"x x x.
To summarize all the developments that brought about the present dispute – expressed in a format that can more readily be appreciated in terms of the Courten banc’s ruling to recall the September 7, 2011 ruling – the FASAP case, as it developed, was attended by special and unusual circumstances that saw:
(a) the confluence of the successive retirement of three Justices (in a Division of five Justices) who actually participated in the assailed Decision and Resolution;
(b) the change in the governing rules – from the A.M.s to the IRSC regime – which transpired during the pendency of the case;
(c) the occurrence of a series of inhibitions in the course of the case (Justices Ruben Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Corona, Velasco, and Carpio), and the absences of Justices Sereno and Reyes at the critical time, requiring their replacement; notably, Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro are the four most senior Members of the Court;
(d) the three re-organizations of the divisions, which all took place during the pendency of the case, necessitating the transfer of the case from the Third Division, to the First, then to the Second Division;
(e) the unusual timing of Atty. Mendoza’s letters, made after the ruling Division had issued its Resolution of September 7, 2011, but before the parties received their copies of the said Resolution; and
(f) finally, the time constraint that intervened, brought about by the parties’ receipt on September 19, 2011 of the Special Division’s Resolution of September 7, 2011, and the consequent running of the period for finality computed from this latter date; and the Resolution would have lapsed to finality after October 4, 2011, had it not been recalled by that date.
All these developments, in no small measure, contributed in their own peculiar way to the confusing situations that attended the September 7, 2011 Resolution, resulting in the recall of this Resolution by the Court en banc.
On deeper consideration, the majority now firmly holds the view that Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC should have prevailed in considering the raffle and assignment of cases after the 2nd MR was accepted, as advocated by some Members within the ruling Division, as against the general rule on inhibition under Section 3, Rule 8. The underlying constitutional reason, of course, is the requirement of Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution already referred to above.[28]
The general rule on statutory interpretation is that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized,[29] as a statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.[30] Only after the failure at this attempt at reconciliation should one provision be considered the applicable provision as against the other.[31]
Applying these rules by reconciling the two provisions under consideration,Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC should be read as the general rule applicable to the inhibition of a Member-in-Charge. This general rule should, however, yield where the inhibition occurs at the late stage of the case when a decision or signed resolution is assailed through an MR. At that point, when the situation calls for thereview of the merits of the decision or the signed resolution made by a ponente (or writer of the assailed ruling), Section 3, Rule 8 no longer applies and must yield toSection 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC which contemplates a situation when the ponente is no longer available, and calls for the referral of the case for raffle among the remaining Members of the Division who acted on the decision or on the signed resolution. This latter provision should rightly apply as it gives those who intimately know the facts and merits of the case, through their previous participation and deliberations, the chance to take a look at the decision or resolution produced with their participation.
To reiterate, Section 3, Rule 8 of the IRSC is the general rule on inhibition, but it must yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC where the obtaining situation is for the review on the merits of an already issued decision or resolution and the ponente or writer is no longer available to act on the matter. On this basis, theponente, on the merits of the case on review, should be chosen from the remaining participating Justices, namely, Justices Peralta and Bersamin.
A final point that needs to be fully clarified at this juncture, in light of the allegations of the Dissent is the role of the Chief Justice in the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution. As can be seen from the above narration, the Chief Justice acted only on the recommendation of the ruling Division, since he had inhibited himself from participation in the case long before. The confusion on this matter could have been brought about by the Chief Justice’s role as the Presiding Officer of the Court en banc(particularly in its meeting of October 4, 2011), and the fact that the four most senior Justices of the Court (namely, Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro) inhibited from participating in the case. In the absence of any clear personal malicious participation, it is neither correct nor proper to hold the Chief Justice personally accountable for the collegial ruling of the Court en banc.
Another disturbing allegation in the Dissent is the implication of the alleged silence of, or lack of objection from, the Members of the ruling Division during the October 4, 2011 deliberations, citing for this purpose the internal en banc deliberations. The lack of a very active role in the arguments can only be attributable to the Members of the ruling Division’s unanimous agreement to recall their ruling immediately; to their desire to have the intricate issues ventilated before the Court en banc; to the looming finality of their Division’s ruling if this ruling would not be recalled; and to their firm resolve to avoid any occasion for future flip-flopping by the Court. To be sure, it was not due to any conspiracy to reverse their ruling to affirm the previous Court rulings already made in favor of FASAP; the Division’s response was simply dictated by the legal uncertainties that existed and the deep division among them on the proper reaction to Atty. Mendoza’s letters.
Of the above-cited reasons, a major influencing factor, of course, was the time constraint – the Members of the ruling Division met with the Chief Justice on September 30, 2011, the Friday before October 4, 2011 (the date of the closest Courten banc meeting, as well as the deadline for the finality of the September 7, 2011 Resolution). They impressed upon the Chief Justice the urgent need to recall their September 7, 2011 Resolution under the risk of being accused of a flip-flop if the Courten banc would later decide to override its ruling.
As a final word, if no detailed reference to internal Court deliberations is made in this Resolution, the omission is intentional in view of the prohibition against the public disclosure of the internal proceedings of the Court during its deliberations. The present administrative matter, despite its pendency, is being ventilated in the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona before the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court, and any disclosure in this Resolution could mean the disclosure of the Court’s internal deliberations to outside parties, contrary to the clear terms of the Court en bancResolution of February 14, 2012 on the attendance of witnesses from this Court and the production of Court records.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution of the ruling Division was a proper and legal move to make under the applicable laws and rules, and the indisputably unusual developments and circumstances of the case.
Between Section 3, Article 8 and Section 7, Rule 2, both of the IRSC, the former is the general provision on a Member-in-Charge’s inhibition, but it should yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2 in a situation where the review of an issued decision or signed resolution is called for and the ponente or writer of these rulings is no longer available to act. Section 7, Rule 2 exactly contemplates this situation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby confirm that the Court en banc has assumed jurisdiction over the resolution of the merits of the motions for reconsideration of Philippine Airlines, Inc., addressing our July 22, 2008 Decision and October 2, 2009 Resolution; and that the September 7, 2011 ruling of the Second Division has been effectively recalled. This case should now be raffled either to Justice Lucas P. Bersamin or Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (the remaining Members of the Special Third Division that originally ruled on the merits of the case) as Member-in-Charge in resolving the merits of these motions.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate dated October 3, 2011, but received by this Court after a recall had been made, has thereby been rendered moot and academic.
The Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines’ Motion for Reconsideration of October 17, 2011 is hereby denied; the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution was made by the Court on its own before the ruling’s finality pursuant to the Court’s power of control over its orders and resolutions. Thus, no due process issue ever arose.
SO ORDERED.
x x x."
