Saturday, May 21, 2022
Certificate of candidacy, denial or cancellation of.
"The COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings.
Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-be candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COC's cancellation or the withholding of due course. To quote these provisions:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualification for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.6 The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.7"
G. R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008
NARDO M. VELASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MOZART P. PANLAQUI, respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_180051_2008.html
Grave abuse of discretion
"Grave Abuse of Discretion.
The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion.4 Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."5
Velasco imputes grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC for canceling his COC on the sole ground that he committed false representation when he claimed that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A. This imputation directly poses to us the question: was the COMELEC ruling capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily made?
In answering this question, we recognize at the outset that together with the cancellation of the COC that is directly before us, we have to consider the effect and impact of the inclusion/exclusion proceedings that Velasco brought before the MTC which, on appeal to the RTC, ultimately led to the denial of his listing as a voter in Sasmuan. While this inclusion/exclusion case is not before us, it was the ruling in this proceeding that the COMELEC cited as ground for the cancellation of Velasco's COC after Velasco claimed that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga."
G. R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008
NARDO M. VELASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MOZART P. PANLAQUI, respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_180051_2008.html
Due process in cancellation of certificate of candidacy and nullification of proclamation
"The Due Process Issue.
Finally, we see no merit in Velasco's argument that the COMELEC annulled his proclamation as Mayor without due process. The nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate was an outcome - a necessary legal consequence - of the cancellation of his COC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. A COC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.22 In the present case, Velasco filed an Answer to Panlaqui's petition to cancel or deny due course to his (Velasco's) COC; hence, he was afforded the opportunity to be heard in the cancellation of his COC.
Under the combined application of Sections 623 and 724 of Republic Act No. 6646,25 candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. If the disqualification or COC cancellation/denial case is not resolved before election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.26 In the meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and be proclaimed if he or she wins, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her COC continues. This rule applies even if the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes,27 and even if the candidate is proclaimed and has taken his oath of office.28 The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional or senatorial candidates with unresolved disqualification or COC denial/cancellation cases after the elections. Pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction over these unfinished cases in favor of the respective Senate or the House of Representatives electoral tribunals after the candidates take their oath of office.29
Under these circumstances, Velasco's claim of denial of due process is misplaced since he was given the opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that would result in the annulment of his proclamation; due process was duly served because its essence is the opportunity to be heard and this was fully given to Velasco.30
In sum, the COMELEC resolutions canceling Velasco's COC are procedurally and substantively correct, thus negating the grave abuse of discretion that Velasco alleges.
As our final point, we are aware that Velasco won the May 14, 2007 mayoralty election in Sasmuan. We recognize, too, that we have ruled in the past that a candidate's victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate's certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.31
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate's eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price - the nullification of his election victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The Status Quo Order we issued is hereby ordered IMMEDIATELY LIFTED. We DECLARE that there is no more legal impediment or obstacle to the implementation of the assailed COMELEC resolutions. No costs.
SO ORDERED."
GR No. 180051 December 24, 2008
NARDO M. VELASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MOZART PANLAQUI.
DISQUALIFICATION of winning candidate, effect of.
"On Palileng’s Proclamation
There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.
First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 200421 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases23 because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases24 had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.
Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law. In Labo, the Court applied the second sentence of Section 6, and even italicized the second sentence for emphasis, thus:
x x x In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:
"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case, Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.25 (Italicization in the original)
Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes "shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and "shall not be counted."
To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate’s disqualification had become final before the elections.
In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat’s petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated 12 April 2004 and the Orders dated 9 May 2004 and 25 October 2004.
SO ORDERED."
G. R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 165736 April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.
Failure to pay FILING FEE for motion for reconsideration, effect of.
"On the Late Filing of Cayat’s Motion for Reconsideration
Cayat learned about the promulgation of the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 and its contents through two separate telegrams. He narrates the circumstances of his receipt of these telegrams as follows:
10. On April 13, 2004, I took a jeepney ride to Loo, Buguias, to attend a farmers’ congress. When the jeep I was riding in made a stop in front of the Lino’s Grocery in Abatan, somebody (who was not an employee of the Telecom Office) came rushing to give me a telegram which I received. Said telegram, which I read later, informed me that the Comelec will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila;
11. I could not make a trip to my lawyer in Baguio City until April 15, 2004, because he was appearing with Attorneys Samson Alcantara and Rene Gorospe before the Supreme Court which was holding oral arguments in Baguio City;
12. On April 15, 2004, at about 3:00 o’clock, I received a text message in the office of my lawyer that a telegram was served to Mr. Simon Guinid. The message was forwarded. It gave information that my Certificate of Candidacy (COC) had been canceled by the First Division of the Comelec;
x x x x15
On 16 April 2004, Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2004 before the COMELEC en banc. Cayat alleged that although the Resolution was promulgated on 12 April 2004, he was notified by telegram only on 13 April 2004. Hence, Cayat posits, he had until 16 April 2004 to move for reconsideration.
Cayat claims that he was not served the advance notice of promulgation required in Section 7 of Resolution No. 6452,16 stating:
Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram or fax.
The three-day period17 from promulgation of the resolution in Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452, within which to file a motion for reconsideration, presupposes that the advance notice in Section 7 was served on Cayat.
The COMELEC sent the advance notice to Cayat by telegram to "Bayoyo, Buguias, Benguet," the address Cayat wrote on the blank space provided beside "RESIDENCE" in the Certificate of Candidacy he filed with the COMELEC.18 The COMELEC sent the telegram to Cayat before the date of promulgation. Cayat, who was traveling throughout Buguias at the time, admitted in his affidavit that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."19
Clearly, by the wordings of the telegram, the COMELEC sent the telegram to the residence address of Cayat before 12 April 2004, the date of promulgation. It is immaterial if Cayat personally received the telegram after 12 April 2004 as long as the telegram was sent and delivered before 12 April 2004 to the residence address Cayat indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy.
However, there is no point belaboring this issue, which need not even be resolved. Whether the telegram reached the residence address of Cayat before or after the date of promulgation will not affect the outcome of this case. Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee when he filed his motion for reconsideration on 16 April 2004. There is no dispute that the failure to pay the filing fee made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all.
Thus, the disqualification of Cayat became final three days after 13 April 2004, based on Cayat’s own allegation that he received the telegram only on 13 April 2004 and that he had until 16 April 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy due to disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, or 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections.
On Cayat’s Failure to Pay the Filing Fee
for His Motion for Reconsideration
In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. Cayat made a fatal error: he failed to pay the required filing fee for his motion for reconsideration.
Although there is nothing in Resolution No. 6452 which mentions the need to pay a fee for filing a motion for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes a fee of ₱300 for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or resolution. The succeeding section further provides that the COMELEC may refuse to take action until it is paid.
Cayat’s motion for reconsideration is merely pro forma because Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee within the prescribed period.20 This brings us to the conclusion that it is as if no motion for reconsideration had been filed, resulting in the 12 April 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division attaining finality. The COMELEC First Division’s 12 April 2004 Resolution declaring Cayat’s disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, long before the 10 May 2004 local elections."
G. R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 165736 April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.
Rule of SUCCESSION applied in DISQUALIFICATION cases
"Second Issue:
The Lawful Mayor
In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be proclaimed mayor-elect after the disqualification of Moll, the Comelec applied Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which provides:
"Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
x x x x x x x x x
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot."
The poll body interpreted the phrase "disqualified by final judgment" to mean "disqualification by a final judgment of conviction," which was the ground upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:
"In this case, the disqualification is based specifically on the final judgment of conviction by a court against private respondent. This final judgment disqualified private respondent from filing his certificate of candidacy in the first instance, and continues to disqualify private respondent from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes and the general rule in the Sunga Case does not apply. Consequently, petitioner, having obtained the highest number of valid votes, is entitled to be proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate."11
Further, it said:
"x x x As such, this instance constitutes an exception to the general rule enunciated in the Sunga Case. In the language of the said case, the foregoing provision of law is a statute which clearly asserts a legislative policy contrary to the rule that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner, given that the votes for the disqualified candidate, though of highest number, are deemed stray and invalid. Consequently, the so-called ‘second placer’ shall be declared the winner because he or she in fact obtained the highest number of valid votes."12
Such arguments do not persuade.
In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration, and their expressed will must at all times be given effect.13 When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the highest number of votes in the election for an office, no one else can be declared elected in place of the former.14 In a long line of cases, this Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.15
The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception declared by the Court in Sunga v. Comelec,16 from which we quote:
"x x x The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless."17
According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
"Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (Italics supplied)
When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other grounds for disqualification.18 It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code.
More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued Resolution No. SPA No. 01-272. The Resolution adopted the recommendation of the provincial election supervisor of Albay to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate in Malinao, Albay. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.
A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was ineligible cannot retroact to the date of the election and thereby invalidate the votes cast for him.19
Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an ineligible candidate. As discussed above, the Resolution declaring him as such was rendered long after the election. Thus, on the part of those who voted for him, their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, and without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.20
The Comelec’s interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant an accepted doctrine laid down by this Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,21 we said:
"x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances."22
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.23
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In such situations, if the equation changes because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, voters’ preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that the results for qualified candidates would not be self-evident.24 The absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer.25 Where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or a plurality of the votes, by no mathematical formulation can the runnerup in the election be construed to have obtained the majority or the plurality of votes cast.26
We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as their mayor.27 The law on succession under Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. This provision relevantly states:
"SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. —
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
x x x x x x x x x.
"For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office."
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it admits no room for interpretation, but merely for application.28 Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the office.29 In such eventuality, the duly elected vice mayor shall succeed as provided by law.30
For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion.31
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner Salvador K. Moll is DECLARED ineligible for the position of municipal mayor of Malinao, Albay. In view of the vacancy created in that office, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare, the duly elected vice mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule on succession. The status quo order of this Court dated April 1, 2003, is made permanent. Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers of the mayor of Malinao, Albay. The Petition in GR 157527 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
G. R. No. 157526 April 28, 2004
EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 157527 April 28, 2004
SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Criminal cases - appeal, modification of judgment.
"Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of conviction5 -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment "promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the proceedings, he still filed a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary period."6 Thus, according to him, the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.
We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads thus:
"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation." (Italics supplied)
In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:
"Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run." (Italics supplied)
It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did file, however, was a "Motion to Quash the Information"; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.
The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.
Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.
Moll himself admitted that "no regular appeal was filed because he was still questioning the propriety of the denial of his Motion to Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of the promulgation of his sentence despite his absence x x x."7 Aside from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the motion to quash was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the accused at any time before entering a plea8 and certainly not on the day of the promulgation, as Moll did.
As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, which argues as follows:
"It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his counsel was present on the day of the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence, because of Moll’s unexplained absence, the promulgation of the judgment could be validly made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court)."9
Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment against him has become final.10 Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor, under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:
"Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
x x x x x x x x x."
Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position."
G. R. No. 157526 April 28, 2004
EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 157527 April 28, 2004
SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Saturday, April 30, 2022
Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution
Mediation and JDR in civil cases
By Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III
January 14, 2022
Manila Standard
“Parties to a dispute must take advantage of these to save their and the court’s time and resources.”
Mediation is a method of settling disputes outside a court setting where a neutral third party, known as a mediator, acts as a link between the parties (Barron’s Law Dictionary). In the Philippines, court-annexed mediation (CAM) is conducted by referring the parties to the mediator of the Philippine Mediation Center Unit (PMCU) accredited by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) is the process wherein a judge known as the JDR Judge employs conciliation, mediation, or early neutral evaluation in order to settle a case at the pre-trial stage (Definition, Philippine Judicial Academy). Under the 2019 Amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure (ARCP), the JDR judge is a judge other than the judge originally assigned to hear and try the case.
The CAM must be terminated no later than 30 days from the receipt of the referral order from the court and the JDR no later than 15 days from the receipt of such a referral order (Section 8, Chapter 2B and Section 3, 2C, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). If both the CAM and JDR are unsuccessful, the trial will proceed on the dates agreed upon during the pre-trial before the judge originally assigned to handle the case (Sections 8 and 9, Rule 18, ARCP).
The CAM shall be mandatory for all ordinary civil cases, including mediatable permissive or compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim. It shall also be mandatory for all special civil actions, except Declaratory Relief (Rule 63), Review of Decisions of COA or COMELEC (Rule 64), Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65), Quo Warranto (Rule 66), and Contempt (Rule 71) (Section 1(a)(b), Chapter 1).
CAM is mandatory in special proceedings cases involving the settlement of estate where the dispute involves claims against the estate, or the distribution or partition of the estate in intestate proceedings; and cases involving issues under the Family Code and other laws, in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations, guardianship of minor children, and other issues which can be the subject of a compromise agreement (Section 1(c)(d), Chapter 1).
Intellectual property cases, commercial or intra-corporate controversy cases, and environmental cases are all mandated to go through CAM (Section 1(e)(f)(g), Chapter 1). However, environmental cases are not required to undergo JDR unless the judge of the court to which the case was originally filed is convinced that settlement is still possible (Section 2(a), Chapter 1).
All cases subject of CAM and appealed cases from the first level courts or metropolitan/municipal trial courts may be referred to JDR in areas declared as JDR sites. (Section 2(a)(b), Chapter 1). The other cases that may be referred to JDR are: (a) settlements of estate, testate and intestate; (b) cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; (c) civil cases involving title to, or possession of, or interest over real property; and (d) habeas corpus cases decided by the metropolitan/municipal trial courts in the absence of any Regional Trial Court Judge (Section 2(1) to (4), Chapter 1).
In all other actions or proceedings where compromise is not prohibited by law and there is a likelihood of settlement, either or both of the parties may, by oral manifestation or written motion after the pre-trial/preliminary conference, or at any stage of the proceedings, request the court to refer their dispute to CAM and JDR, provided that there are still factual issues to be resolved (Section 3, Chapter 1).
There are cases that cannot be resolved by a compromise and therefore may not be referred to CAM and JDR. These are: (a) cases involving the civil status of persons; validity of a marriage or legal separation, any grounds for legal separation, future support, the jurisdiction of courts, and future legitime; (b) habeas corpus petitions; (c) probate of a will; and (d) cases with pending applications for restraining orders or preliminary injunctions (Section 4, Chapter 1).
However, for marriage cases where the parties inform the court that they have agreed to undergo mediation on some aspects of the case, the court may allow mediation on the custody of minor children, separation of property, or support pendente lite. By mutual consent of the parties, restraining orders and preliminary injunctions can also be subject to mediation (Section 4, Chapter 1).
It shall be the duty of the Judge during Pre-Trial/Preliminary Conference to orient the parties and counsels on: (a) the CAM process; (b) their mandatory appearance during the mediation proceedings; (c) their duty to negotiate in good faith and to exert earnest efforts to settle the case; and (d) the consequences of and sanctions for failure to appear before the PMCU or any misconduct or misbehavior committed during the mediation proceedings (Section 2(a)(b), Chapter 2A).
The Judge shall inform the parties that in case there is no settlement during CAM, the case may be referred to another court for JDR if the former is convinced that settlement is still possible. The parties will be informed that the JDR Judge may conduct a non-binding early neutral evaluation on the merits of their respective cases (Section 2(c)(d), Chapter 2A).
In the initial appearance of the parties and counsels for CAM, the PMCU shall require them to present proof of payment of mediation fees and assist them in selecting a mutually acceptable mediator from among the roster of mediators in the PMCU (Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2B). If the parties cannot jointly select a common mediator, the PMCU shall, in the presence of the parties, choose the mediator by lot from among the mediators present at the unit (Section 4, Chapter 2B).
The PMCU shall submit a Mediator’s Report to the court specifying the result of the mediation (Section 12, Chapter 2B). If a compromise agreement is reached by the parties, the judgment of the court approving the compromise agreement shall contain a statement that it was rendered through CAM. This is to distinguish the CAM judgment from the JDR judgment and vice versa. (Section 13, Chapter 2B, Section 9, Chapter 2C).
Upon receipt of the Mediator’s Report stating that no settlement was reached in CAM, the referring judge shall determine, in the hearing set for this purpose, if settlement is still possible, and if he is convinced that it is, refer the case to the JDR Judge (Section 1, Chapter 2C). Only those judges who have undergone skills-based training in JDR procedures and stationed in areas declared as JDR sites, are authorized to conduct JDR (Section 4, Chapter 2C).
The JDR Judge shall then conduct the JDR process as mediator, conciliator, and/or neutral evaluator to actively assist and facilitate negotiations among the parties for them to settle their dispute. As mediator and conciliator, he facilitates the settlement discussions between the parties to reconcile their differences (Section 5, Chapter 2C).
As a neutral evaluator, he assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case and makes a non-binding and impartial evaluation to guide the parties to a fair and mutually acceptable settlement of their dispute. If the case is not settled in JDR, the JDR Judge shall accomplish the JDR Report and return the case to the Judge for the continuation of the proceedings in court (Sections 5 and 8, Chapter 2C).
The trial court shall impose the following sanctions in case parties and counsels fail to appear during CAM or JDR proceedings: (a) dismissal of the case, when there is failure of the plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause; or (b) ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim when there is failure of the defendant and counsel to appear without valid cause (Section 5, Chapter 2D).
The court may, likewise, impose other sanctions, including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt, or reimbursement by the absent party of the costs of the appearing party, including attorney’s fees for that day up to treble such costs, which are payable on or before the date of the re-scheduled setting. In the exercise of its sound discretion, the trial court may lift, set aside, or modify the sanctions previously imposed (Section 5 and 6, Chapter 2D).
Any and all matters discussed or communications made, including requests for mediation, and documents presented during CAM and JDR shall be privileged and confidential. The mediator or JDR Judge shall not, in any manner, record the proceedings. No transcript or minutes of the mediation proceedings shall be taken. If personal notes are taken for guidance, the notes shall be destroyed. Should such records exist, the same shall also be privileged and confidential (Section 7, Chapter 2D).
Parties to a dispute must take advantage of the CAM and JDR in order to save their and the court’s time and resources. It may not look like a complete victory for either the complainant or defendant based on the reliefs sought in their respective pleadings but it may terminate the case that causes anxiety, sleepless nights and emotional distress. Hence, it is a win-win solution.
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii/314065991/mediation-and-jdr-in-civil-cases.html
“Parties to a dispute must take advantage of these to save their and the court’s time and resources.”
Mediation is a method of settling disputes outside a court setting where a neutral third party, known as a mediator, acts as a link between the parties (Barron’s Law Dictionary). In the Philippines, court-annexed mediation (CAM) is conducted by referring the parties to the mediator of the Philippine Mediation Center Unit (PMCU) accredited by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) is the process wherein a judge known as the JDR Judge employs conciliation, mediation, or early neutral evaluation in order to settle a case at the pre-trial stage (Definition, Philippine Judicial Academy). Under the 2019 Amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure (ARCP), the JDR judge is a judge other than the judge originally assigned to hear and try the case.
The CAM must be terminated no later than 30 days from the receipt of the referral order from the court and the JDR no later than 15 days from the receipt of such a referral order (Section 8, Chapter 2B and Section 3, 2C, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). If both the CAM and JDR are unsuccessful, the trial will proceed on the dates agreed upon during the pre-trial before the judge originally assigned to handle the case (Sections 8 and 9, Rule 18, ARCP).
The CAM shall be mandatory for all ordinary civil cases, including mediatable permissive or compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim. It shall also be mandatory for all special civil actions, except Declaratory Relief (Rule 63), Review of Decisions of COA or COMELEC (Rule 64), Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65), Quo Warranto (Rule 66), and Contempt (Rule 71) (Section 1(a)(b), Chapter 1).
CAM is mandatory in special proceedings cases involving the settlement of estate where the dispute involves claims against the estate, or the distribution or partition of the estate in intestate proceedings; and cases involving issues under the Family Code and other laws, in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations, guardianship of minor children, and other issues which can be the subject of a compromise agreement (Section 1(c)(d), Chapter 1).
Intellectual property cases, commercial or intra-corporate controversy cases, and environmental cases are all mandated to go through CAM (Section 1(e)(f)(g), Chapter 1). However, environmental cases are not required to undergo JDR unless the judge of the court to which the case was originally filed is convinced that settlement is still possible (Section 2(a), Chapter 1).
All cases subject of CAM and appealed cases from the first level courts or metropolitan/municipal trial courts may be referred to JDR in areas declared as JDR sites. (Section 2(a)(b), Chapter 1). The other cases that may be referred to JDR are: (a) settlements of estate, testate and intestate; (b) cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; (c) civil cases involving title to, or possession of, or interest over real property; and (d) habeas corpus cases decided by the metropolitan/municipal trial courts in the absence of any Regional Trial Court Judge (Section 2(1) to (4), Chapter 1).
In all other actions or proceedings where compromise is not prohibited by law and there is a likelihood of settlement, either or both of the parties may, by oral manifestation or written motion after the pre-trial/preliminary conference, or at any stage of the proceedings, request the court to refer their dispute to CAM and JDR, provided that there are still factual issues to be resolved (Section 3, Chapter 1).
There are cases that cannot be resolved by a compromise and therefore may not be referred to CAM and JDR. These are: (a) cases involving the civil status of persons; validity of a marriage or legal separation, any grounds for legal separation, future support, the jurisdiction of courts, and future legitime; (b) habeas corpus petitions; (c) probate of a will; and (d) cases with pending applications for restraining orders or preliminary injunctions (Section 4, Chapter 1).
However, for marriage cases where the parties inform the court that they have agreed to undergo mediation on some aspects of the case, the court may allow mediation on the custody of minor children, separation of property, or support pendente lite. By mutual consent of the parties, restraining orders and preliminary injunctions can also be subject to mediation (Section 4, Chapter 1).
It shall be the duty of the Judge during Pre-Trial/Preliminary Conference to orient the parties and counsels on: (a) the CAM process; (b) their mandatory appearance during the mediation proceedings; (c) their duty to negotiate in good faith and to exert earnest efforts to settle the case; and (d) the consequences of and sanctions for failure to appear before the PMCU or any misconduct or misbehavior committed during the mediation proceedings (Section 2(a)(b), Chapter 2A).
The Judge shall inform the parties that in case there is no settlement during CAM, the case may be referred to another court for JDR if the former is convinced that settlement is still possible. The parties will be informed that the JDR Judge may conduct a non-binding early neutral evaluation on the merits of their respective cases (Section 2(c)(d), Chapter 2A).
In the initial appearance of the parties and counsels for CAM, the PMCU shall require them to present proof of payment of mediation fees and assist them in selecting a mutually acceptable mediator from among the roster of mediators in the PMCU (Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2B). If the parties cannot jointly select a common mediator, the PMCU shall, in the presence of the parties, choose the mediator by lot from among the mediators present at the unit (Section 4, Chapter 2B).
The PMCU shall submit a Mediator’s Report to the court specifying the result of the mediation (Section 12, Chapter 2B). If a compromise agreement is reached by the parties, the judgment of the court approving the compromise agreement shall contain a statement that it was rendered through CAM. This is to distinguish the CAM judgment from the JDR judgment and vice versa. (Section 13, Chapter 2B, Section 9, Chapter 2C).
Upon receipt of the Mediator’s Report stating that no settlement was reached in CAM, the referring judge shall determine, in the hearing set for this purpose, if settlement is still possible, and if he is convinced that it is, refer the case to the JDR Judge (Section 1, Chapter 2C). Only those judges who have undergone skills-based training in JDR procedures and stationed in areas declared as JDR sites, are authorized to conduct JDR (Section 4, Chapter 2C).
The JDR Judge shall then conduct the JDR process as mediator, conciliator, and/or neutral evaluator to actively assist and facilitate negotiations among the parties for them to settle their dispute. As mediator and conciliator, he facilitates the settlement discussions between the parties to reconcile their differences (Section 5, Chapter 2C).
As a neutral evaluator, he assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case and makes a non-binding and impartial evaluation to guide the parties to a fair and mutually acceptable settlement of their dispute. If the case is not settled in JDR, the JDR Judge shall accomplish the JDR Report and return the case to the Judge for the continuation of the proceedings in court (Sections 5 and 8, Chapter 2C).
The trial court shall impose the following sanctions in case parties and counsels fail to appear during CAM or JDR proceedings: (a) dismissal of the case, when there is failure of the plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause; or (b) ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim when there is failure of the defendant and counsel to appear without valid cause (Section 5, Chapter 2D).
The court may, likewise, impose other sanctions, including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt, or reimbursement by the absent party of the costs of the appearing party, including attorney’s fees for that day up to treble such costs, which are payable on or before the date of the re-scheduled setting. In the exercise of its sound discretion, the trial court may lift, set aside, or modify the sanctions previously imposed (Section 5 and 6, Chapter 2D).
Any and all matters discussed or communications made, including requests for mediation, and documents presented during CAM and JDR shall be privileged and confidential. The mediator or JDR Judge shall not, in any manner, record the proceedings. No transcript or minutes of the mediation proceedings shall be taken. If personal notes are taken for guidance, the notes shall be destroyed. Should such records exist, the same shall also be privileged and confidential (Section 7, Chapter 2D).
Parties to a dispute must take advantage of the CAM and JDR in order to save their and the court’s time and resources. It may not look like a complete victory for either the complainant or defendant based on the reliefs sought in their respective pleadings but it may terminate the case that causes anxiety, sleepless nights and emotional distress. Hence, it is a win-win solution.
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii/314065991/mediation-and-jdr-in-civil-cases.html
Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers to extrinsic or collateral fraud which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court.
"While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the Court deems it necessary to write finis to this case at this level in order to avoid remanding the case to the appellate court. It has been held that "remand is not necessary if the Court is in a position to resolve a dispute on the basis of the records before it; and if such remand would not serve the ends of justice."51 A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to support a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers to extrinsic or collateral fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court.53 In Lasala v. National Food Authority,54 the Court defined extrinsic fraud in relation to parties represented by counsel, viz.:
Extrinsic fraud x x x refers to "any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat."
Because extrinsic fraud must emanate from the opposing party, extrinsic fraud concerning a party's lawyer often involves the latter's collusion with the prevailing party, such that his lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.
In this light, we have ruled in several cases that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount to the extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.
We so ruled not only because extsic fraud has to involve the opposing party, but also because the negligence of counsel, as a rule, binds his client.55 (Citations omitted)
Given this definition, the Court found the following circumstances sufficient to make out a case for extrinsic fraud:
The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers to vigilantly protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its counsel, they were its employees tasked to advance the agency's legal interests.
Further, the NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it appears deliberate on their part.
First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its chance to recover from Lasala the employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer.
Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on his part. Parenthetically, this was not the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the same when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in a prior 1993 case where Lasala secured a judgment of P34,500,229.67 against the NFA.
For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse decision was lost and was only found after the lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA was forced to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.
Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-examine Lasala's witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove and counter Lasala's counterclaim. Atty. Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala was awarded the huge amount of P52,788,970.50, without any convincing evidence to support it.
When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned that the NFA's copy of the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for appeal had already lapsed.
The trial court's adverse decision, of course, could have been avoided or the award minimized, if Atty. Cahucom did not waive the NFA's right to present its controverting evidence against Lasala's counterclaim evidence. Strangely, when asked during hearing, Atty. Cahucom refused to refute Lasala's testimony and instead simply moved for the filing of a memorandum.
The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with unreasonable disregard for the case they were handling and with obvious indifference towards the NFA's plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys. Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial court's huge and baseless counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from making a fair submission in the controversy.56
Lasala has been subsequently reiterated in Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation,57 where the Court held that:cralawred
[I]n cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of extrinsic fraud, the Court must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. x x x [F]or the extrinsic fraud to justify a petition for relief from judgment, it must be that fraud which the prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard on his action or defense. Such fraud concerns not the judgment itself but the manner in which it was obtained. Guided by these pronouncements, the Court in the case of Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals wrote:
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's professional delinquency or infidelity, the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.58 (Citations omitted and emphases in the original)
As in Lasala, the Court found sufficient factual justification for the grant of CEZA's petition for relief, viz.:
At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its right to present evidence during the trial of the case when Atty. Baniaga filed a joint manifestation submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings without informing CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty to protect his client's interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to submit the case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. Worse, after he received a copy of the decision, he did not even bother to inform his client and the OGCC of the adverse judgment. He did not even take steps to protect the interests of his client by filing an appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality. Such reckless and gross negligence deprived CEZA not only of the chance to seek reconsideration thereof but also the opportunity to elevate its case to the CA.59
Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her petition for relief fall way short of the jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic fraud. The Court quotes the allegations Dana made in her petition for relief with the trial court:
In all candor, [Dana] wanted to present her side of the controversy and all she intended was to take the witness stand. Without her knowing it, however, her time to present her evidence passed without her being able to do so. Her previous counsel did not remind, much less advice [sic], her of the hearing dates to present her case. Particularly, she was not simply aware of the hearings held by this [h]onorable [c]ourt on February 26 and March 26, 2009. She can only surmise that somebody must have maneuvered to impress, if not mislead, the [h]onorable [c]ourt that she was not interested to present her side.
This must be so since after [Dana] confronted her counsel about the promulgation of the Decision without her being able to present evidence, her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual decision not to present any evidence. This was not what [Dana] thought and knew. In the first place, she filed her Answer to the petition and assailed all the material allegations therein. She found no reason to abandon her case.
[Dana], by these assertions does not accuse her previous counsel any wrongdoing or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel. But it certainly had caused some harm to and, in fact, defrauded this [h]onorable [c]ourt which was led into believing that [Dana] was not interested in presenting her evidence. Hence, this [h]onorable [c]ourt found that [Dana] failed to appear despite notice as already mentioned above. Had it known that she was interested on [sic] presenting her side, this [h]onorable [c]ourt certainly would not have denied her that right. Otherwise put, by the deception, this Honorable Court was not aware that [Dana] was deprived of her day in court.60 (Emphasis and underlining Ours)
Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel failed to notify her of the hearings dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and second, that her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual decision to not present any evidence. However, she categorically admits that she "does not accuse her previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel."61 Furthermore, the petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances attributable to her counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity to fully ventilate her claims and defenses with the trial court. The acts complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and palpable negligence" nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The general rule, which binds the client to the negligence of her counsel, remains applicable to this case. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for relief."
DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019julydecisions.php?id=510
The propriety of setting aside the judgment on compromise.
"The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside the judgment on compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon compromise is well-settled. In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.44
However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void judgment; and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not divest rights, and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally worthless."45
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:cralawre
x x x
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation.
x x x x
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for certiorari with the CA, which is nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in her petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.
In Uy v. Chua,46 which also involves an issue not subject to compromise under Article 2035, the Court held:
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.47 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and even judges, who have drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction adulterous relations. The rule applies a fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore, erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11 Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the appellate court held, it was Dana's intention49 to have the case terminated upon the execution of the compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-Ã -vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court:cralawred
The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to their property relations vis-Ã -vis their children.50
However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of consent or other defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding upon Dana and Leodegario, as they have freely and willingly agreed to, and have already complied with, the covenants therein. The agreement operates as a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the trial court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse of discretion."
DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019julydecisions.php?id=510
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable and, hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be." Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, the grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial; and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.
"The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment upon compromise rendered by the court a quo. Dana maintains that the judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of their compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the validity of her marriage. To bolster her stand, she invokes Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution and urges the State to uphold, or at least try to uphold, her marriage. Leodegario, on the other hand, asserts the binding force of the trial court's decision and the judgment on compromise, claiming that the courts a quo acted according to law and jurisprudence in rendering the assailed judgments.
It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are, therefore, the Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court applying suppletorily.27
In the case at bar, the CA28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court decision had attained finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom. The two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the judgment on the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage had attained finality. Dana, on the other hand, asserts that it had not.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality of the RTC decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the subsequent proceedings a quo.
There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration or new trial from the RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal. However, probably cognizant of the proscription in Section 2030 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and filed a petition for relief from judgment.
There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court31 to cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana availed of an inappropriate remedy to question the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the trial court admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the issues thereon, and rendered an order denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order of denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of the 15-day period for appealing the decision.
Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is to set aside a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-6954 had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their marriage contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for relief from that judgment. From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate court. The appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties' compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition. This conclusion is untenable.
In Samia v. Medina,34 which involved the application of the statutory ascendant of Rule 38 in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the Court held:cralawred
There is a great deal of similarity between an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against" under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as both set aside the judgment, order, or proceeding complained of; both call for a new trial, and in both the injured party may question the order granting the motion for the new trial upon appeal from the new judgment rendered upon the merits of the case. The only fundamental difference lies in this, that while the judgment, order, or proceeding coming under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not final, that coming under section 113 is final. But this does not alter the nature or effect of the order granting the new trial, for this order does not put an end to the litigation in the sense that the party injured thereby has no other remedy short of appeal; he may question the propriety of the new trial on appeal from an adverse judgment rendered after such trial.35 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,36 decided prior to the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court held:cralawred
There is no question that a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an order granting such relief which is interlocutory. However, the second part of the above-quoted provision (that in the course of an appeal from the denial or dismissal of a petition for relief, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits) may give the erroneous impression that in such appeal the appellate court may reverse or modify the judgment on the merits. This cannot be done because the judgment from which relief is sought is already final and executor. x x x
The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.37 (Citations omitted)
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable38 and, hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment,41 the grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial;42 and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.
The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of the finality of the trial court decision."
DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019julydecisions.php?id=510
Wednesday, March 30, 2022
Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014
"In fine, we agree with the rulings of the HLURB, OP and the CA that respondents are entitled to the relief sought. Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.23 Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special competence.24"
Indispensable parties
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014
"As to petitioners' claim that they are merely necessary parties and that there must be a prior judgment directing and commanding the developer Silverland Realty & Development Corporation to enforce its contractual obligations, we are not convinced.
Respondents have sued not only the petitioners but also the developer corporation and the homeowners' association. That Silverland Realty & Development Corporation and Silverland Village 1 Homeowners Association did not file their answer, did not divest the HLURB of jurisdiction over the case. We agree with respondents that petitioners are indispensable parties for they were the ones who built and operate the church inside the subdivision and without them no final determination can be had of the action. Petitioners are the ones who will be affected by the judgment. In fact, they are the ones who are prohibited from using the subject property as a church."
Development permit - "While the construction and establishment of any church is not prohibited within a subdivision, the same should be located in an area designed or allowable in the approved development plan for the purpose."
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014
"On the second issue, we uphold the ruling that petitioners cannot use #46 of Silverlane Street for religious purposes or as a location of a church.
Here, as noted by the HLURB, the Development Permit indicates the use of the property as residential except for the designated open spaces. Petitioners do not deny that the building built beside the lot of Annie and Joel Geronimo is used as a church and that other religious activities are performed there. Clearly, this usage contravenes the land use policy particularly prescribed in the subdivision plan and in the Development Permit. Respondents, as subdivision lot owners, are entitled to assert that the use of the said property for religious activities be enjoined since it clearly violates the intended use of the subject lot.
Also, we find no fault on the part of the CA in affirming the HLURB’s act of taking judicial notice of the Development Permit issued for the project. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies.20 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.21
The issue of taking judicial notice of the Development Permit was also properly discussed and justified by the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB, First Division, to wit:
With respect to the assailed documents which the Office relied upon to arrive at its conclusion, Rule X, Section 6 of the HLURB Rules of Procedure provides:
Section 6. Summary resolution. – With or without the position paper or draft decision, the Arbiter shall resume (sic) the cases on bases of the pleadings and pertinent records of the case and of the Board.
The Regional Office can therefore take judicial notice of all documents forming part of its official records. The rule is in accord with Section 22 of Chapter IV, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
Neither can the argument that herein respondents are not bound by the development permit as this is only between the government and the developer, be held valid. To accept such rationalization would be to say that buyers, after acquiring title to a subdivision property, are free to set aside all zoning and development plans the government has deemed appropriate for the area in consideration of the general welfare.
Respondents, in deciding to acquire property in a subdivision project, are deemed to have accepted and understood, that they are not merely trying to possess a property but are in fact joining a unique community with a distinctive lifestyle envisioned since its development.
While the construction and establishment of any church is not prohibited within a subdivision, the same should be located in an area designed or allowable in the approved development plan for the purpose.22"
HLURB jurisdiction
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014
"On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.11 We have ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.12
We explained the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction in Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Spouses Ignacio13 in this wise:
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, "EMPOWERING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957," clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific terms:
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi- judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, "THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE." Section 3 of this statute provides:
x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. – The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
In Maria Luisa Park Association,Inc. (MPLAI) v. Almendras,14 we also ruled that:
The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Spouses Chua v. Ang,15 we held that:
The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium development involves public interest and welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. x x x
In the present case, respondents are buyers of a subdivision lot from subdivision owner and developer Silverland Realty & Development Corporation. Respondents’ action against Silverland Realty & Development Corporation was for violation of its own subdivision plan when it allowed the construction and operation of SACC.16 Respondents sued to stop the church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention of the residential use of the subdivision lots. Undoubtedly, the present suit for the enforcement of statutory and contractual obligations of the subdivision developer clearly falls within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction. Needless to stress, when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body.17 Split jurisdiction is not favored.18
Thus, respondents properly filed their complaint before the HLURB. The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations tomake the subdivision a better place to live in.19"
Tuesday, March 29, 2022
The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.
"We now determine whether or not the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, to wit: evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, were established.
The trial court ruled as follows:39
"The killing was qualified and characterized:
1) with evident premeditation because the killing was pre-planned (upon the victim's refusal to give liquor on credit at about ten o'clock in the evening, the accused roused with anger or showed signs of wrath followed by cool utterance or intention to follow the victim home, and finally after the lapse of about three hours or at one o'clock early dawn, they killed her — the accused had sufficient time to reflect dispassionately upon the consequences of their contemplated act); 2) with treachery because the malefactors took the defenseless victim at the main door of the house while on her way down and one of them thrust her with a knife and dragged (her) to the dark (sic) creek to finish her (off); 3) with abuse of superior strength because the victim (a woman) was attacked with a deadly weapon; and 4) by nocturnity because the accused took advantage of the darkness."
We hold that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following requirements are proved: (a) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of the act. Evident premeditation must, like the crime itself, be proved beyond reasonable doubt.40
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that appellant Hermosa was slighted by the refusal of the victim to extend credit in his favor. He gave her a dagger look. However, such behavior by itself is insufficient to prove that the appellants had determined, at that time, to kill the victim.41 At most, it only proved the motive for the killing.”
CONSPIRACY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.
"We sustain the trial court's finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime. It exists when, at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.38 Macuibelle testified that appellant Abelinde clubbed the victim's carabao. Thereafter, he joined appellant Hermosa who was then at the main door of the victim's house. They acted in unison in dragging the victim from her house to the creek where they finally finished her off. Their conduct clearly showed their mutual intent to kill the victim.”
CHILD WITNESS - "In the new Child Witness Rule, every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.
"The oft repeated rule is that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they are telling the truth or not.22 This opportunity enables the trial judge to detect better that thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court.23 Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that his judgment is erroneous.24
X x x.
We give full faith and credit to her testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was honest and sincere. It cannot be suspected as a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.
We should not take Macuibelle's testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. Indeed, the time when we degrade a child witness testimony is now passé. In the new Child Witness Rule,26 every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.27
Nonetheless, the appellants impugn the testimony of Macuibelle on the ground that she did not immediately tag them as the culprits when the investigating officer arrived at the scene. They also contend that it was improbable for the eyewitness to see the assailants of the victim because they would have put off the lamp she was carrying to avoid recognition.
We are not convinced. The alleged delay in identifying the appellants is more apparent than real. It is clear from the records that the appellants were identified by Macuibelle as the persons responsible for the death of the victim. She failed to mention their names when the police first arrived at the scene, but a few hours later, she told the police that the appellants were the assailants. In fact, the appellants were immediately arrested shortly after the discovery of the crime.28
Failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness.29 Even adult witnesses sometimes would not reveal at once the killers of their loved ones for one reason or another.30 Fear of the criminal is one such reason.31
We stress that the identity of the appellants was well established. Macuibelle positively identified them. The victim was then at the main door of their house when the appellants forcibly dragged her. She saw them from a distance of about six (6) meters. The lamp held by the victim provided the light that gave Macuibelle the chance to recognize the appellants.32 She was also familiar with them because they were neighbors. The possibility that she was mistaken as to their identity is nil.
We note, too, that appellant Abelinde claimed that his father and the victim were relatives. If that were true, then it is more unlikely for Macuibelle and her siblings to impute a grievous offense against him unless they are certain as to his involvement in the crime. Even appellant Hermosa could not think of any reason why Macuibelle pointed to him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.33 Her lack of ill motive bolsters her credibility.
The appellants also discredit Macuibelle because she went back to sleep after witnessing the stabbing of her mother. For the appellants, such behavior meant she did not witness the incident.
Again, we disagree. Macuibelle was only eight (8) years old when she witnessed the shocking incident. Despite her plea, no one came to help them when the appellants attacked the victim and dragged her from their house. She was helpless and afraid. She knew her brother Zaldy and sister Marither were not around to protect her. After the traumatic incident, it is difficult to fault her when he chose to go back to sleep and wait for her siblings to arrive the next day. Her behavior is not irrational.34
The appellants further insist that Macuibelle is not a credible witness because, contrary to her claim that the victim was stabbed on the chest, the medical report of Dr. Ching showed that the wounds of the victim were mostly located on the neck. Moreover, appellants suggest that the stabbing incident must have transpired first before the victim shouted for help, thus, when Macuibelle woke up later, she did not really see what happened to the victim.
The argument does not impress. The exact location of the victim's wounds does not destroy Macuibelle's testimony that appellant Hermosa was the one who stabbed the victim and, with Abelinde's help, dragged her to the nearby creek where they finally finished her off. The misdescription of where appellant Hermosa stabbed the victim does not mean the witness perjured herself. The violent incident happened fast. Macuibelle just woke up and witnessed the bloody assault. It was a traumatic experience for the eight-year old girl. She cannot be expected to have a perfect memory of an event she may even want to forget.”
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