"x x x.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners have resorted to a wrong mode of appeal by pursuing a Rule 65 petition from the DARAB’s decision. Section 60[24] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 clearly states that the modality of recourse from decisions or orders of the then special agrarian courts is by petition for review. In turn, Section 61[25] of the law mandates that judicial review of said orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. Section 60[26] thereof is to be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902,[27] which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.[28] On this basis, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 1-95[29]governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review regardless of the nature of the question raised. Hence, the Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that must govern the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR as in this case. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[30]moreover, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by a wrong or inappropriate mode warrants a dismissal.
Thus, petitioners should have assailed the January 16, 2001 decision and the June 25, 2002 resolution of the DARAB before the appellate court via a petition for review under Rule 43. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review, petitioners have clearly taken an inappropriate recourse. For this reason alone, we find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition before it. While the rule that a petition for certiorariis dismissible when availed of as a wrong remedy is not inflexible and admits of exceptions – such as when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; or when the broader interest of justice so requires; or when the writs issued are null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority[31] – none of these exceptions obtains in the present case.
x x x."
