"x x x.
Jurisprudence has clearly established the doctrine that a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from entering an electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct periods to file the corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) over the case is dependent.
x x x.
The Court’s Ruling
The Comelec has the constitutional mandate to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.”[16] It has the power to create its own rules and regulations, a power it exercised on 11 November 2009 in promulgating Resolution No. 8696, or the “Rules on Disqualification of Cases filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.” Section 4 thereof provides for the procedure to be followed in filing the following petitions: 1) Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy; 2) Petition to Declare a Nuisance Candidate, and 3) petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the Election Code and petition to disqualify for lack of qualifications or for possessing some grounds for disqualification.
Resolution No. 8696 provides for the venue for the filing of the petitions and the period within which they should be filed. The validity of the said Resolution has been recognized by this Court in the fairly recent case ofAmora v. Comelec.[17]
Munder alleges that Sarip’s petition with the Comelec should be considered as one to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC, and not for disqualification. One of the important differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods. For a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to file is within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. On the other hand, a petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed at any day after the last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.
It has been argued by Munder, who was earlier sustained by the Comelec Second Division, that the petition for disqualification should be treated as a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, which had already prescribed.
We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petition filed by Sarip. The main ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that he was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not. This ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.
Amora v. Comelec is applicable to the present controversy. In that case, similar to the present one, a mayoralty candidate was disqualified by the Comelec pursuant to a Petition for Disqualification. The petition was filed by one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, on the ground that the CoC had not been properly sworn to. Amora won in the election, but was disqualified by the Comelec after he was proclaimed as mayor of Candijay, Bohol. One of the issues clarified in the said case was the distinction between a Petition for Disqualification and a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The Court, in effect, held that the Comelec should have dismissed the petition outright, since it was premised on a wrong ground. A Petition for Disqualification has specific grounds different from those of a Petition to Deny Due Course to or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The latter is anchored on the false representation by a candidate as to material information in the CoC.[18]
For a petition for disqualification, the law expressly enumerates the grounds in Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 as amended, and which was replicated in Section 4(b) of Comelec Resolution No. 8696. The grounds stated by respondent in his Petition for Disqualification – that Munder was not qualified to run for not being a registered voter therein – was not included in the enumeration of the grounds for disqualification. The grounds in Section 68 may be categorized into two. First, those comprising “prohibited” acts of candidates; and second, the fact of their permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate according to the law.
In the earlier case of Fermin v. Comelec[19], the Court clarified the two remedies that may be availed of by a candidate to prevent another from running in an electoral race. The Court held:
The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the “disqualification” of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification….
. . .
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local Government Code]. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.[20]
In Fermin, the Court has debunked the interpretation that a petition for disqualification covers the absence of the substantive qualifications of a candidate (with the exception of the existence of the fact of the candidate's permanent residency abroad). It has, in effect, even struck down a Comelec Resolution - Resolution No. 7800, which enumerated the grounds for a petition for disqualification to include the non-registration of a candidate as voter in the locality where he or she is running as a candidate. In ruling as such, Resolution No. 7800 which was considered as infringement of the powers of the legislature, the Court reiterated an earlier ruling:
A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.[21]
Responding to the above ruling, the Comelec’s subsequent Resolution on the same matter deleted the enumerated grounds, interpreted by the Court as improper for a petition for disqualification, found in Comelec Resolution 7800.[22]
It is thus clear that the ground invoked by Sarip in his Petition for Disqualification against Munder - the latter’s alleged status as unregistered voter in the municipality - was inappropriate for the said petition. The said ground should have been raised in a petition to cancel Munder’s CoC. Since the two remedies vary in nature, they also vary in their prescriptive period. A petition to cancel a CoC gives a registered candidate the chance to question the qualification of a rival candidate for a shorter period: within 5 days from the last day of their filing of CoCs, but not later than 25 days from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled.[23] A petition for disqualification may be filed any day after the last day of the filing of CoC but not later than the date of the proclamation.[24]
The Comelec Second Division stated that the last day of filing of the CoCs was on 21 December 2009. Thus, the period to file a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had already prescribed when Sarip filed his petition against Munder.
It was therefore grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc to gloss over the issue of whether the petition was one for disqualification or for the cancellation of CoC. The nature of the petition will determine whether the action has prescribed, and whether the Commission can take cognizance of the petition. In directly tackling the factual issues without determining whether it can properly take cognizance of the petition, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion.
Assuming arguendo that the Comelec En Banc could answer the factual issue of Munder’s non-registration as a voter in Bubong by considering it as a ground for the disqualification of his candidacy, we find that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Munder the voter was not Munder the mayoralty candidate. We observe that the Comelec En Banc relied on the Voter's Certification indicating one Alfaiz Tocalo Munder registering for the first time in 2003, with 7 May 1984 as birth date, and stating therein that he was 18 years old at the time of the registration. We find this evidence insufficient to impeach the fact that he
was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. In the first place, the registration was in 2003, while the election was in 2010. The said evidence would not negate the fact that in 2010, he had already attained eligibility to run for mayor. In such a small municipality like Bubong, the likelihood of not being able to know whether one has a namesake, especially when one is running for a public office, is very slim. Sarip should have proved that another Alfais Tocalo Munder is in existence, and that the latter is the registered voter and not herein petitioner. In such a case, Sarip's remedy is not a Petition for Disqualification, but a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. Otherwise, his remedy, after Munder has been proclaimed is to file aquo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that Munder lacks the eligibility required by law.
It may be true that in 2003, Munder, who was still a minor, registered himself as a voter and misrepresented that he was already of legal age. Even if it was deliberate, we cannot review his past political acts in this petition. Neither can the Comelec review those acts in an inappropriate remedy. In so doing, it committed grave abuse of discretion, and the act resulting therefrom must be nullified.
With this conclusion, Sarip's petition has become moot. There is no longer any issue of whether to apply the rule on succession to an elective office, since Munder is necessarily established in the position for which the people have elected him.
x x x."
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