q Now, you said that police officer Casuple showed you a plastic sachet and told you that they are going to use the plastic sachet to file a case against you, did I hear you right?
A That is correct, sir.
Q Where did the plastic sachet come from?
A I do not know, sir, they immediately showed that to me.
Q At the police station before you were brought there were you frisked?
A No, sir, but they mauled me, sir.
Q At the police station, did they frisk you?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the frisking they showed you the plastic sachet?
A Not yet, sir.
Q When was the plastic sachet shown to you
A When they brought me to City Hall, sir.
Q That was on the same day?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you brought to the City Hall?
A I was to be presented for inquest, sir. [46]
Accused-appellant initially testified that the plastic sachet was shown to him while he was in an alley in Isla Puting Bato, with the police threatening to use it as evidence against him. On the other hand, in accused-appellant's declaration above, he stated that he had been shown the plastic sachet when he was brought to the City Hall for inquest. On its face, there does not seem to be a real contradiction between the two declarations, considering that accused-appellant has not described either instance as the first time the plastic sachet was shown to him. Moreover, it is not impossible that the sachet was shown to him on more than one occasion.
We nevertheless note that the Court “reads only in cold print the testimony of witnesses which is usually translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of translation, ‘not only the fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listening, may escape the reader of the written translated words.’ Necessarily, the appellate court is placed at a disadvantage in this regard. Hence, in the absence of a glaring misapprehension of facts on the part of the trial court, the appellate court places great reliance on its findings of facts.”[47] Hence, while accused-appellant was not conclusively shown to have contradicted himself as regards the time when the plastic sachet was shown to him by the police, we have to rely on the perception of the trial court on the matter. At any rate, the court a quo cites this as only one of several material inconsistencies and incredible statements made by accused-appellant during the trial.
Accused-appellant argues that the presumption of innocence cannot be overturned by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. This is correct. However, both are mere disputable presumptions, which can be overcome by evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, accused-appellant has not presented any evidence to support his defense of frame-up apart from his uncorroborated testimony. He could have at least presented another witness or some other evidence to corroborate his claim that the accusation against him was a mere fabrication. After all, “frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.”[48]
In contrast, the prosecution has adduced testimonial and documentary evidence, which we have reviewed.
It is true that, as pointed out by accused-appellant, the procedure under Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly followed by the police. The records show that the plastic sachet seized from accused-appellant was marked at the police station; and that no elected public official, media or representative from the Department of Justice was present during the inventory. Nevertheless,
xxx we have held in several cases that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, the integrity of the drug seized from appellants was preserved. The chain of custody of the drug subject matter of the instant case was shown not to have been broken. xxx Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Appellants in this case bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption that there was regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers, and that the latter properly discharged their duties. Appellants failed to produce convincing proof that the evidence submitted by the prosecution had been tampered with. xxx As earlier discussed, the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drug seized as evidence. Both were satisfactorily proved in the present case.”[49]
Applying the foregoing points to the present case, we note that accused-appellant has not adduced any evidence to show that the integrity of the evidence has been compromised. On the other hand, the seized plastic sachet and marked money were properly presented and identified in court. The prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the chain of custody of the seized item from the time it was obtained from accused-appellant and marked by SPO2 Casuple, until it was delivered by PO2 Garcia to SPI Reyes of the PNP Crime Laboratory who made the laboratory examination thereof and the corresponding Laboratory Report. Earlier, during pre-trial, the parties had dispensed with the testimony of SPI Reyes after stipulating on her position and qualifications and on the results of her examination of the item submitted for testing.[50]
We did observe that the police failed to check the box marked “buy-bust operation” in its Pre-Operation and Coordination Report. However, standing alone, this minor omission does not affect the finding of guilt of accused-appellant. As ruled by the Court in People v. Sta. Maria,[51]
xxx [Cursorily] read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the “lead agency” in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, “shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act.” We find much logic in the Solicitor General's interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the “lead agency” in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies — The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the [National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)] and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA . . . . Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (Underscoring supplied.)
In other words, the fact that the PDEA was not notified of the buy-bust operation, as shown in the Pre-Operation and Coordination Report, cannot by itself exculpate accused-appellant. In the first place, the police are authorized to effect a warrantless arrest. Second, R.A. No. 9165 does not invalidate a buy-bust operation in which the PDEA is not notified. Third, the PDEA actually had some knowledge of the operation against one who had the alias “Danny” (albeit only for “casing” and “surveillance”), as the Pre-Operation and Coordination Report had been sent to and confirmed by it prior to the buy-bust operation.
In fine, after going over the records of the case and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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