AYALA LAND, INC. and CAPITOL CITIFARMS, INC., Petitioners, - versus - SIMEONA CASTILLO, LORENZO PERLAS, JESSIELYN CASTILLO, LUIS MAESA, ROLANDO BATIQUIN, and BUKLURAN MAGSASAKA NG TIBIG, as represented by their attorney-in-fact, SIMEONA CASTILLO, Respondents. | G. R. No. 178110 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: June 15, 2011 |
RESPONDENTS RAISED A NEW ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
The CA found the Conversion Order valid on all points, with the sole exception of the effect of the alleged issuance of a Notice of Acquisition. In its eight-page Decision, the CA merely asserted in two lines: “no less than the cited DAR Administrative Order No. 12 enjoins the conversion of lands directly under a notice of acquisition.”[24]
After perusing the records of the DAR and the OP, however, we find no admissible proof presented to support this claim. What was attached to the Petition for Review[25] to the CA was not a Notice of Acquisition, but a mere photocopy of the Notice of Coverage. A Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence before the DAR and never became part of the records even at the trial court level. Thus, its existence is not a fully established fact for the purpose of serving as the sole basis the entire history of the policy decisions made by the DAR and the OP were to be overturned. The CA committed reversible error when it gave credence to a mere assertion by the tenant-farmers, rather than to the policy evaluation made by the OP.
Assuming arguendo however, that the farmers had submitted the proper document to the appellate court, the latter could not have reversed the OP Decision on nothing more than this submission, as the issue of the Notice of Acquisition had never been raised before the administrative agency concerned. In fact, the records show that this issue was not raised in the original Petition for Revocation in the second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the farmers before the DAR, and that no Notice of Acquisition was attached to their Appeal Memorandum to the OP. As a consequence, the OP, Secretary Pagdanganan, Secretary Braganza, and Secretary Morales did not have any opportunity to dwell on this issue in their Orders and Decision. Instead, what respondents persistently allege is the concealment of the sale by CCFI and ALI. The three DAR Secretaries, including Secretary Garilao who issued the Conversion Order, correctly found this allegation bereft of merit.
We cannot uphold respondents’ proposition for us to disregard basic rules, particularly the rule that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Aside from their failure to raise the non-issuance of a notice of acquisition before the OP and DAR, they also failed to question the lack of approved town plan at the DAR level, prompting the OP to correctly rule on the latter, thus:
…Appellants’ lapses in not raising the issues before the DAR which has the expertise to resolve the same and in a position to conduct due hearings and reception of evidence from contending parties pertaining to the issue, puts the appellants in estoppel to question the same for the first time on appeal. Jurisprudence dictates the following:
…The petitioner for the first time, to allow him to assume a different posture when he comes before the court and challenge the position he had accepted at the administrative level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court – which is supposed to review administrative determinations – would not review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question not raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the same reason that underlies the requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior authority to decide controversies within its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Aguinaldo Industries Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue & Court of Tax Appeals, 112 SCRA 136)[26]
It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.[27] More important, if these matters had been raised earlier, they could have been seriously examined by the administrative agency concerned.[28]
Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical training and knowledgeand the latter are given wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions.[29] This Court has always given primary importance to the DAR Secretary’s ruling and will not disturb such ruling without substantial reason:
Considering that these issues involve an evaluation of the DAR’s findings of facts, this Court is constrained to accord respect to such findings. It is settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of the Secretary of DAR who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.[30]
The CA erred in passing upon and ruling on an issue not raised by the farmers themselves. This Court must not countenance the violation of petitioner’s right to due process by the CA upholding its conclusion founded on a legal theory only newly discovered by the CA itself. This is especially insupportable considering the long history of government affirmation of the conversion of the subject land.
PROVISION IN DAR A.O. 12-94 IS ONLY A GUIDING PRINCIPLE
Assuming for a moment that the notice of acquisition exists, it is not an absolute, perpetual ban on conversion. The provision invoked in AO 12-94, paragraph E, disallows applications for conversion of lands for which the DAR has issued a notice of acquisition. But paragraph E falls under heading VI, “Policies and Guiding Principles.” By no stretch of the imagination can a mere “principle” be interpreted as an absolute proscription on conversion. Secretary Garilao thus acted within his authority in issuing the Conversion Order, precisely because the law grants him the sole power to make this policy judgment, despite the “guiding principle” regarding the notice of acquisition. The CA committed grave error by favoring a principle over the DAR’s own factual determination of the propriety of conversion. The CA agreed with the OP that land use conversion may be allowed when it is by reason of changes in the predominant use brought about by urban development, but the appellate court invalidated the OP Decision anyway for the following reason:
The argument is valid if the agricultural land is still not subjected to compulsory acquisition under CARP. But as we saw, there has already been a notice of coverage and notice of acquisition issued for the property...Verily, no less than the cited DAR Administrative Order No. 12 enjoins conversions of lands already under a notice of acquisition. The objectives and ends of economic progress must always be sought after within the framework of the law, not against it, or in spite of it.[31]
However, under the same heading VI, on Guiding Principles, is paragraph B (3), which reads:
If at the time of the application, the land still falls within the agricultural zone, conversion shall be allowed only on the following instances:
a) When the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, as certified by the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture (DA) or
b) When the locality has become highly urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial and industrial purposes, as certified by the local government unit.
The thrust of this provision, which DAR Secretary Garilao rightly took into account in issuing the Conversion Order, is that even if the land has not yet been reclassified, if its use has changed towards the modernization of the community, conversion is still allowed.
As DAR Secretary, Garilao had full authority to balance the guiding principle in paragraph E against that in paragraph B (3) and to find for conversion. Note that the same guiding principle which includes the general proscription against conversion was scrapped from the new rules on conversion, DAR A.O. 1, Series of 2002, or the “Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion.” It must be emphasized that the policy allowing conversion, on the other hand, was retained. This is a complex case in which there can be no simplistic or mechanical solution. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is not intractable, nor does it condemn a piece of land to a single use forever. With the same conviction that the state promotes rural development,[32] it also “recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.”[33]
Respondents herein muddle the issue in contending that a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution was not a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the Local Government Code that an ordinance must be enacted for a valid reclassification. Yet there was already a Conversion Order. To correct a situation in which lands redeemed from the MBC would remain idle, petitioners took the route of applying for conversion. Conversion and reclassification are separate procedures.[34] CCFI and ALI submitted the two Resolutions to the DAR (one issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, the other by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite) only as supporting documents in their application.
Again, paragraph B (3), Part VI of DAR AO 12-94, cited above, allows conversion when the land will have greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes “as certified by the Local Government Unit.” It is clear that the thrust of the community and the local government is the conversion of the lands. To this end, the two Resolutions, one issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, the other by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite, while not strictly for purposes of reclassification, are sufficient compliance with the requirement of the Conversion Order.
Paragraph E and paragraph B (3) were thus set merely as guidelines in issues of conversion. CARL is to be solely implemented by the DAR, taking into account current land use as governed by the needs and political will of the local government and its people. The palpable intent of the Administrative Order is to make the DAR the principal agency in deciding questions on conversion. A.O. 12-94 clearly states:
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform is mandated to “approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring, or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,” pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.”
B. Section 5 (1) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses.[35]
THE CONVERSION ORDER HAS LONG ATTAINED FINALITY AND MAY NO LONGER BE QUESTIONED.
Respondents came forward as claimants under CARL almost three years after the Conversion Order was issued. In arguing that the claim of respondents had already prescribed, petitioner ALI applied DAR A.O. 1, Series of 1999, which lays down a one-year prescriptive period for petitions for cancellation or withdrawal. Section 34 thereof states:
Filing of Petition – A petition for cancellation or withdrawal of the conversion order may be filed at the instance of DAR or any aggrieved party before the approving authority within ninety (90) days from discovery of facts which would warrant such cancellation but not more than one (1) year from issuance of the order: Provided, that where the ground refers to any of those enumerated in Sec. 35 (b), (e), and (f), the petition may be filed within ninety (90) days from discovery of such facts but not beyond the period for development stipulated in the order of conversion; Provided further, That where the ground is lack of jurisdiction, the petition shall be filed with the Secretary and the period prescribed herein shall not apply.
The Conversion Order was issued by Secretary Garilao on 31 October 1997. Respondents questioned the Order only on 19 May 2000, almost two years and seven months later. Since the action was filed during the effectivity of A.O. 01-99, its provision on prescription should apply.
Respondents, on the other hand, state that the applicable rule is A.O. 12 (promulgated in 1994), which was the rule subsisting at the time the Conversion Order was issued. A.O. 12-94 imposes a prescriptive period of five (5) years; thus, according to the farmers, the petition was filed well within the period.
Petitioner ALI’s argument is well-taken. A.O. 01-99 entitled “REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES,” provides for its own effectivity as follows:
SEC. 56. Effectivity – This Order shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
A.O. 01-99 was promulgated on 30 March 1999 and published in Malaya and Manila Standard on the following day, 31 March 1999. Thus, A.O. 01-99 was the rule governing the filing of a “petition for cancellation or withdrawal of the conversion order” at the time the farmers filed their petition.
Respondent farmers argue that, according to A.O. No. 01-99, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the issuance of the Conversion Order. They point out that it was impossible for them to receive notice of this rule when Secretary Garilao issued the Conversion Order, since the rule was published only one year and seven months after the issuance of the Order. Thus, it should be A.O. 12-94, or the five-year prescription period, that should be applied to them, and not the one-year period in A.O. 01-99.
Respondents assume that the rule to be applied is that prevailing at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order. This is incorrect. The rule applicable in determining the timeliness of a petition for cancellation or withdrawal of a conversion order is the rule prevailing at the time of the filing of that petition, and not at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order. It is axiomatic that laws have prospective effect, as the Administrative Code provides.[36] While A.O. 01-99 was not yet promulgated at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order, it was already published and in effect when the Petition for Revocation was filed on 19 May 2000.
Regarding the question on when the one-year prescription period should be reckoned, it must be still be resolved in conformity with the prospective character of laws and rules. In this case, the one-year period should be reckoned from the date of effectivity of A.O. 1-99, which is 31 March 1999. Therefore, no petition for cancellation or withdrawal of conversion of lands already converted as of 30 March 1999 may be filed after 1 March 2000.
The Conversion Order is final and executory. The Court ruled in Villorente v. Aplaya Laiya Corporation:
Indubitably, the Conversion Order of the DAR was a final order, because it resolved the issue of whether the subject property may be converted to non-agricultural use. The finality of such Conversion Order is not dependent upon the subsequent determination, either by agreement of the parties or by the DAR, of the compensation due to the tenants/occupants of the property caused by its conversion to non-agricultural use. Once final and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be questioned.[37]
A conversion order is a final judgment and cannot be repeatedly assailed by respondents in perpetuity, after they have received compensation and exhausted other means. In Villorente, the Court had occasion to rebuke the would-be beneficiaries who, after accepting the compensation stipulated in the conversion Order – thereby impliedly acknowledging the validity of the order – turned around and suddenly assailed it. The Court held:
We are convinced that the petition for review filed by the petitioners with the CA was merely an afterthought…
… … … …
It must be stressed that the petitioners agreed to negotiate with the respondent for the disturbance compensation which they claimed was due them, conformably with the said Conversion Order. Hence, they cannot now assail the said order without running afoul to (sic) the doctrine of estoppel. The petitioners cannot approbate and disapprobate at the same time.[38]
It must be borne in mind that there can be no vested right to judicial relief, as ruled by the Court in United Paracale Mining v. Dela Rosa:
There can be no vested right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right…the right to judicial relief is not a right which may constitute vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made by another.[39]
THE CONVERSION AND/OR RECLASSIFICATION OF THE SAID LANDS HAS BECOME AN OPERATIVE FACT
Respondent farmers do not deny that at the time of filing of the Petition for Revocation, the lands in question were no longer agricultural. Secretary Morales affirmed this fact in his Decision, even as he revoked Secretary Garilao’s Order of conversion:
When respondent Capitol applied for conversion of the subject land on 7 May 1996, the land is already reclassified from agricultural to other uses. Respondent Capitol applied for conversion as the registered owner of the land, although in truth it was no longer the owner of the same by virtue of its sale to ALI. This fact of transfer of ownership is not known since the absolute sale of the land was not yet public, the deed of sale not having been registered before the Register of Deeds at that time.
… … …
At the time of the registration of the deed on 29 September 1999, the subject land had ceased to be an agricultural land since it has already been converted to other uses by virtue of an approved conversion application. As such, the requirement of reporting by the Register of Deeds of any transaction involving agricultural lands beyond five (5) hectares, was not made as it is no longer necessary.
Clearly, the findings of the CLUPPI, the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, and Secretary Morales himself confirm as an operative fact the reclassification and/or conversion of the lands. Both the DAR and the Sangguniang Bayan anchored their findings on the Certifications from the CLUPPI (obtained by the CLUPPI’s executive committee as required by the DAR procedure), the National Irrigation Administration, the Philippine Coconut Authority, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[40] The CLUPPI and the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Office) conducted their own ocular inspection. The Sangguniang Bayan of Silang conducted plebiscites before issuing the Resolution for reclassification.[41]
In sum, the findings of the different government agencies are as follows:
1. The property is about ten (10) kilometers from the provincial road.
2. The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa Technopark.
3. The property is beyond eighteen (18) degrees in slope and undeveloped.
4. Based on a DAR Soil Investigation Report, the property is only marginally suitable for agriculture use due to its undulating topography.[42]
5. The land is outside the irrigable area of the Cavite Friar Lands Irrigation Systems.
6. DENR Administrative Order No. 08 granted the application for an Environmental Clearance while presenting these additional findings:
· The area is unirrigated, and the main source of water supply is rainfall.
· The occupants have been paid disturbance compensation.
· The area in question had been granted a Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion by the DAR on 16 January 1996.
The reclassification/conversion of the land has long been a foregone fact. While respondents insist that the process by which the land was reclassified was invalid, their claim is immaterial, because, as stated, the two procedures are distinct. Independently of the Sangguniang Bayan’s own initiative, the DAR issued a Certificate of Eligibility. These issuances only bolster the fact that, at the time it was converted, the land was no longer agricultural, and that it would generate more revenue if reclassified as a residential area. Resolution No. ML-08-S-96, adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, recommended conversion based on the favorable findings of the Committee on Housing and Land Use. The Resolution states:[43]
...Whereas based on the favorable findings by the Committee on Housing and Land Use after careful study and after conducting several public hearings has favorably recommended the approval of the request of Capitol Citifarms, Inc.;
Whereas, the land use reclassification of the said parcels of land will benefit the people of Silang by way of increased municipal revenue, generate employment, increased commercial activities and general (sic) uplift the socio-economic condition of the people particularly those in the vicinity of said parcels of land.
It is no longer necessary to delve into the allegations of the lack of a valid ordinance or the lack of a land use plan. Aside from the OP finding that this issue was raised belatedly, the submission of “new or revised town plans approved by the HLURB” is a requirement only in the process of reclassification embodied in the Local Government Code. This is not a requirement in the process of conversion, wherein the DAR is given the sole prerogative to make technical determinations on changes in land use and to decide whether a particular parcel of agricultural land, due to modernization and the needs of the community, has indeed been converted to non-agricultural use.
IT HAS LONG BEEN RESOLVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THAT THE LANDS IN THIS CASE ARE EXEMPTED FROM CARL COVERAGE, PARTLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY'S BANKING SYSTEM.
In the first OP Decision dated 11 October 1996, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres expressly declared that the preservation of the assets of the BSP warranted higher consideration, so certain lands of the MBC were exempt from coverage of the CARL. In remanding the case to the DAR for it to identify which lands should be exempted, Secretary Torres held:
Upon review of the entire records of the case, this Office is persuaded that a stringent appreciation of the issues raised by the parties may not do justice to their respective causes, and the public in general. What is involved is the susceptibility of a bank to undergo rehabilitation which will be jeopardized by the distribution of its assets…a careful balance between the interest of the petitioner bank, its creditors (which includes the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and the general public on the one hand, and adherence to the implementation of the agrarian reform program on the other, must be established.
… … … …
…the ends of justice will be better subserved if the Statutory Receiver is given the fullest opportunity to monetize the assets of the bank which are supposed to be outside of the coverage of the CARL or may be converted into non-agricultural uses.[44]
Secretary Torres denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the DAR. The denial was based precisely on the need to balance the agrarian reform law with another policy consideration, the stability of the banking system. He explained as follows:
The guiding principle on land use conversion is to preserve prime agricultural lands. On the other hand, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use of lands as a national resource for public welfare, shall be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner.
… … …
Finally, we wish to reiterate the need to balance the interest between the petitioner bank (under receivership by the BSP), its creditors (85% of which or a total of P8, 771, 893, 000 is payable to BSP) and the general public on one hand, and the faithful implementation of agrarian reform program on the other hand, with the view to harmonizing them and ensuring that the objectives of the CAR are met and satisfied.[45]
The Conversion Order was a product of policy determinations made by the DAR, the Office of the President, and even the Supreme Court. Secretary Torres had ordered the DAR to “respect the temporary custody of those properties by the Statutory Receiver (BSP Deputy Governor Alberto Reyes) by deferring their coverage under the CARL…” This order stemmed in turn from the BSP Resolution of 22 May 1987 placing MBC’s assets under custodia legis. Bolstered by the need to save MBC, which was one of BSP’s crucial debtors, the Supreme Court allowed the BSP receiver to sell MBC’s assets to a third party “under the best terms and conditions,” to give it ample opportunity to rehabilitate MBC. The disposition of MBC’s properties was a judgment call made by the BSP, which, as the sole agency mandated to assist banks and financial institutions in distress, exercises asset management on a macro level. The Supreme Court Resolution called the arrangement the “best solution for Manila Banking and CCFI.”
In light of the foregoing, it would be absurd to impute bad faith to ALI solely because it chose to purchase the redeemed land. Similarly, ALI cannot be held accountable for all the years that the land remained idle pending conversion. To deny relief to ALI would be tantamount to placing the private sector in the unjust situation of investing, upon invitation from the government, in a bank’s distressed assets – among which are lands the government itself has ordered converted – then subsequently confiscating the same from it.
Petitioners did not renege on their duty to pay disturbance compensation to the tenant-farmers. They expended substantial amounts in addition to the purchase price of the foreclosed lands – for litigation and administrative processing costs, the farmers’ compensation, and improvements on the land. The development projects were grounded on a reliance on national government actions that support the thrust of Cavite towards urbanization.
It was the OP’s first Decision, together with the Supreme Court Resolution, that ultimately paved the way for ALI to acquire title to the subject lands as a third party buyer. When the dispute over the subject land reached the OP for the second time – when the validity of the conversion order was in dispute – the OP of course found no merit in the allegation of concealment. There is therefore absolutely no basis for the imputation of bad faith upon ALI simply on account of the alleged delay in the registration of the sale from CCFI to it.
It must be emphasized that the OP’s ground for supporting conversion finds its moorings in DAR Memorandum Circular 11-79 governing the conversion of private agricultural lands into other uses. The Circular states that conversion may be allowed when it is by reason of the changes in the predominant land use, brought about by urban development. The OP Decision pointed to the fact that the close proximity of Cavite to Manila opened Cavite to the effects of modernization and urbanization. While the CA characterized this ground as “novel,” it still agreed that land use conversion may be allowed, if caused by changes in predominant land use due to urban development.
The DAR found merit in the thrust of the local government to “disperse urban growth towards neighboring regions of Metro Manila”; to encourage the movement of residential development in the area; and to support the housing needs not just of the neighboring Santa Rosa Technopark, but also of other commercial centers. It is helpful to remember that it is the local government, in this case, that of Silang, Cavite, that occupies the primary policy role of allowing the development of real estate to generate real property taxes and other local revenues.
The CA Decision effectively enfeebles the Orders of no less than three Secretaries of the DAR and the policy pronouncements of the OP. The actions of respondents – accepting disturbance compensation for the land, seeking petitioners’ compliance with the terms of the Conversion Order, then reversing themselves by assailing the Order itself long after the proper period had prescribed – contradict this Court’s rule that conversion orders, once final and executory, may no longer be questioned.
The only justification for the CA ruling – that the lands had already been subjected to a Notice of Acquisition, hence no conversion thereof can take place – cannot stand in the light of two points: 1) the record before this Court (including the CA and the DAR records) is bereft of any copy, certified or otherwise, of the alleged Notice of Acquisition; and 2) even if the land is subject to a Notice of Acquisition, this issue was never raised before the DAR or the OP, nor was it argued before the CA. It existed as a single-line statement in petitioners’ Appeal Memorandum.[46] Since the DAR and the OP had ruled for petitioners CCFI and ALI, and the CA itself admitted that petitioners’ stand would have been valid if not for the alleged Notice, the CA should have been more circumspect in verifying whether the evidence on record supported respondents’ self-serving claim.
Before the CA’s unilateral action, this unsupported allegation was never raised as a live legal issue. Hence, CCFI and ALI were deprived of any opportunity to controvert the fact of the Notice of Acquisition and its legal effect, because they were never alerted that the existence of such Notice would in any way endanger their legal position. They had the right to expect that only issues properly raised before the administrative tribunals needed to be addressed. Even assuming that the Notice of Acquisition did exist, considering that CCFI and ALI had no chance to controvert the CA finding of its legal bar to conversion, this Court is unable to ascertain the details of the Notice of Acquisition at this belated stage, or rule on its legal effect on the Conversion Order duly issued by the DAR, without undermining the technical expertise of the DAR itself. To do so would run counter to another basic rule that courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question that is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution of that question.[47]
CARL cannot be used to stultify modernization. It is not the role of the Supreme Court to apply the missing notice of acquisition in perpetuity. This is not a case wherein a feudal landowner is unjustly enriched by the plantings of a long-suffering tenant. ALI is in the precarious position of having been that third-party buyer who offered the terms and conditions most helpful to CCFI, MBC, and effectively, the BSP, considering the 85% portion of the total debt of MBC that BSP owns. What this Court can do positively is to contribute to policy stability by binding the government to its clear policy decisions borne over a long period of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in nullifying the policy pronouncement of the Office of the President and the Department of Agrarian Reform. The instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, and the Order of the Office of the President dated 26 January 2004 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] SC rollo at 58-66. Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[2] Id. at 202-208.
[3]OP Decision in OP Case No. 6231, at 1, DAR records; Folder 3 of 3, at 1481.
[4]SC rollo at 316.
[5] On 29 August 1995, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 85960, DAR Records; Folder 3 of 3 at 1443-1444.
[6] Dated 29 December 1995.
[7] Supra note 3, at 3.
[8] OP Decision promulgated 11 October 1996, at 9.
[9] OP Decision promulgated 14 March 1997, at 2.
[10] Excerpts from the Minutes of the regular session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, held on 9 February 1996; DAR records, Folder 1 of 3, at 170.
[11] DAR records, Folder 3 of 3, Exhibit 12, at 1546.
[12] DAR records, Folder 3 of 3, at 1547-1945.
[14] Morales Order, SC rollo at 336-352.
[15] Braganza Order, CA rollo at 84-95.
[16] Id. at 89.
[17] Motion for Reconsideration, Annex 2, at 2.
[18] Id. at 3.
[19] Pagdanganan Order, SC rollo at 163.
[20] Respondent farmers’ Appeal Memorandum to the OP, SC rollo at 317.
[21] Id.
[22] OP Decision, SC rollo at 202.
[23] Id. at 207.
[24] CA Decision, SC rollo at 65.
[25] SC rollo at 211.
[26] Supra note 24, at 206.
[27] Madrid v. Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 14, 28.
[28] Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26911, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 246.
[29] Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128305, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 17.
[30] Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 609 (2003).
[31] Supra note 24.
[34] Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152085, 8 July 2003, 323 SCRA 716.
[35]DAR A.O. 12, S. of 1994, Part II, Legal Mandate, pars. A and B.
[36] EO 292, Book 1, Chapter 5, Sec. 18.
[37] G.R. No. 145013, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 493.
[38] Id. at 501.
[39] United Paracale Mining Company v. Joselito Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 63786-7, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 108, 115.
[40] DAR records, Folder 3 of 3, at 516-528.
[41] DAR records, Folder 1 of 3, at 16-18.
[42] CA rollo at 38-40.
[43] Supra note 12.
[44] OP Decision, 11 October 1996, at 9.
[45] OP Decision, 14 March 1997, at 2.
[46] CA rollo at 42.
[47] The Supreme Court discusses the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction in Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003,408 SCRA 678.
