Monday, April 30, 2012

March 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

March 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

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Here are select March 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and procedure.
Dismissal; constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. In the instant case, the overt act relied upon by petitioner is not only a doubtful occurrence but is, if it did transpire, even consistent with the dismissal from employment posited by the respondent. The factual appraisal of the Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioner was displeased after incurring expenses for respondent’s medical check-up and, it is credible that, thereafter, respondent was prevented entry into the work premises. This is tantamount to constructive dismissal. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the incredibility of petitioner’s submission about abandonment of work renders credible the position of respondent that she was prevented from entering the property. This was even corroborated by the affidavits of Siarot and Mendoza which were made part of the records of this case. Ma. Melissa A. Galang vs. Julia Malasuqui, G.R. No. 174173. March 7, 2012.
Dismissal; loss of trust and confidence. The rule is long and well settled that, in illegal dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence which is understood as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Failure of the employer to discharge the foregoing onus would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.
In  the case at bar, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that mere substantial evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to justify the dismissal from service of an employee charged with theft of company property. However, the Court found no error in the CA’s findings that the petitioners had not adequately proven by substantial evidence that Arlene and Joseph indeed participated or cooperated in the commission of theft relative to the six missing intensifying screens so as to justify the latter’s termination from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Blue Sky Trading Company, Inc. et al. vs. Arlene P. Blas and Joseph D. Silvano, G.R. No. 190559. March 7, 2012.
Dismissal; probationary employees. Gala insists that he cannot be sanctioned for the theft of company property on May 25, 2006. He maintains that he had no direct participation in the incident and that he was not aware that an illegal activity was going on as he was at some distance from the trucks when the alleged theft was being committed. He adds that he did not call the attention of the foremen because he was a mere lineman and he was focused on what he was doing at the time. He argues that in any event, his mere presence in the area was not enough to make him a conspirator in the commission of the pilferage.
Gala misses the point. He forgets that as a probationary employee, his overall job performance and his behavior were being monitored and measured in accordance with the standards (i.e., the terms and conditions) laid down in his probationary employment agreement. Under paragraph 8 of the agreement, he was subject to strict compliance with, and non-violation of the Company Code on Employee Discipline, Safety Code, rules and regulations and existing policies. Par. 10 required him to observe at all times the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, free from any form of conflict or contradicting with his own personal interest. Manila Electric Company vs. Jan Carlo Gala, G.R. No. 191288. March 7, 2012.
Dismissal; relief of illegally dismissed employee. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement if such is viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and to back wages. The normal consequences of respondent’s illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the time compensation was withheld from him up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.
Petitioners question the CA Resolution dated October 24, 2008, arguing that it modified its March 31, 2008 Decision which has already attained finality insofar as respondent is concerned. Such contention is misplaced. The CA merely clarified the period of payment of back wages and separation pay up to the finality of its decision (March 31, 2008) modifying the Labor Arbiter’s decision. In view of the modification of monetary awards in the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the time frame for the payment of back wages and separation pay is accordingly modified to the finality of the CA decision. Norkis Distribution, Inc., et al. vs. Delfin S. Descallar, G.R. No. 185255. March 14, 2012
Employees; project vs. regular employees. The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as distinguished from “regular employees” is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
In a number of cases, the Court has held that the length of service or the re-hiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon them regular employment status, since their re-hiring is only a natural consequence of the fact that experienced construction workers are preferred. Employees who are hired for carrying out a separate job, distinct from the other undertakings of the company, the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of the employment are properly treated as project employees and their services may be lawfully terminated upon the completion of a project. Should the terms of their employment fail to comply with this standard, they cannot be considered project employees.
Applying the above disquisition, the Court agreed with the findings of the CA that petitioners were project employees.  It is not disputed that petitioners were hired for the construction of the Cordova Reef Village Resort in Cordova, Cebu.  By the nature of the contract alone, it is clear that petitioners’ employment was to carry out a specific project. Wilfredo Aro, Ronilo Tirol, et al.  vs. NLRC, Fourth Division, et al., G.R. No. 174792. March 7, 2012.
Jurisdiction; power of the DOLE to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an employer-employee relationship has been subjected to review by the Supreme Court, with the finding being that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented. The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as there was no employer-employee relationship present. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper. People’s Broadcasting Service (Bombo Rado Phils., Inc.) vs. The Secretary of the Dept. of Labor & Employment, et al. G.R. No. 179652. March 6, 2012.
Management prerogative; resignation of employees running for public office. The Supreme Court has consistently held that so long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, the Court will uphold them. In the instant case, ABS-CBN validly justified the implementation of Policy No. HR-ER-016. It is well within its rights to ensure that it maintains its objectivity and credibility and freeing itself from any appearance of impartiality so that the confidence of the viewing and listening public in it will not be in any way eroded. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. Ernesto Ymbong vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Veranda Sy & Dante Luzon, G.R. No. 184885. March 7, 2012.
Separation pay; payment to those who participated in illegal strikes. Separation pay may be given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law. It is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job. As a general rule, when just causes for terminating the services of an employee exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay because lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts. The rule, however, is subject to exceptions.
Here, not only did the Court declare the strike illegal, rather, it also found the Union officers to have knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Worse, the Union members committed prohibited acts during the strike. Thus, as the Court has concluded in other cases it has previously decided, such Union officers are not entitled to the award of separation pay in the form of financial assistance. C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al./Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL, et al. vs. C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., et al./Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL, et al. vs. C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 155109/G.R. No. 155135/G.R. No. 179220. March 14, 2012.
(Leslie thanks Rommel Lumagui for his assistance in the preparation of this post.)

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Exam preparation | UNSW LAW

Exam preparation | UNSW LAW

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Solving problems – using MIRAT

The MIRAT system is a useful way to begin doing legal problem-solving. MIRAT stands for the following:
Material facts
Issue
Rule
Application of rule to the facts
Tentative conclusion
Normally when one is given a problem question it will have a set of facts on which you are asked to advise. These facts will include the material factsie, the facts which are important in relation to the law. For example, consider the following extract:
Joanna Jones was driving on the Highway near Leichhardt in a red sports car with the hood open. She was accompanied by her friend Anna Ames. They were having an argument. Joanna Jones was wearing a Chanel scarf round her neck. Her car had recently been serviced at AAA Automotive Repairs.
Which of these facts is material will depend on the legal issue to be determined. For example, if the issue was a matter of criminal law concerning a fight between Joanna and Anna which took place in the car, where the car had been serviced was probably not a material fact. If the issue was whether a car accident had been caused by poor service then where the car was serviced would be significant and the fact that Joanna and Anna were arguing may not be.
At the same time, the legal issue to be determined will be suggested to you by the facts.
The legal issue you have to determine is the legal question a court would have to answer on these facts.
The rule will be the ratio decidendi (reason for the decision) of a case or a provision in a statute. Sometimes this will be a very obvious and well-established rule, eg a duty of care is owed by all drivers to other users of the road: Derrick v Cheung. At other times you may have to take the time to make an argument at this stage about what the rule should be, arguing on the basis of the direction of precedent, or that cases outside the jurisdiction should be followed for some reason etc. 
Application of the rule to the facts. This is a crucial part of  the process. Applying the rule to the facts is the only way to reach a conclusion about how to answer the issue question. If the rule can be stated as a test then you can apply that test to the facts.
You can then come to a tentative conclusion. This means you can arrive at a conclusion; however, the conclusion is generally tentative because you may be wrong and your conclusion might need to have an alternative considered. It is thus best to say something like ‘it is most likely that’...
Answering the question – multiple MIRATS
Most problem questions have multiple legal issues in them. There may be logical connections between these issues. For example, in a contract question there may be questions about formation of contract which require a number of issues to be answered, and only if all those can be answered in the affirmative will a contract be regarded as formed.  Thus each of the tentative conclusions needs to be connected together at the end to give a final answer to the problem question. Most problem questions require you to advise the client. This means you are advising them about their likelihood of success should they bring an action or if one is brought against them. It is vital to answer the question by considering this general advice as well as the answers to each specific legal issue.

Additional resources

There are some great resources out there from law students who have gone before you. Have a look at these sites for some great advice on preparing for and managing exam stress.
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The Trouble With Antitrust Compliance and 10 Ways to Fix It

The Trouble With Antitrust Compliance and 10 Ways to Fix It

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No, Really, What Should a Company Do?

Obviously, if you are faced with a final judgment or a consent decree that contains compliance requirements, you do what is ordered, no matter how ineffective it might be in actually convincing people to obey the antitrust laws. But for a company that just wants to do the right thing, there are much better ways to make it more likely that a conspiracy won’t be taking place under your nose. Here are 10 key things you should do:
  1. Make certain that the antitrust program tracks each requirement of the sentencing guidelines.
  2. Tailor the antitrust compliance program to each employee’s job, not to the law. If a person is in sales, talk about the restrictions on price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation—and not mergers. If a person is involved in marketing, talk about unfair and deceptive practices and price discrimination, not interlocking directorates. Training should use relevant examples that the employee can relate to. (I’ve never seen a widget and don’t know why an antitrust course is worried about them. . .)
  3. Communicate to employees in the way they communicate—live, via computer-based training, via their smartphones, via podcast. Use the media that is easiest for them, not for you.
  4. Keep any sort of communications or training short and punchy. People tune out after a certain amount of time, and get angry and resentful if they are forced to sit through training that is boring and/or irrelevant to their jobs and their lives. Mix antitrust messages into other training as well. Don’t feel compelled to use an attorney for training—there is nothing that requires a law degree to say, “Don’t fix prices.”
  5. Recognize that each level of management has a role in an antitrust compliance program, and help them perform their roles by giving them the materials to do their job. Senior management sends a message to the organization. Department management makes sure that everyone understands the need to follow the laws, take training, and ask questions. Local management makes sure that every member of the staff knows that compliance with the antitrust laws will take precedence over any annual or quarterly goal. The board makes sure that senior management delivers, and that sufficient resources are devoted to the program.
  6. Perform a risk assessment to identify the highest-risk areas. Start with trade association involvement. Have the participants been trained? Have the policies and procedures of the trade associations been reviewed? Do you even know who goes to which meetings?
  7. Establish annual compliance goals for everyone who has annual goals, and be sure they count in performance evaluations.
  8. Use computerized screening to watch price quotes and look for anomalies that might indicate collusion. Antitrust audits are also appropriate, along with business controls that can reduce risk by, for example, requiring justifications for price changes, or separating the power to change prices from the people who may talk to competitors.
  9. Make sure that employees understand the rewards of following the law—and the consequences of violating the law. Employees who violate the law or company policy should be disciplined, and the discipline should be public.
  10. Whatever you do in your program, evaluate it periodically. Don’t assume that something will work with your people just because you found it in a book or a consent decree.
I could go on with more. But the main point is that companies that want to implement an effective antitrust compliance program need to do it themselves. Although it would seem to be appropriate for the Justice Department to help companies comply with the antitrust laws (as they do in so many other areas where they really want to prevent violations and not just catch them), they have chosen not to do so. So you are on your own, and while implementing a compliance program in good faith won’t necessarily convince the Antitrust Division not to prosecute should your program be imperfect, at least you will have minimized the chances that your rogue employee will be able to get the company in trouble.

Theodore Banks is president of Compliance & Competition Consultants LLC, and of counsel, Schoeman, Updike & Kaufman, LLP.

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Republic Act No. 10158 amends Art. 202, Rev. Penal Code re PROSTITUTION; repeals VAGRANCY.

Republic Act No. 10158 [Full Text] | Article VIII Jester

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[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10158 ]
AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby, amended to read as follows:
“Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. – For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
“Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.”
SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. – All pending cases under the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. – All persons serving sentence for violation of the provisions of  Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be immediately released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That they are not serving sentence or detained for any other offense or felony.
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 27, 2012.
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Republic Act No. 10159 amends Art. 39, Rev. Penal Code, re: SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT

Republic Act No. 10159 [Full Text] | Article VIII Jester

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[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10159]
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 39 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 39 of Act No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:
“1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
“2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
“3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
“4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
“5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.” (As amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969.)
SEC. 2. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees or issuances, executive orders, letters of instruction, administrative orders or rules and regulations which may be inconsistent with this Act shall be deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
SEC. 4. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: April 10, 2012.
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JURIST - Paper Chase: South Africa president pardons 35,000 offenders to ease prison overcrowding

JURIST - Paper Chase: South Africa president pardons 35,000 offenders to ease prison overcrowding

Perhaps this is one idea/option that the PHL gov't should study and adopt to declog its overcrowded prisons.


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Photo source or description
[JURIST] South African President Jacob Zuma [BBC profile] announced Saturday that he will be issuing pardons [text], known as "special remissions," to 35,000 offenders in order to ease prison overcrowding. The remissions were issued in honor of Freedom Day commemorating Nelson Mandela [BBC profile] winning the nation's first all-race elections in 1994. According to the police minister [AP report], 14,600 of the offenders will be "conditionally or unconditionally" released from prison, and 20,000 offenders' parole or probation sentences will be dismissed. The president is granted this power under Section 84(j) of the South African Constitution [text, PDF].

Prison overcrowding is a common problem across the globe. In FebruaryHuman Rights Watch [advocacy website] called for the reduction of overcrowding [JURIST report] to improve poor prison conditions in Latin America following a prison fire in Honduras. In August Venezuelan Minister for Prisons Iris Varela announced that she plans to release up to 40 percent [JURIST report] of the country's prisoners in an effort to reduce prison overcrowding. The US also has prison overcrowding concerns, particularly in California. Last year, the US Supreme Courtupheld [opinion, PDF] an order requiring California to release up to 46,000 prisoners [JURIST report] to remedy the state's overcrowded prisons. California submitted a plan to comply with the court's order, but the state's Legislative Analyst's Office has concluded that California isunlikely to meet [JURIST reports] the Supreme Court's two-year deadline.


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Age discrimination case in UK; labor law.

ItemPage

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Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (Supreme Court)

25 April 2012

Subjects : Justification; Retirement; Direct Discrimination
Mr Seldon, an equity partner in a small Kent law firm, was compulsorily retired at the age of 65 in accordance with the terms of the partnership deed.  The firm accepted that this was direct age discrimination but argued that it could be justified as a proportionate means of achieving various legitimate aims.  The aims accepted as legitimate by the Employment Tribunal were:
  • ensuring associates were given the opportunity of partnership after a reasonable period;
  • facilitating planning of the partnership and workforce across individual departments by having a realistic long-term expectation as to when vacancies would arise; and
  • limiting the need to expel partners by way of performance management, thus contributing to the congenial and supportive culture in the firm.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (click here for a summary) and the Court of Appeal (click here for a summary) also accepted that all of these aims were legitimate.  However, it still had to be established that a retirement age of 65, as opposed to any other age, was proportionate for all of these aims.   
Mr Seldon appealed with the support of the EHRC. The key question for the Supreme Court was when compulsory retirement of employees at a particular age can be justified by an employer.  Requiring an employee to retire at a particular age will inevitably be direct age discrimination.  Unlike other types of discrimination, direct age discrimination can be justified.  However, it has been unclear what aims an employer can use to justify retirement, and whether the test is the same as or narrower than the test for justification of indirect discrimination.

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Seldon’s appeal and remitted his case back to the Employment Tribunal.
Although the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, it did set out a number of significant principles about justification of direct age discrimination, particularly for private businesses. 

The Supreme Court held that the type of legitimate aims that can be used to justify direct age discrimination are different from the aims that can be used to justify indirect discrimination.  They must be based on “social policy objectives”, such as those related to employment policy, the labour market or vocational training.  This means the aims must be of a “public interest nature”, rather than purely individual reasons particular to one employer’s situation. This aspect of the decision received attention from the Telegraph.

The Supreme Court noted that two different types of legitimate aim have been identified by the ECJ in direct age discrimination cases.  The first is “intergenerational fairness”, which can mean various things, including facilitating access to employment for young people, sharing work fairly between the generations, and enabling older people to remain in the workforce.  The second is “dignity”, which is based around avoiding the need to involve older workers in incapacity or underperformance processes.  The Supreme Court noted that this second objective was more controversial and based on assumptions which “look suspiciously like stereotyping”, but the ECJ had held that avoiding “unseemly debates about capacity” could be a legitimate aim.

The Supreme Court held that ECJ caselaw said that it is not necessary, when seeking to justify discrimination, for the legitimate aim to have been articulated by the employer at the time, or even realised.  The aim must be genuine, but could be a rationalisation after the event.

Once an aim has been identified, it must be shown to be legitimate in the particular circumstances of the employment concerned.  For example, an employer cannot rely on an aim based on facilitating recruitment of younger workers if, in fact, there is no problem in recruiting younger workers.  In addition, seeking to avoid performance management for one section of the workforce may not be a legitimate aim if the employer already has sophisticated performance management measures in place.

The means of achieving this aim must be appropriate and necessary – i.e. proportionate.  This involves looking at whether, in the context of this employer, there are less discriminatory ways of achieving the same objective.  In retirement cases, the key issue will be the age chosen for retirement, and whether this is proportionate.
The Supreme Court also confirmed that it is not necessary to justify application of the retirement age to each individual – it is fine for employers to have a general rule about retirement.

Implications

Arguably, this decision makes mandatory retirement rules more difficult to justify.
The first hurdle is the need for an employer to show that its aims are of a “public interest nature”, rather than just relevant to their own business.  This is less onerous that it might seem at first glance. Many of the aims which an employer may have for its own business may also fit with the types of “social policy” aims that have been identified by the Court, such as fair sharing or work and opportunities between different generations, and avoiding undignified performance management of older workers. 

What is not allowed are aims purely on the employer’s own situation, such as reducing costs or improving competitiveness.  In setting a retirement age, it would be advisable for employers to record the basis for doing so, and ensure that this also relates to one or more of the approved aims of inter-generational fairness and dignity.
The next hurdle is showing that the aims are legitimate in the circumstances of the employer’s own business. This may be more difficult. For example, an employer cannot simply assume that a fixed retirement age will assist with inter-generational fairness issues such as recruitment or promotion opportunities for younger workers.  Instead, it must show that there is actual evidence to support this approach. 

It may be even more difficult for employers to rely on the other potentially legitimate aim of “dignity”.  Although the Court accepted that this could be a valid aim, they did express some disapproval of the concept that assumptions about capabilities at a certain age could be used to set a dismissal date for all workers.  Lady Hale commented that it may not be legitimate for a particular business to avoid proper performance management for older workers if it already has “sophisticated” performance management measures in place.  This suggests that an employer with good performance management practices may be unable to rely on “dignity” as a reason for retiring rather than performance managing older workers – while an employer with bad performance management practices may succeed in using this aim.  This seems an odd conclusion if the aim is to avoid subjecting older workers to the indignity of performance management, which surely is more likely in a business with proper performance management processes.

The final hurdle is showing that the particular retirement age selected is proportionate in the circumstances.  Again, this may be tricky for an employer to establish.  The Employment Tribunal still has to decide whether the age of 65 used in this case was proportionate (as opposed to another age such as 67 or 70).  Employers will need to show why their chosen age is appropriate and necessary, as opposed to other ages. 

Summary

The decision in Seldon indicates that justification of compulsory retirement will be difficult for employers to establish, and it gives no answer as to what retirement age might be appropriate.  Employers who do currently retain a retirement age would be well advised to consider this carefully in light of the Court’s decision.  Those that do not should not rush to set a retirement age now, but instead consider doing so in the future if changing circumstances make it a business necessity.

A copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment can be found here
A summary of the Court of Appeal judgment can be found here.
A summary of the Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment can be foundhere.
A summary of the Employment Tribunal judgment can be found here.
Seldon (Appellant) v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A Partnership) [2012] UKSC 16

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Thursday, April 26, 2012

JURIST - Paper Chase: UN experts welcome US report on criminalizing homelessness

JURIST - Paper Chase: UN experts welcome US report on criminalizing homelessness

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Photo source or description
[JURIST] The UN Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) [official website] on Monday welcomed [press release] a report [text, PDF] published by the US Interagency Council on Homelessness (ICH) and the Department of Justice(DOJ) [official websites] which found that ordinances criminalizing homelessness may violate human rights as well as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments [text]. The report condemns the criminalization of the homeless through various acts of living, such as sleeping or conducting personal hygiene measures in public spaces and suggests alternatives to reduce homelessness and implement preventative measures. The report goes on to state:
Homeless individuals who have been forced to leave an area or whose belongings have been confiscated by law enforcement during sweeps of homeless encampments have successfully brought civil rights challenges on the grounds that law enforcement violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and their due process rights. The Fourth Amendment also serves as a basis to challenge government actors who confiscate an individual's property during sweeps and either destroy, or fail to provide meaningful procedures to reclaim seized property. Laws imposing criminal penalties for engaging in necessary life activities when there are no other public options that exist have been found to violate the Eighth Amendment.
In a recent report [text, PDF] to the UN General Assembly, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights Magdalena Sepulveda [official profile] warned of increasing laws penalizing individuals living in poverty. Both the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate standard of living Raquel Rolnik and Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation Catarina de Albuquerque [official profiles] addressed the issue in their reports stating that cities do not provide enough affordable housing or shelters [report, PDF] leading to an increase in homelessness, and that denying an individual the right to engage in necessary personal hygiene measures compromises human dignity [report, PDF].
These reports come after economic and financial problems have caused an increase in the US homeless population. The OHCHR suggests that any law disproportionally affecting those living in poverty should be repealed. In 2008, New York City reached a settlement in a long-standing lawsuit over homeless families' right to use shelters [JURIST report] throughout the city. The lawsuit stemmed from a claim that shelters in the city were deficient and did not institute proper standards. In 2006, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [official website] ruled Los Angeles homeless ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment[JURIST report]. They found LA ordinances subjecting the homeless to arrest if they were caught sitting, lying or sleeping in public was cruel and unusual punishment.


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JURIST - Paper Chase: European Muslims facing discrimination: Amnesty report

JURIST - Paper Chase: European Muslims facing discrimination: Amnesty report

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[JURIST] Amnesty International (AI) [advocacy website] on Monday challenged European governments to do more to address discrimination against Muslims [report, PDF], especially in the areas of employment and education. The report states that many women are denied jobs or access to classrooms simply because they are wearing traditional forms of dress, such as a headscarf [JURIST news archive]. Men also reportedly face discrimination for growing beards in a style traditionally associated with Islam. The report documents cases in European countries, such as Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, that have restrictions on building places of worship and have banned full face veils. AI says the restrictions are in direct conflict with existing EU anti-discrimination laws. Marco Perolini, AI's expert on discrimination, stated[press release]:
Any restriction to the wearing of religious and cultural symbols and dress in schools must be a based on assessment of the needs in each individual case. General bans risk adversely [affecting] Muslim girls' access to education and violating their rights to freedom of expression and to manifest their beliefs. The right to establish places of worship is a key component of the right to freedom of religion or belief which is being restricted in some European countries, despite state obligations to protect, respect and fulfill this right.
AI called on European countries to address the stereotypes and either reform or uphold existing legislation in accordance with EU anti-discrimination legislation.In January, Dutch lawmakers announced that a ban [JURIST report] on burqas [JURIST news archive] and other full face coverings will go forward later this year. If enacted, the Netherlands will become the second European country, after France [JURIST report], to ban the burqa. In August, an Italian parliamentary commission approved a draft law [JURIST report] that bans women from wearing full-face veils in public. In July, Belgium implemented a law banning women from wearing the burqa [JURIST report] in public, with violators facing the possibility of fines or up to seven days in jail. Last April, a Dutch court upheld a ban on Islamic headscarves [JURIST report] at a Catholic college saying the prohibition was in line with the school's interest in maintaining its Catholic character. In 2009, a similar ban was instituted in all Dutch-speaking Belgium schools [JURIST report]. That same year, Swiss voters approved [JURIST report] a constitutional ban on the construction of minarets by a margin of 57.5 to 42.5 percent.


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