A writ of certiorari is a remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction, for which reason it must clearly show that the public respondent has no jurisdiction to issue an order or to render a decision. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has instituted the petition for certiorari to correct acts of any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This remedy serves as a check on acts, either of excess or passivity, that constitute grave abuse of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. This Court, in San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino,[43] explained thus:
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.
A cert[iorari] writ may be issued if the court or quasi-judicial body issues an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Moreover, a party is entitled to a writ of certiorari only if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate relief in the ordinary course of law.
The raison d’etre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action forcertiorari.[44](citations omitted)
Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and on what these acts were. In this case, the CA seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a petition for certiorari was to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC. The CA proceeded to review the records and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The pivotal issue before the NLRC was whether petitioner’s telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a break, was already a positive act of dismissing him. This issue was not discussed by the CA.
A reading of the assailed Decision will readily reveal the patent errors of the CA. On page 11 of its Decision, it held as follows: “The NLRC likewise concluded that petitioner was not entitled to separation pay because he was not a regular employee of private respondent, he (the petitioner) being paid on purely ‘commission’ or ‘pakyaw’ basis.” The CA took off from that point to give a discussion on regular employment and further held:
To Us, private respondent's “advice to take a rest” theory is nothing but a mere ploy to reinforce his hypothesis that the petitioner is not a regular employee. What makes this worse is that the NLRC bought private respondent's aforesaid theory hook, line and sinker and ruled that the petitioner was neither dismissed from work, he (the petitioner) being considered merely on “leave of absence without pay”, nor is he (the petitioner) entitled to separation pay on the ground that he was paid on purely “commission” or “pakyaw” basis which is in legal parlance, in effect, implies that the petitioner is not a regular employee of the private respondent, but a mere seasonal worker or independent contractor.
It is most disturbing to see how the CA regarded labor terms “paid on commission,” “pakyaw” and “seasonal worker” as one and the same. In labor law, they are different and have distinct meanings, which we do not need to elaborate on in this Petition as they are not the issue here. It should also be remembered that a regular status of employment is not based on how the salary is paid to an employee. An employee may be paid purely on commission and still be considered a regular employee.[45] Moreover, a seasonal employee may also be considered a regular employee.[46]
Further, the appreciation by the CA of the NLRC Resolution was erroneous. The fact is that the refusal by the NLRC to grant separation pay was merely consistent with its ruling that there was no dismissal. Since respondent was not dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, separation pay was unnecessary. The CA looked at the issue differently and erroneously, as it held that the NLRC refused to grant the award of separation pay because respondent had not been found to be a regular employee. The NLRC had in fact made no such ruling. These are flagrant errors that are reversible by this
Court. They should be corrected for the sake not only of the litigants, but also of the CA, so that it would become more circumspect in its appreciation of the records before it.
We reviewed the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision and found nothing in it that was whimsical, unreasonable or patently violative of the law. It was the CA which erred in finding faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.
On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for Certiorari despite the prescribed Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, we find another error committed by the CA. The pertinent provisions of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC are as follows:
Rule VII, Section 14. Motions for Reconsideration. — Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
Rule VIII, Section 2. Finality of decisions of the Commission. — (a) Finality of the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission. Except as provided in Rule XI, Section 10, the decisions, resolutions orders of the Commission/Division shall become executory after (10) calendar days from receipt of the same.
When respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC’s 30 November 2006 Resolution within the reglementary period, the Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by the Court of Appeals. The Court has ruled as follows:
[I]t is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.[47]
It cannot be argued that prescriptive periods are mere procedural rules and technicalities, which may be brushed aside at every cry of injustice, and may be bent and broken by every appeal to pity. The Court’s ruling inVideogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals finds application to the present case:
There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.
Similarly, a motion for reconsideration filed out of time cannot reopen a final and executory judgment of the NLRC. Untimeliness in filing motions or petitions is not a mere technical or procedural defect, as leniency regarding this requirement will impinge on the right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from the laying to rest of the controversy.
As to the third issue, since the CA could no longer modify the NLRC Resolution, it logically follows that the modification of the award cannot be done either. Had the Resolution not yet attained finality, the CA could have granted some other relief, even if not specifically sought by petitioner, if such ruling is proper under the circumstances. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or filing of memoranda or upon the expiration of the period for filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had become final and executory 25 days before respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, subsequent proceedings and modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed 23 June 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 20 December 2010 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. The 30 November 2006 and 30 March 2010 Resolutions of the NLRC are AFFIRMED and sustained.
SO ORDERED.
x x x."
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