OUR RULING
The accused is acquitted of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Various irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation and the processing of the evidence in the present case have left the case against the accused too weak to overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.
The first irregularity attaches to the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet, which is intended to show the coordination between the PDEA and the police. Its importance lies in the fact that RA No. 9165 mandates close coordination between the Philippine National Police/National Bureau of Investigation and the PDEA on all drug-related matters, including investigations on violations of RA No. 9165, with the PDEA as the lead agency.[26]
In the case at bar, the original Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet was not presented in court and the records contain only a photocopy thereof, provisionally marked Exhibit “D.” Caution must be made that the failure of the prosecution to present the Pre-Operation Report, by itself, is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.[27] Even if the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet was properly presented in evidence, however, it is suspect as it was apparently accomplished and sent to PDEA hours before the informant arrived to give the police any information about the alleged illegal drug activity of Martin. SPO1 Mora variably testified that the confidential informant came to their office at 5 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. of 6 November 2006. Meanwhile, from the three faint stamps marked on the face of the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet, it was received by PDEA-MMRO either at 1:30 p.m., 1:40 p.m. or 2:00 p.m. of 6 November 2006.
Second, the actual marked money was likewise not presented in evidence[28] since SPO1 Mora could no longer locate the marked money[29]after he probably turned it over to the Investigator who photocopied it.[30]While the Court has also had occasion to hold that presentation of the buy-bust money, as a lone defect, is not indispensable to the prosecution of a drug case,[31] again it raises doubts regarding the regularity of the buy-bust operation.
Third, the police officer did not comply with the procedure for seizure of evidence laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165[32] and its corresponding Implementing Rules[33] without giving any reasonable excuse for the lapse. When confronted with the fact that they have not complied with the procedure for seizure of evidence laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, SPO1 Mora testified:
Asst. Pros. Yap:
Q Now you said the marking was made by the Investigator. Why did you not mark the specimen at the scene of the transaction?
Witness:
A Because the Investigator will make an inventory regarding the recovered evidence and other pertinent documents, sir.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
That would be all, your Honor.
COURT:
Cross.
Atty. Cabrera:
With the kind permission of this Honorable Court.
Q Why did you not mark the specimen at the crime scene, you were not following the guidelines under the rules?
A Because it was not properly implemented yet those guidelines of RA 9165, sir.[34]
While noncompliance with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case because the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items,” nevertheless, lapses in procedure “must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.”[35] Otherwise, the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service.
In the present case, it was not shown that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason. The only “reason” the police officers gave for not complying with the guidelines does not even hold water. The police justified their non-compliance with the procedure laid down in RA No. 9165 allegedly because these have not yet been “properly implemented” at the time. In truth, however, the implementing guidelines for R.A. No. 9165 took effect on November 27, 2002 while the arrest took place about four years later, or on 6 November 2006.
Fourth, the prosecution failed to establish the “chain of custody”[36]of the seized item. After the buy-bust operation, the police officers proceeded to the DAID office where they turned over the sachet and (probably) the marked money to the Investigator.[37] It was this unidentified “investigator” who marked the corpus delicti (plastic sachet) and who had custody of both the corpus delicti and the marked money. Apparently, it was also he who turned over the plastic sachet to the Crime Laboratory for testing.[38]However, he was not presented to testify as to the marking of the sachet, the whereabouts of the marked money and the completion of the chain of custody of the evidence from SPO1 Mora to the Crime Laboratory.
Various reasons exist why failure to establish the chain of custody in a narcotics case, such as the case at bar, is fatal to the prosecution’s case. As the Court exhaustively explained in Carino v. People, [39]
While a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering — without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not — dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Hence, the risk of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit of this nature is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. The danger, according to Graham v. State, is real. In that case, a substance later analyzed as heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because it was previously handled by two police officers prior to examination who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession. The court pointed out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
Indeed, the Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over a narcotic specimen there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. (Underscoring supplied)
Fifth, the presumption that the police officers regularly performed their duty cannot, standing alone, defeat the presumption of innocence of the accused herein. Generally, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty,[40] but this is a mere procedural presumption which cannot overturn the constitutionally recognized presumption of innocence of the accused where lapses in the buy bust operation are shown. As we held inPeople v. Sanchez,[41]
Admittedly, the defense did not adduce any evidence showing that SPO2 Sevilla had any motive to falsify. The regularity of the performance of his duties, however, leaves much to be desired given the lapses in his handling of the allegedly confiscated drugs as heretofore shown.
An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People, is to negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. There can be no ifs and buts regarding this consequence considering the effect of the evidentiary presumption of regularity on the constitutional presumption of innocence.
People v. Santos instructively tells us that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Underscoring supplied)
In this connection, since there were only three persons who had witnessed what actually transpired between SPO1 Mora and the accused prior to the arrest (the accused, SPO1 Mora and the confidential informant), the prosecution’s failure to present the confidential informant left it without any witness to corroborate SPO1 Mora’s testimony. In effect, it is SPO1 Mora’s word against that of the accused.
However, SPO1 Mora’s testimony is unreliable. First, he testified that after interviewing the confidential informant who arrived at their office either at 5 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. of 6 November 2006, they prepared the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet and sent it to PDEA on the same day. However, the time stamped on the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet showed that it was sent to PDEA much earlier - either at 1:30 p.m., 1:40 p.m. or 2 p.m. of 6 November 2006. Second, while SPO1 Mora claimed to have custody of the shabu specimen right after recovering it from Martin during the latter’s arrest, he did not mark the same at the scene of the crime. This is contrary to the explicit procedure for seizure of evidence laid down in Section 21 of R.A. 9165. He justified his non-compliance by saying that at the time, the guidelines had not yet been “properly implemented.” Contrary to SPO1 Mora’s excuse, however, the implementing guidelines for R.A. No. 9165 took effect on November 27, 2002, or four years before this incident.Third, SPO1 Mora had custody of the buy-bust money at the time of Martin’s arrest but when asked to explain its loss less than a year after the incident, he could not remember whether or not he handed it over to the investigator.[42]
In view of the cited irregularities in the buy bust operation and the processing of the evidence shown in the preceding discussion, SPO1 Mora’s word cannot be given more weight than that of the accused.
The burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the crime charged is based on the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused until the contrary is proven.[43] Measured against this yardstick, and considering the foregoing discussion, the prosecution has fallen short of what is required for the conviction of the accused.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the appealed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Roberto Martin y Castano is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. His release from detention is hereby ordered forthwith, unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
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