| HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners,
- versus-
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, |
| G.R. No. 170071
G.R. No. 170125
|
|
|
| Present: |
| - versus - |
| CORONA, |
|
| VELASCO, JR., |
|
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Respondents. |
| DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated: March 9, 2011 |
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An accident which claimed the life of a passenger is the root of these two petitions - one brought before us by the common carrier and the other by the heirs of the deceased.
x x x.
Our Ruling
We shall first tackle the issues raised by G & S in its petition.
The first, third and fourth issues raised by G & S involve questions of fact
We have reviewed said issues and we find that the determination of the first, third and fourth issues raised entails re-examination of the evidence presented because they all involve questions of fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,[32] we held that:
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proof on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such a gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact. (Citations omitted)
In this case, the said three issues boil down to the determination of the following questions: What is the proximate cause of the death of Jose Marcial? Is the testimony of prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees? Suffice it to say that these are all questions of fact which require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the trial court. As we have consistently held, “[t]his Court is not a trier of facts. It is not a function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.”[33] Here, we note that although G & S enumerated in its Consolidated Memorandum[34] the exceptions[35] to the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out under what exception its case falls. And, upon review of the records of the case, we are convinced that it does not fall under any. Hence, we cannot proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the findings and conclusions of the CA with respect thereto. As we declared in Diokno v. Cacdac:[36]
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari. [Citations omitted.]
There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial
What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G & S “is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.”[37] However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. “In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.”[38] Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court and the CA found that the accident which led to Jose Marcial’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of G & S’ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.
The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of contract
This thus now leaves us with the remaining issue raised by G & S, that is, whether the CA gravely erred in not taking note of the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, a charge which arose from the same incident subject of this case.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Thus, in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip,[39] we declared:
In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.” (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted.)
In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S’ claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.
In view of the foregoing, we deny G & S’ petition for lack of merit.
The denial by the CA of the heirs’ claim for lost earnings is unwarranted
Going now to the petition filed by the heirs, we note at the outset that the issues of whether the CA erred in deleting the award for loss of earning capacity and in reducing the award for moral damages made by the trial court likewise raise questions of fact as they “involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties”.[40] However, we find that the heirs’ case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the RTC.[41] Since the heirs properly raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.[42]
In Ereño, we denied the claim for loss of income because the handwritten estimate of the deceased’s daily income as a self-employed vendor was not supported by competent evidence like income tax returns or receipts. This was in view of the rule that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of damages suffered. We reiterated this rule in People v. Yrat[43] where we likewise denied the same claim because the only evidence presented to show that the deceased was earning P50,000.00 a month was the testimony of the wife. There we stated that for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased’s average income. Self-serving, hence, unreliable statement is not enough. In People v. Caraig,[44] we declared that “documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefor may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws”. However, we subsequently ruled in Pleyto v. Lomboy[45] that “failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of earning capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity”. Hence, we held as sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity the testimony of the victim’s widow that her husband was earning a monthly income of P8,000.00. Later, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,[46] after finding that the deceased’s earnings does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Caraig, we deleted the award for compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity as same was awarded by the lower courts only on the basis of the husband’s testimony that the deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum at the time of her death. This same rule was also applied in the 2008 case of Licyayo v. People.[47]
In all of the cases mentioned except for Ereño, the sole basis for the claim for loss of earning capacity were the testimonies of the claimants. This is not the case here. Just like in Ereño where the testimony of the mother of the deceased was accompanied by a handwritten estimate of her daughter’s alleged income as a fish vendor, the testimony of Jose Marcial’s wife that he was earning around P450,000.00 a year was corroborated by a Certification issued by the USAID. However in Ereño, we declared as self-serving the handwritten estimate submitted by the mother hence we denied the claim for such award. Based on said ruling, the CA in this case deleted the award for lost income after it found the USAID Certification to be self-serving and unreliable.
We disagree. The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification is self-serving and unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to arrive at such a conclusion. A research on USAID reveals that it is the “principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.”[48] It is an “independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States].”[49] Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certification containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.[50] Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certification and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This presumption remains especially so where the authenticity, due execution and correctness of said certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court or the CA. As to its being self-serving, our discussion on “self-serving evidence” in Heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien[51] is enlightening, viz:
‘Self-serving evidence,’ perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a party's testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court x x x. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving because it does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs themselves as parties to this case.
Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and unreliable. On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity just like in Tamayo v. Señora[52] where we based the victim’s gross annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine National Police. Hence, we uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity.
While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy* x (gross annual income - reasonable living expenses),[53]
*Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – age of the deceased)
we, however, find incorrect the amount of P6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The award should be P6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following computation:
3
Net earning capacity = 2 (80-36[54]) x 450, 844.49[55]-50%[56]
3
= 88 x 225,422.25
= 29.33 x 225,422.25
= P6, 611,634.59
The award of moral damages should be modified
While we deemed it proper to modify the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court as discussed below, we nevertheless agree with the heirs that the CA should not have pegged said award in proportion to the award of exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based on different jural foundations.[57] They are different in nature and require separate determination.[58] The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the other.
In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad[59] we awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral damages to the husband and three children of the deceased, a 39-year old Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to compensate said heirs for the grief caused by her death. This is pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1764 and 2206(3) which provide:
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Articles 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2206. x x x
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Here, there is no question that the heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages pursuant to the above provisions, considering the mental anguish suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcial’s untimely death, as can be deduced from the following testimony of his wife Ruby:
Atty. Suarez:
Q: How would you describe Jose Marcial Ochoa?
(Ruby) A: My husband was a very loving husband, faithful husband, a very [good] provider[.] I depended on him so much financially [and] emotionally[.] He was practically my life then.
Q: How is he as a father?
A: A very good father, he is very committed to Micaela[. H]e has always time for her[. H]e is a family man, so it’s really a great [loss] to me and to Micaela.
Q: What was your reaction upon learning of your husband’s death?
A: Immediately after I learned of his death, I tried very hard to keep a clear mind for my little girl, she was 3 ½ and she could not grasp what death is, so I found [it] so hard to explain to her [at] that time what happened [e]specially [because] she just talked to her father from the airport telling her that he is coming home, tapos hindi na pala.
Q: How did it affect you?
A: It was a painful struggle everyday just to get up and move on when someone who [you] really really love and [who] is important to you … it is very hard to move on and [it is even] harder to move on [when] I found out that I was pregnant with my second child, parang tinabunan ka [ng] lahat eh[. I]t’s [too] hard to find happiness, you’re pregnant, when you know wala naman talagang father yung bata later on x x x
x x x x
Q: How did this affect your family?
A: Yung effect kay Micaela, she [used] to be a gregarious child, yung happy ganyan, but nung wala na yong father niya that time, [during] graduation ng nursery that time naging very very [quiet] siya, so a lot of emotional support from my own family was given to her at the time para makacope-up siya sa loss kasi she is very close to the father.
Q: Financially, how did it affect you?
A: I had to make do of what was left by my husband, I couldn’t also work so much at the time because I was….and hirap eh, I cannot find enthusiasm in what I do, tapos pregnant pa ako, and hirap talaga.
Q: How else did it affect you?
A: We had to move houses like we used to live in Quezon City at (the) time of his death, tapos kinuha kami ni Gorjie my brother-in-law sa compound nila para hindi… [to] support us emotionally (at that time) kasi nga I was pregnant and then I also decided to move (to make it easy for me) to adjust yung lifestyle ng mga bata, because I cannot cope [here] financially on my own[. N]ahihirapan na ako dito because the living expenses here are quite high compared sa probinsiya so I decided to move.
Q: If you would assign that pain and suffering that you suffered as a result of the death of your husband, what will be the monetary consideration?
A: I struggled with that kasi….I can honestly say no amount of money can ever repay the [loss] that my children suffered, future nila yan eh, and my son was not given a chance to get to know his father, so I cannot imagine kung ano yung sinasabi n’yong amount that will compensate the suffering that I have to go through and my children will go through, ‘yon and mahirap bayaran.[60]
Under this circumstance, we thus find as sufficient and “somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted”[61] an award of moral damages in an amount similar to that awarded in Victory which is P100,000.00.
From the above discussion, we, thus, partly grant the heirs’ petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 170071 is PARTLY GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 170125 is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and October 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75602 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that G & S is ordered to pay the heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa the sum of P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 216-233; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2] Id. at 309.
[3] RTC Decision dated December 7, 2001; penned by Judge Librado S. Correa, records, pp. 298-303.
[4] Id. at 18-19.
[5] Id. at 1-8.
[6] Art. 2180 – The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
[7] Art. 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict x x x.
[8] Records, pp. 48-54.
[9] Id. at 298-303.
[10] Id. at 303.
[11] Id. at 307-308
[12] Id. at 316-323.
[13] Art. 1764 – Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
[14] Art. 2206 – The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
x x x x
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
[15] Records,. 331-341.
[16] Id. at 342-343.
[17] Id. at 343.
[18] Id. at 344-346.
[19] Id. at 353.
[20] Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Quezon City, Branch 39 in Criminal Case No. 0011769 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, CA rollo, pp. 112-120. However, this MTC Decision was later reversed and set aside by the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 222 in Criminal Case No. Q03-118524 on December 11, 2003 where Padilla was accordingly acquitted; id. at 194-200.
[21] Id. at 216-233.
[22] Records, p. 150.
[23] 383 Phil. 30, 46 (2000).
[24] G & S’ Motion for Reconsideration, CA rollo, pp. 240-249 and the heirs’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration, id. at 250-263.
[25] Id. at 309.
[26] Rollo of G.R. No. 170071, pp. 114-115 and rollo of G.R. No. 170125, pp. 6-7.
[27] Rollo of G.R. No. 170125, p. 16.
[28] Rollo of G.R. No. 170071, pp. 11-12.
[29] A reading of Ereño, however, reveals that it was the victim’s mother, not the spouse, who submitted a handwritten statement of her daughter’s daily income and claimed for the award for lost income.
[30] 476 Phil. 373, 389 (2004).
[31] 316 Phil. 210, 225 (1995).
[32] 481 Phil. 550, 561-562 (2004).
[33] Id. at 563.
[34] Rollo of G.R. No. 170125, pp. 273-298; rollo of G.R. No. 170071, pp. 168-195.
[35] The rule that a petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, Marquez v. Espejo. G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010.
[36] G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 440, 460-461.
[37] Civil Code, Article 1755.
[38] Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 468, 472.
[39] 440 Phil. 29, 40 (2002).
[40] Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 122, 131 (1999).
[41] Meneses v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.
[42] Id.
[43] 419 Phil. 435, 443 (2001).
[44] 448 Phil. 78, 97 (2003).
[45] Supra note 30.
[46] 486 Phil. 574, 591 (2004).
[47] G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 598, 615-616.
[48] USAID: About USAID, Last updated on December 8, 2010,http://www.usaid.gov/(visited February 4, 2011).
[49] Id.
[50] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
[51] G.R. No. 155508, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 405, 416.
[52] G.R. No. 176946, November 15, 2010.
[53] Id.
[54] Jose Marcial’s age at the time of his death.
[55] Jose Marcial’s annual income per Certification from USAID.
[56] If there is no proof of living expenses, as in this case, the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income, People v. Templo, 400 Phil. 471, 494 (2000).
[57] Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad, supra note 46 at 592-593.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] TSN, May 12, 2000, pp. 18-21.
[61] Go v. Cordero, G.R. Nos. 164703 &164747, May 4, 2010.
