The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable and, hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be." Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, the grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial; and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.

"The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment upon compromise rendered by the court a quo. Dana maintains that the judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of their compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the validity of her marriage. To bolster her stand, she invokes Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution and urges the State to uphold, or at least try to uphold, her marriage. Leodegario, on the other hand, asserts the binding force of the trial court's decision and the judgment on compromise, claiming that the courts a quo acted according to law and jurisprudence in rendering the assailed judgments.

It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are, therefore, the Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court applying suppletorily.27

In the case at bar, the CA28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court decision had attained finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom. The two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the judgment on the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage had attained finality. Dana, on the other hand, asserts that it had not.

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality of the RTC decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the subsequent proceedings a quo.

There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration or new trial from the RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal. However, probably cognizant of the proscription in Section 2030 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and filed a petition for relief from judgment.

There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court31 to cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana availed of an inappropriate remedy to question the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the trial court admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the issues thereon, and rendered an order denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order of denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of the 15-day period for appealing the decision.

Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is to set aside a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-6954 had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their marriage contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for relief from that judgment. From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate court. The appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties' compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition. This conclusion is untenable.

In Samia v. Medina,34 which involved the application of the statutory ascendant of Rule 38 in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the Court held:cralawred

There is a great deal of similarity between an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against" under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as both set aside the judgment, order, or proceeding complained of; both call for a new trial, and in both the injured party may question the order granting the motion for the new trial upon appeal from the new judgment rendered upon the merits of the case. The only fundamental difference lies in this, that while the judgment, order, or proceeding coming under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not final, that coming under section 113 is final. But this does not alter the nature or effect of the order granting the new trial, for this order does not put an end to the litigation in the sense that the party injured thereby has no other remedy short of appeal; he may question the propriety of the new trial on appeal from an adverse judgment rendered after such trial.35 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,36 decided prior to the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court held:cralawred

There is no question that a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an order granting such relief which is interlocutory. However, the second part of the above-quoted provision (that in the course of an appeal from the denial or dismissal of a petition for relief, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits) may give the erroneous impression that in such appeal the appellate court may reverse or modify the judgment on the merits. This cannot be done because the judgment from which relief is sought is already final and executor. x x x

The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.37 (Citations omitted)

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable38 and, hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment,41 the grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial;42 and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.

The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of the finality of the trial court decision."

DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019.

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