OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32]the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.”
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,[33] “[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court’s ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accused’s act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said examiner’s testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabuinto the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] “[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.”
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court’s finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
“Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.”[38] “[C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.”[39] “It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.”[40] “The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole” as we ruled inPeople v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Petitioner’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioner’s contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner’s bag.[42] Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this slight clash in Cinco’s statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial court’s words on this matter when it resolved petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence in its Order[44] of
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang’s bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN,
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. “In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.”[46] Also, where there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is amalum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. “It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.”[47]
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48] The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from “life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00” to “reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million”. On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty ofreclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.
And, since “reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect”,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
SO ORDERED.
