Identity of the accused not established; acquitted G.R. No. 183830

G.R. No. 183830

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Issue

The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.[19]

The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the culprit by Amegable in the following manner:[20]

As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailant’s face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.

At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very well recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering that he frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:

Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I correct?

A: Several times.

Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?

A: No, sir.

Q: Are you acquainted with him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Even if he is in his back position?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)

Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.

The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegable’s declaration in court and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellant’s criminal liability. Her whole attention was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to strengthen the witness’ credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.

In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against appellant.

Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.

Contrary to the CA’s holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegable’s recognition of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral certainty.

When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,[21] to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:

xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.[22]

Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso’s back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of another’s back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.[23]

Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number “11” did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.

Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegable’s identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.

The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate dated June 9, 1997,[24] did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere scratch marks,[25]were not even linked by the examining physician to the crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to his doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence of guilt is nil.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,[26]though his innocence may be doubted.[27] The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.[28]

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further detention.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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