"The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside the judgment on compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon compromise is well-settled. In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.44
However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void judgment; and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not divest rights, and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally worthless."45
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:cralawre
x x x
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation.
x x x x
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for certiorari with the CA, which is nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in her petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.
In Uy v. Chua,46 which also involves an issue not subject to compromise under Article 2035, the Court held:
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.47 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and even judges, who have drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction adulterous relations. The rule applies a fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore, erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11 Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the appellate court held, it was Dana's intention49 to have the case terminated upon the execution of the compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court:cralawred
The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to their property relations vis-à-vis their children.50
However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of consent or other defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding upon Dana and Leodegario, as they have freely and willingly agreed to, and have already complied with, the covenants therein. The agreement operates as a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the trial court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse of discretion."
DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019julydecisions.php?id=510
