"x x x.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[37]where the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, held:
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. – The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
x x x x
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)[38]
Dr. Apolonio’s invocation of our obiter dictum in Tapiador was likewise rejected in Ledesma, viz.:
Petitioner insists that the word “recommend” be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner [was] administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word “recommend” must be taken in conjunction with the phrase “and ensure compliance therewith.” The proper interpretation of the Court’s statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.[39]
In denying Tapiador and the reasoning in that case, Ledesma traced the constitutional mandate of the Ombudsman, as expressed in the intent of its framers and the constitutionality of RA 6770, viz.:
The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents’ theory. Section 15 is substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
x x x x
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer[.] (Emphasis supplied)
We note that the proviso above qualifies the “order” “to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute” an officer or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over allelective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal the following:
MR. MONSOD:
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it may see fit, may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
MR. MONSOD:
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report which recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law – the last one, P.D. No. 1630 —did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan, x x x.
x x x x
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan, it was held:
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. x x x. [emphasis and underscoring ours, citations excluded][40]
The conclusion reached by the Court in Ledesma is clear: the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right to impose administrative penalties on erring public officials. That the Constitution merely indicated a “recommendatory” power in the text of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution did not deprive Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated.
We affirmed and consistently applied this ruling in the cases of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,[41] Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[42]Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[43] Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[44] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[45] Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero,[46] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[47]
To be sure, in the most recent case of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,[48] this Court reiterated the principle behind the grant of such powers to the Ombudsman, viz.:
The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. (emphasis ours, citations excluded)
