The jettisoning of the petition is inevitable: the holding of the October 2010 Barangay Elections makes the issues posed by petitioner moot and academic.
Before anything else, we note the apparent mix-up in Mendoza’s designation of the present petition. He alleged grave abuse of discretion, but incorrectly specified in the prefatory statement of the petition that it is a “petition for review on certiorari.”
For clarity and to obviate confusion, we treat the instant petition as one filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since the totality of the allegations contained therein seek to annul and set aside the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As we have also noted in Mendoza v. Mayor Villas,[14] another case filed by
Even without going into Mendoza’s penchant for filing confused petitions, the supervening event that is the conduct of the 2010 BarangayElections renders this case moot and academic. The term of office forBarangay Captain of Balatasan for the 2007 Barangay Elections had long expired in 2010 following the last elections held on October 25 of the same year.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[15]
Certainly, the rule is not set in stone and permits exceptions. Thus, we may choose to decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved; third, the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.[16] None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court to exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.
The justiciability of the present petition is further decimated by our recent ruling in Mendoza v. Mayor Villas:[17]
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired that has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is because, as stated inFernandez v. Commission on Elections, "whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced."
In any event, upon a perusal of the merits or lack thereof, the petition is clearly dismissible.
Our decision in COMELEC v. Cruz[18] settles, once and for all, the constitutionality of the three-consecutive term limit rule reckoned from the 1994 Barangay Elections. We unequivocally declared, thus:
The Retroactive Application Issue
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Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a retroactive application of the term limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the [Local Government Code] and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangayofficials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply tobarangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, exceptbarangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which it is found in Title II of the LGC.
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All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents’ constitutional challenge to the proviso—based on retroactivity—must fail.[19]
