We grant the petition.
As a general rule, only questions of law may be allowed in a petition for review on certiorari.[12]Considering, however, that the Labor Arbiter’s findings were reversed by the NLRC, whose Decision was in turn overturned by the CA, reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, it behooves the Court to reexamine the records and resolve the conflicting rulings.[13]
Scrutinizing the records, we find that the NLRC’s finding of illegal dismissal is supported by the totality of evidence and more consistent with logic and ordinary human experience than the common finding of the CA and Labor Arbiter that petitioner informally severed his employment relationship with the company. It hardly convinces us that after declining his supposed transfer to another department as per the information relayed to him by his supervisor, petitioner would readily turn over his files and samples unless something critical indeed took place in his subsequent closed-door meeting with Sy and Garcia. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is irrelevant whether or not he had earlier inquired from his supervisor what he will receive if he offers instead to resign upon being told of his impending transfer, for what matters is the action of Sy on his employment status. If ever petitioner momentarily contemplated resignation and such was the impression he conveyed in his talk with his supervisor prior to the meeting with Sy, such is borne by circumstances indicating Garcia’s antagonism towards petitioner. In any event, whether such perception of a strained working relationship with Garcia was mistaken or not is beside the point. The crucial factor is the verbal order directly given by Sy, the company president, for petitioner to immediately turn over his accountabilities. Notably, Sy got irked when petitioner asked for his termination paper. Petitioner apparently wanted to ascertain whether such summary dismissal was official, and it was well within his right to demand that he be furnished with a written notice in order to apprise him of the real ground for his termination.
Contrary to respondents’ theory that petitioner’s act of turning over the company files and samples is proof of his voluntary informal resignation rather than of the summary dismissal effected by management, no other plausible explanation can be made of such immediate turn over except that petitioner directly confirmed from the company president herself that he was already being dismissed. The subsequent memos sent to petitioner’s residence after he did not anymore report for work only reinforce the conclusion that the belated written notice of the charge against him – his alleged failure to meet the prescribed sales quota – was an afterthought on the part of respondents who may have realized that they failed to observe due process in terminating him. That respondents would still require a written explanation for petitioner’s poor sales performance after the latter already complied with Sy’s directive to turn over all his accountabilities is simply inconsistent with their claim that petitioner offered to resign and voluntarily relinquished possession of company files and samples when told of his impending transfer. In other words, petitioner was not given any opportunity to defend himself from whatever charges hurled by management against him, such as poor sales performance as relayed to him by his supervisor, when Sy unceremoniously terminated him which must have shocked him considering that his supervisor earlier advised that he would just be transferred to another department. Under this scenario, petitioner’s decision not to report for work anymore was perfectly understandable, as the sensible reaction of an employee fired by no less than the company president. It was indeed a classic case of dismissal without just cause and due process, which is proscribed under our labor laws.
As to the affidavits submitted by the respondents, these are at best self-serving having been executed by employees beholden to their employer and which evidence by themselves did not refute petitioner’s main cause of action -- the fact of his summary dismissal on February 19, 2002. Respondents’ effort to present the case as one of an erring employee about to be investigated for poor sales performance must likewise fail. The NLRC duly noted the discriminatory treatment accorded to petitioner when it declared that there is no evidence at all that other sales personnel who failed to meet the prescribed sales quota were similarly reprimanded or penalized. Incidentally, the question may be asked if petitioner whose performance was assessed by management as “poor” yet admittedly ranked second to the top sales agent of the company, why was it that no evidence was submitted by respondents to show the comparative sales performance of all sales agents? Given the strained working relationship with Garcia, or at least a perception of such gap on the part of petitioner, the latter could not have been properly informed of the actual ground for his dismissal. But more importantly, respondents terminated petitioner first and only belatedly sent him written notices of the charge against him. Fairness requires that dismissal, being the ultimate penalty that can be meted out to an employee, must have a clear basis. Any ambiguity in the ground for the termination of an employee should be interpreted against the employer, who ordained such ground in the first place.[14]
Resignation is defined as“the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.”[15] In this case, the evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; he was orally dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process, that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages.[16] Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary resignation. Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents.[17]
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal.Furthermore, Article 4 of the Labor Code expresses the basic principle that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor of the workingman. This principle has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence presented by the employer and the employee.[18] Thus we have held that if the evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[19] Accordingly, the NLRC’s finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.
However, the award of back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement should be modified. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.[20] Under the facts established, petitioner is entitled to the payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondents on March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 21, 2006 and Resolution dated September 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88061 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 29, 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 035557-03 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS in that in addition to the unpaid commission ofP16,581.00, respondent Centro Ceramica Corporation is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Jhorizaldy Uy his full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one monthsalary for every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondent corporation on March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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