Section 8 of the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (R.A. 7305) provides that “(i)n case of regular employment of public health workers, their services shall not be terminated except for cause provided by law and after due process.”
Nevertheless, a government officer or employee’s removal from office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a valid cause for that employee’s removal.[9]
Hence, the pertinent issue would be whether the reorganization herein was undertaken in bad faith.
Petitioners claim that the provincial government’s reorganization implemented by Governor Parilla was not caused by a desire to streamline the local bureaucracy to save on resources. They allege that despite the availability of a sufficient number of vehicles for official use, the provincial government bought five motor vehicles, which were used by provincial officials belonging to the same political party as that of Governor Parilla. Allegedly, there were also excessive numbers of casuals hired and positions/items abolished, only to create new ones with substantially the same functions. Petitioners were all appointees of former Governor Wayne Jaro, who is the political enemy of Governor Parilla.
On the other hand, the provincial government argued, and the CSC found, that the Biliran Province had a total of 162 personnel in 1990. However, this number swelled to 381 personnel in 1998. Reorganization was therefore called for to lessen the budget allocation for personnel services; and to increase that for development projects, the purchase of medicines and supplies, and the maintenance of infrastructure.
It is a basic principle that good faith is presumed and that the party who alleges bad faith has the burden of proving the allegation. Petitioners therefore had the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the province when it undertook the reorganization. Section 2 of R.A. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization) cites instances that may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal from office of a government officer or employee pursuant to a reorganization, to wit:
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Underscoring supplied.)
Measured against the foregoing guidelines, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to show bad faith on the part of the Province in effecting the reorganization.
First, petitioners have failed to show that there was a “significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern” of Biliran Province as a result of the reorganization. On the contrary, it is undisputed that from a high of 120 positions in 1998, the number of those at the Biliran Provincial Health Office was reduced to only 98 after the reorganization.[10]Even assuming the truth of petitioners’ claim that the CSC and the CA committed a misapprehension of facts in equating the number of personnel in the Biliran Provincial Hospital with the number of personnel in the entire Provincial Health Office, this conclusion cannot be altered in the absence of glaring error in such apprehension.
Second, petitioners have failed to present evidence that an office performing substantially the same functions as an abolished office was created as a result of the reorganization. We note that there were four new positions created within the Provincial Health Office (one Medical Technologist II for the Health Services Group; and one Storekeeper each for Caibiran Community Hospital, Culaba Community Hospital and Maripipi Community Hospital). None of these positions may be considered as having been created to perform substantially the same functions as any of the abolished offices. None of the petitioners held the position of Storekeeper; and, although petitioner Najarro held the position of Medical Technologist II, he was then assigned to the Maripipi Community Hospital, and not to the Health (Field) Services Group.
Third, petitioners have not shown that there was a “reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices.”
Fourth, petitioners have not adduced evidence that they were “replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit.” Alternatively, petitioners have not adduced any evidence to show that their qualifications in terms of performance and merit are any better than those possessed by the persons who were eventually appointed to the reorganized positions.
Neither have petitioners been able to demonstrate that their removal from office as a result of the reorganization violated the order of separation as found in Section 3 of R.A. 6656, particularly, in the provision that “those … who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid [off] first, length of service notwithstanding.”
Petitioners also erroneously insist on the application of the “next in rank” rule in claiming that they should have been appointed to the available positions after the reorganization. However, the “next in rank rule” specifically applies only to promotions and not to positions created in the course of a valid reorganization.[11] Apart from the fact that the “next in rank” rule only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, it does not by any means give him exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy. Indeed, the appointing authority is vested with sufficient discretion to appoint a candidate, as long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications under the law.[12]
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