Thursday, May 10, 2012

Lawyer disbarred for abusing the remedy of motion to inhibit and for using secret internal documents of Supreme Court to support his motions. - A. C. No. 6332

A. C. No. 6332

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EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peña’s actions in the administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the public and the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues.[98] They shall not, in their professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.[99] Lawyers shall use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.[100] The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of a judicial forum.[101]
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged.[102]
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent Peña has manifested a troubling history of praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1.                  Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;
2.                  Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;
3.                  Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;
4.                  Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;
5.                  Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6.                  Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;
7.                  Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;
8.                  Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
9.                  Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;
10.              Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
11.              Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);
12.              Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;
13.              Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June 2008;
14.              Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15.              Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;
16.              Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
17.              Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;
18.              Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;
19.              Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;
20.              Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and
21.              Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and sparse relations between the parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer.[103] He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on the ground that she was “a close judicial ally” of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to respondent, was antagonistic toward him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive Session in this administrative case.[104] 
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Court’s Third Division because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former President Fidel V. Ramos.[105]  He similarly sought the inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President Ramos.[106] He likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to respondent Peña, “President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice Brion.”[107]
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban Bank because of his decision in a related case[108] and his prior appointment as Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent Peña impliedly prayed that his case be specifically retained in the Court’s Third Division.[109] Respondent’s peculiar request, which was not included in his other motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member being designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether. Respondent Peña’s odd prayer in his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,[110] the Court warned against litigants’ contumacious practice in successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause:

We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’ apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.

As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not always be heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain cases to their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition and re-raffle filed by respondent Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice, most especially in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons why this administrative case has dragged on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise delays the administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving the case than about making sure that the “wrong” or “unfriendly” Justices – in his perception – do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted interruptions caused by his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case languishing in this Court for years and clogging its dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an example so that litigants be reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules of basic courtesy in imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Peña has violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action – in this Court, no less – tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be sanctioned accordingly.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First Division, attached as Annexes “B” and “C” of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex “D” of the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex “5” of respondent Peña’s Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex “A” of the Reply (to Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Peña. She is further required to SUBMIT such an investigation report with recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting confidential and internal court documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.
          SO ORDERED.

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