DISQUALIFICATION of winning candidate, effect of.

"On Palileng’s Proclamation

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 200421 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases23 because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases24 had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.

Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law. In Labo, the Court applied the second sentence of Section 6, and even italicized the second sentence for emphasis, thus:

x x x In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case, Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.25 (Italicization in the original)

Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes "shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and "shall not be counted."

To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate’s disqualification had become final before the elections.

In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat’s petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated 12 April 2004 and the Orders dated 9 May 2004 and 25 October 2004.

SO ORDERED."


G. R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 165736 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.