Saturday, July 30, 2011

Certiorari disguised to secure Injunction; G. R. No. 190795

 G. R. No. 190795

Excerpts:


"Petitioners have Chosen the Wrong Remedy and the Wrong Forum; the Real Motive for Bringing Petition was to Obtain an indefinite TRO, this the Court cannot Countenance
Section 1, Rule 23 of the ERC’S Rules of Procedure expressly provides for the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration,viz:
A party adversely affected by a final order, resolution, or decision of the Commission rendered in an adjudicative proceeding may, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, file a motion for reconsideration. In its motion, the movant may also request for reopening of the proceeding for the purpose of taking additional evidence in accordance with Section 17 of Rule 18. No more than one motion for reconsideration by each party shall be entertained.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a petition for certiorari may be filed when “there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law”. The “plain” and “adequate remedy” referred to in Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.[30] Thus, it is a well-settled rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[31] The purpose of this rule is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.[32] However, this requirement is not an ironclad rule. The prior filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with if petitioners are able to show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.[33] The Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and take cognizance of the petition if it raises an issue of paramount importance and constitutional significance.[34] Thus:
True, we had, on certain occasions, entertained direct recourse to this Court as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts. In those exceptional cases, however, we recognized an exception because it was dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.[35]
Petitioners claim that they did not file any motion for reconsideration with the ERC “in order to prevent the imminent miscarriage of justice, that the issue involves the principles of social justice, that the Decision sought to be set aside is a patent nullity and that the need for relief therefore is extremely urgent”[36]; because they believe that the same would be a futile exercise considering that the ERC had blatantly disregarded the Supreme Court directive to consider the last increase of Meralco as provisional until ERC has taken action on the COA Audit Report;[37] and because “an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient.”[38]
They also claim that the direct resort to the Supreme Court resorted to by them is in order “to timely prevent a grave injustice to the 4.3 million customers of Meralco who stand to suffer by reason of a patently void decision by ERC which would result in additional monthly billing of at least half a billion pesos”;[39] because “time is of the essence”; and because “transcendental constitutional issues” are involved in this case.[40]
Petitioners further argue that their decision to go directly to this Court is justified “because of the number of consumers affected by the said Decision; because the amount involved in the controversy is so huge (P605.25 million [plus 12% VAT] additional billing per month); because it is violative of the provisions of EPIRA; because it is contrary to the constitutional provisions on social justice, and because it is in utter disregard of the COA Audit Report”.[41]
We do not uphold petitioners’ arguments on this matter.
In Cervantes v. CA,[42] this Court ruled:
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
The general statements used by Petitioner to excuse their direct recourse to this Court are not the “concrete, compelling, and valid reasons” required by jurisprudence to justify their failure to comply with the mandated procedural requirements. In addition to this, the “urgency” of the resolution of matters raised by petitioners is negated, by the fact that rates approved by the ERC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing powers, are in a sense, inherently only provisional.
Furthermore, this Court finds that the real motive behind the filing of the present Petition is to obtain an indefinite TRO and this, the Court cannot countenance. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the rules for permanent injunctions, to wit:
Sec. 9. When final injunction granted.
If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners assert that this Court should issue a TRO because of the huge amount that would unduly burden the consumers with the continued application of the MAP2010 rates. According to petitioners, “if not stayed, the present financial hardships of 4.3 million MERALCO customers due to the global financial meltdown and the recent calamities in the country will surely further worsen.” Petitioners also claim that there is an extreme urgency to secure a TRO, considering that the assailed Decision is immediately executory.
The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from further injury, until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.[43] Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
If such irreparable injury would result from the non-issuance of the requested writ or if the “extreme urgency” referred to by petitioners indeed exists, then they should have been more vigilant in protecting their rights. As they have all been duly notified of the proceedings in the ERC case, they should have appeared before the ERC and participated in the trials.
We find that petitioners erred in thinking that the non-issuance of the TRO they requested would put consumers in danger of suffering an “irreparable injury”. But this asserted injury can be repaired, because, had petitioners participated in the proceedings before the ERC and the latter had found merit in their appeal, the undue increase in electric bills shall be refunded to the consumers.
All the other issues raised by petitioners in connection with the MAP2010 case are factual in nature and should be raised before the ERC not before this Court. Allegations and issues in connection with the rate increases under ERC Case No. 2008-018- RC and ERC Case No. 2008-004-RC, including the question of whether Meralco improperly exceeded the 12% maximum rate of return provided by law, are more properly to be disposed of in another pending case, G.R. No. 191150.[44]
Before finally disposing of this case, we deem it proper to warn the ERC that it cannot give a deadline to parties before it that it will not respect. Even though the ERC, as an administrative agency, is not bound by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it is still bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before it."