"C. Petition for Contempt
In dismissing the petition, the CA held:[17]
Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view thereof, the rules in criminal prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents’ constitutional rights inevitably come into play. As held in People v. Godoy:
In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioner’s allegations, said circumstantial evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that is required to establish the guilt of an accused in a criminal proceeding, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas Corpus proceeding, is Section 16, Rule 102, which provides:
Sec. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. - A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, andmay also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied]
In Montenegro v. Montenegro,[18] we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity."7 The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
x x x
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis supplied]
We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of the charge filed by the petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administration of justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy,[19] which the CA cited, we specifically held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; that the accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.[20]
Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.[21] The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty – a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.[22]
For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of the time of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not provide a direct link between the respondents and the abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had a hand in the abduction of Jonas, and consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their returns to the Writ of habeas corpus denying custody of Jonas.
However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative findings presented to us by the CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a twist to our otherwise clear conclusion. Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only conclude that the CA’s dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e., without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step warranted by the evidence in the proceedings related to Jonas’s disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may transpire.
To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case without need of naming their current incumbents, separately from the then incumbent officials that the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for possible responsibility and accountability.
In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the longer the President of the Republic of the
