Thursday, May 10, 2012

Genuineness of handwriting; how proved. - G.R. No. 164457

G.R. No. 164457

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The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the Prosecution’s flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
         
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondent’s cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondent’s cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action is founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent’s importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon.  Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.  In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons.  She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King’s testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.  Here, respondent’s documentary exhibits are private documents.  They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner’s liability.

That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencan’s testimony bypetitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse party’s waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial court’s overruling of petitioner’s objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
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