| ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB, |
| G.R. No. 170658
Present:
CORONA, C.J. DE CASTRO, |
| Petitioners, |
| DEL CASTILLO, |
|
|
| PEREZ, and |
| - versus - |
| MENDOZA,⃰ |
|
|
|
|
| REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, |
| Promulgated: |
| Respondent. |
| June 22, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment.
x x x.
Issue[32]
The crux of the case is the propriety of rendering a summary judgment.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[33] A deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:[34]
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.[35]
“A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”[36] The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact,[37] “as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.”[38] “[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway.”[39]
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as “the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.”[40]
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.[41] The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.[42]
In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections.
More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.
It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2004 summary judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, for trial. The Presiding Judge is directed to proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
⃰ Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 18- 37.
[2] Id. at 45-56; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[3] Id. at 57.
[4] Id. at 39-44; penned by Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr.
[5] RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; id. at 43-44.
[6] Records, pp. 50-51.
[7] Id. at 2.
[8] The Republic was represented by Commander Abelardo Arugay, who was appointed as Administrator of Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation on April 15, 1994 (id. at 49).
[9] Id. at 1-6. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4846 (95-Tug.) and raffled to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
[10] Id. at 3.
[11] Id. at 4.
[12] Answer, pp. 1-2; id. at 17-18.
[13] Id. at 2; id. at 18.
[14] Id. at 3; id. at 19.
[15] Id. at 1; id. at 17.
[16] Records, pp. 58-59.
[17] Id. at 61.
[18] Manifestation and Compliance dated July 28, 1999 (id. at 95) and Plaintiff’s Memorandum dated November 18, 1999 (id. at 111-112).
[19] Id. at 124.
[20] Id. at 125-130.
[21] Rollo, pp. 39-44.
[22] Id. at 42.
[23] Rollo, pp. 45-56.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 18-21.
[25] CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 55.
[26] Id. at 7-8; id. at 51-52.
[27] Id. at 10; id. at 54.
[28] Id.; id.
[29] Id. at 9; id. at 53.
[30] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 27-31; id. at 141-145.
[31] Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 5-8; id. at 100-103.
[32] Petition for Review, pp. 8-9; id. at 25-26.
[33] Rules of Court, Rule 35.
[34] 178 Phil. 561 (1979).
[35] Id. at 572-573. Citations omitted.
[36] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010, 613 SCRA 66, 81-82.
[37] Estrada v. Consolacion, 163 Phil. 540, 549 (1976).
[38] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, supra at 88.
[39] Concurring Opinion of Justice Barredo in Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at 554. Emphasis supplied.
[40] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, surpa at 82. Emphasis supplied.
[41] Estrada v. Consolacion, supra note 37 at 550.
[42] Caridao v. Hon. Estenzo, 217 Phil. 93, 101-102 (1984).
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