Criminal cases - appeal, modification of judgment.

"Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of conviction5 -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment "promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the proceedings, he still filed a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary period."6 Thus, according to him, the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.

We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads thus:

"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation." (Italics supplied)

In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:

"Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run." (Italics supplied)

It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did file, however, was a "Motion to Quash the Information"; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.

The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.

Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.

Moll himself admitted that "no regular appeal was filed because he was still questioning the propriety of the denial of his Motion to Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of the promulgation of his sentence despite his absence x x x."7 Aside from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the motion to quash was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the accused at any time before entering a plea8 and certainly not on the day of the promulgation, as Moll did.

As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, which argues as follows:

"It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his counsel was present on the day of the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence, because of Moll’s unexplained absence, the promulgation of the judgment could be validly made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court)."9

Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment against him has become final.10 Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor, under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:

"Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

x x x x x x x x x."

Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position."


G. R. No. 157526 April 28, 2004

EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 157527 April 28, 2004

SALVADOR K. MOLL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.