A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC – RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT.”, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The history of the Supreme Court shows that the times when it emerged with strength from tempests of public criticism were those times when it valued constitutional democracy and its own institutional integrity. Indeed, dangers from pressure and threat presented by what is usually constitutionally deemed as free speech can arise only when the Court allows itself to be so threatened. It is unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its core of independence can be shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-page commentary from academia. By issuing the Show Cause Order, and affirming it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in the precarious position of shackling free speech and expression. The Court, which has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety, but which appears to the public to have failed to transcend its instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt, gains nothing by punishing those who, to its mind, also lacked such restraint.
I join the dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Martin S. Villarama. To be taken together with this Opinion is my earlier Dissenting Opinion dated 19 October 2010. The effect and intent of the “Restoring Integrity” Statement must be examined in the context of what this Court has done to contribute to the controversy as well as the reception by the public of the pronouncements of this Court on the plagiarism charges in connection with the Decision in G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya, et al v. Executive Secretary, promulgated on 28 April 2010.
A few days after the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office informed the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism charges against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion. He stated further that: “You can’t expect all justices in the Supreme Court to be familiar with all these journal articles.”[1] Justice del Castillo defended himself by submitting his official statement to the Philippine Star, which published it on 30 July 2010. In the meantime, Dr. Mark Ellis, one of several authors whose works was allegedly plagiarized, sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 to the Court, expressing concern about the alleged plagiarism of his work and the misreading of the arguments therein “for cross purposes.”
On 31 July 2010, the Daily Tribune, the Manila Standard, and other newspapers of national circulation reported that Senator Francis Pangilinan, a member of the bar, demanded the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in order to “spare the judiciary from embarrassment and harm.” On 25 July 2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer discussed the plagiarism issue in their editorial entitled “Supreme Theft.” On 5 August 2010, another member of the bar wrote about plagiarism in his column entitled “What’s in a Name?” published in the Business Mirror.[2] On 8 August 2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban’s opinion, to the effect that the issue “seeps to the very integrity of the Court.” That same opinion also raised the question of whether the justices who concurred in the Vinuya ponencia were qualified to sit as members of the Ethics Committee.
Dean Marvic M.V. F. Leonen of the University of the Philippines College of Law transmitted to the Court a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty Of The University Of The Philippines College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In The Supreme Court,” the cover letter of which was dated 11 August 2010. Shortly thereafter, several schools published their own declarations on the matter.
A week after the UP Law Faculty’s statement was transmitted to the Court, Professor Christian
Tams expressed his own views. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice[3], Professor Tams said: “…I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.” Other authors soon followed suit, articulating their own dismay at the use of their original works, through internet blogs, comments and other public fora.[4]
Thus, the negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot be attributed solely to the UP Law Faculty. That the Court was put in the spotlight and garnered unwanted attention was caused by a myriad of factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillo’s own published defense entitled “The Del Castillo ponencia in Vinuya” pending the resolution of the complaint against him by the Ethics Committee, and the categorical statement made by the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of investigating the plagiarism charges. These twin acts attracted negative reaction, much of which came from the legal profession and the academe. The issue itself – alleged plagiarism in a judicial decision, including the alleged use of plagiarized materials to achieve a result opposite to the theses of the said materials – resonated in the public’s consciousness and stirred a natural desire in the citizenry to raise calls to save an important public institution, namely, the judiciary. The responses published by different sectors constituted nothing more than an exercise of free speech – critical commentary calling a public official to task in the exercise of his functions.
The respondents herein, who were not parties to any pending case at the time, forwarded the “Restoring Integrity” Statement as a public expression of the faculty’s stand regarding the plagiarism issue. Such an open communication of ideas from the citizenry is an everyday occurrence – as evidenced by dozens of letters of appeals for justice received regularly by this Court from a myriad of people, and the placards displayed along Padre Faura Street every Tuesday. The commentators and participants in the public discussions on the Vinuya Decision, both on the Internet and in traditional media, included legal experts and other members of the bar, with even a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court numbered among them. Yet only members of the UP Law Faculty were deemed to be the cause for the majority’s trepidation that the Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence was being undermined. The Show Cause Order went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members responsible for threatening the independence of the judiciary.
Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an exercise of the Court’s disciplinary authority over members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the proceeding as one for indirect contempt, the due process requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The majority attempts to skirt the issue regarding the non-observance of due process by insisting that the present case is not an exercise of the Court’s contempt powers, but rather is anchored on the Court’s disciplinary powers. Whatever designation the majority may find convenient to formally characterize this proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the disposition in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its supporting rationale.
The majority directed respondents to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar. Yet the substance therein demonstrates that the present proceeding is one for indirect contempt, particularly in the following portions:
We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.[5]
… … …
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.[6]
… … …
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for reconsideration.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudence adverted to by the majority dwell on contempt, foremost of which is In re Kelly, one of the first and leading cases discussing contempt. Citing Ex Parte Terry, the Supreme Court in that case held that acts punishable as contempt are those “…tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority.”[8] Significantly, before he was cited for contempt, Respondent Amzi B. Kelly was first given the opportunity to appear before the Court, submit a written Answer, and present his oral argument.
The footnote citation in Footnote 4 of the 19 October 2010 Resolution, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, refers to “In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,” a case for indirect contempt lodged against the publisher of a national daily.
In this case, the Court not only gave respondent a chance to explain himself, but also created an Investigating Committee regarding the subject matter of the alleged contemptible act:
From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Dañguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as their testimonies on direct examination. They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Dañguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively.[9]
This approach of using jurisprudence on contempt to justify adverse findings against herein respondents is continued in the current Decision. The majority cites the 1935 case Salcedo v. Hernandez[10] which identified the proceedings specifically as contempt, even though the respondent was a member of the bar. The 1949 case of In Re Vicente Sotto[11], from which the majority quotes heavily – and which the majority states is “still good law” – is explicitly identified as a proceeding for contempt of court. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, the Court issued a Resolution “to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions…”[12] only after a Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed by the petitioner. Even as the Court discussed its exercise of both its contempt powers and disciplinary powers over the respondent attorney in the said case, it still gave him ample time and opportunity to defend himself by allowing him to file an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition, a Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, a Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and an Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam.
The case of In Re Almacen[13], also cited in the current Decision, was in the nature of a contempt proceeding even as it adverted to duties of members of the bar, as can be gleaned from the following:
So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal.
Atty. Almacen filed with the Court a “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” after his clients had lost the right to file an appeal before the Court due to his own inadvertence. And yet, the Court still gave him the “ampliest [sic] latitude” for his defense, giving him an opportunity to file a written explanation and to be heard in oral argument.
All of the above negate the claim that this is not a contempt proceeding but purely an administrative one.
The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the proceeding. The allegation and conclusion that the faculty members purportedly “undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence,” make it clear that the true nature of the action is one for indirect contempt. The discussion in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 hinged on the tribunal’s need for self-preservation and independence, in view of the “institutional attacks” and “outside interference” with its functions – charges which more appropriately fall under its contempt authority, rather than the authority to determine fitness of entering and maintaining membership in the bar.
The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly demonstrated that the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the Order states: “The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.” Page four (4) makes the conclusion that: “The publication of a statement…was totally unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.”
The Order also violated respondents’ right to due process because it never afforded them the categorical requirements of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect Contempt as laid out in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court demand strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.[14]
The essence of a court’s contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the violation of lawful court orders and for maintaining decorum during proceedings, as an essential auxiliary to the due administration of justice.[15] It is not an all-encompassing tool to silence criticism. Courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill.[16] It must be wielded on the preservative, rather than on the vindictive, principle.[17] So careful is the approach ordinarily taken by the Court in cases of contempt that it places a premium on the conduct of a hearing, to such a point that it administratively sanctioned a lower court judge for issuing a Show Cause Order sua sponte and finding the respondent guilty of criminal contempt without the benefit of a hearing. In the case of Castaños v. Judge Escaño, Jr.,[18] the Court held:
It is an oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not for retaliation or vindication.
It is true that, in the case at bench, respondent judge, after having received a copy of Agapito's affidavit in connection with the petitioner's administrative charges against him, directed Agapito to show cause within three days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of court…but, without the benefit of hearing required in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge, in an Order, dated February 22, 1993, sentenced Agapito guilty for contempt of court on account of the allegations he made in his affidavit, dated November 18, 1992. Such failure to afford Agapito the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
In finding Judge Escaño, Jr. guilty of grave abuse of judicial authority, the Court stated:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Moreover, witnesses against erring judges cannot come out in the open to help the Judiciary in disrobing its inept members if we allow judges to abuse their judicial discretion, more particularly with respect to the exercise of their contempt powers.
As Justice Carpio Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, this action of the Court is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:
“…the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order that initiates what would become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more than meets the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and presents itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without proper recourse left to the parties.”[19]
Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting Opinion to the current Decision her belief that this proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:
“Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position that there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of (i) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, which was anchored on an irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the subject Statement, that could taint the disciplinary action.”
The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised solely towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed carefully against the substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom. In this critical balancing act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness and clarity of reasoning, and must not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of temper.
Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it, both as an important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for vindication of felt injustice. Judicial legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in decision-making rightly generates public acceptance of such decisions, which makes them truly binding. William Howard Taft, who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming the President of the United States, understood the weight of public evaluation in this wise: “If the law is but the essence of common sense, the protest of many average men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest reasoning and profoundest learning.”[20]
We who occupy this august chamber are right not because our word is accorded legal finality on matters that are before us. We are right only when we have been proven right. There must always reside, in the recesses of our minds, the clear distinction between what is merely legal and what is legitimate. Legitimacy is a “tenuous commodity, particularly for unelected judges,”[21] and it can only be maintained by a sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the retention of the moral authority of individual judges. This required characteristic of the Court is diminished when its members do not act through the rational strength of their decisions, but are instead perceived to have done so in the misunderstanding of the Court’s disciplinary powers.
“To maintain not only its stature, but also, more importantly, its independence, the judiciary must adhere to the discipline of judicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in the language of the documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the strength of the judiciary's independence depends not only on the constitutional framework, but also on the extent to which the judiciary acknowledges its responsibility to decide ‘according to law’…”[22]
Furthermore, as one American Federal Supreme Court decision said:
“Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.”[23]
The Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes the standards for a judicial response to free speech which, highly-charged though it may be, is necessarily protected. Rule 3.04 in particular states that: “A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.” The Supreme Court has itself, on occasion, demanded of lower court judges that they be “dignified in demeanor and refined in speech, [and] exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint…”[24]
Nothing can be gained from the Court’s exercise of a heavy hand in a matter which has originated from the Court itself. On the contrary, there is much to lose in imposing penalties on the outspoken merely because the outspoken have earned the ire of the Court’s members.
They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged. By occupying an exalted seat in the judiciary, judges in effect undertake to embrace a profession and lead lives that demand stringent ethical norms.[25] In his dealings with the public, a judge must exhibit great self-restraint; he should be the last person to be perceived as a tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain,[26] and must demonstrate to the public that in the discharge of his judicial role, he “possess[es] the virtue of gravitas. He should be…dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character…[H]e must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint… a judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason.”[27]
In my view of a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate moral authority and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times. It has often been said that the rule of law requires an independent judiciary that fairly, impartially and promptly applies the law to cases before it. The rule of law requires a judiciary that is not beholden to any political power or private interests, whose only loyalty is to the people and to the Constitution that the people have ordained as their fundamental governing precept. It requires integrity, independence and probity of each individual judge. To be independent, the judiciary must always remember that it will lose public support and in a certain sense, its legitimacy, if it does not demonstrate its integrity in its judicial decisions. It must show a keen nose for the fundamental importance of upholding right over wrong.
To maintain a life of intellectual integrity, those of us in the judiciary must be buffeted by the winds of healthful criticism. Direct and informed criticism of judicial decisions strengthens accountability. As Taft is noted for writing: “[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid criticism .... In the case of judges having a life tenure, indeed, their very independence makes the right freely to comment on their decisions of greater importance, because it is the only practical and available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve.”[28]
This is where academic freedom, when exercised in appropriate measure, is most helpful. Milton encapsulates free speech as simply the right to “argue freely according to conscience.”[29] The value of academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the right to freedom of expression, lies in the ability of the common man, aided by the expertise available in the academe, to hold a magistrate accountable in the exercise of his official functions, foremost of which is the issuance of written decisions. Paragraph 23 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers[30] states:
Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local, national or international organizations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organization…
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers “have been formulated to assist Member States in their task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers,” and these “should be respected and taken into account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and legislature, and the public in general.” Thus, faced with the duty of balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has now been expressly recognized in the international arena, against this Court’s desire to preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining for offensive language, this Court must examine whether it has already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference with the basic rights of individuals. The realm of public opinion is where the academe, especially our schools and universities, plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly legitimizing its acts, but by constantly reminding the judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally. The academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary; it is to help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take, by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence.
In this regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe Haddon writes: “[t]he value and preservation of academic freedom depend on an academic environment that nurtures, not silences, diverse views. The law school faculty has a special responsibility to maintain a nurturing environment for diverse views because of the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our teaching and the value we theoretically place on the role of persuasive discourse in the quest for knowledge. Faculty autonomy takes on significance because it can protect freedom of inquiry.”[31] In a certain sense, therefore, because the law faculty can discharge a most meaningful role in keeping the judiciary honest, there must be recognition given to the special role of the law faculty in upholding judicial independence.
The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure by the legal academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial decisions rise up to the definition of just and well-reasoned decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. If we have a legal academe that is slothful, that is not self-disciplined, that covets the closeness to the powers-that-be which an unprofessional relationship with the judicial leadership can bring, then this refining role of the legal academe is lost. The legal academe is the preserver of the noble standards of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. It must itself demonstrate strength and independence and not be punished when doing so.
Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this country must always be ready to hold themselves accountable to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the judiciary has limits to its usefulness and these times do not call for the unbroken observance of such deference as much as they call for a public demonstration of honesty in all its forms.
I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a warning to the thirty-five faculty members in connection with the “Restoring Integrity” Statement. I find the Common Compliance of the thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as well as the Compliance submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista on 18 November 2010 and by Professor Raul Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen dated 18 November 2010 and of Professor Owen J. Lynch dated 19 November 2010 similarly satisfactory, and vote to consider this matter closed and terminated.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
[1] The news item is also available on the publication’s website at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirer headlines/nation/view/20100721-282283/High-court-not-probing-plagiarism.
[2] Atty. Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., Plagiarism, in What’s in a Name?, Business Mirror, 5 August 2010.
[3] Dated 18 August 2010.
[4] Evan Criddle, who co-authored the article, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,” with Evan Fox-Decent, wrote a comment in reply to a post written about the issue in a legal blog. The blog entry to which Criddle commented is the Opinio Juris entry entitled “International Law Plagiarism Charge Bedevils Philippines Supreme Court Justice”, located at ; Criddle’s comment was made on 19 July 2010 at 2:44 pm EST.
[5] From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.
[6] From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010. The footnote points to a case docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC.
[7] From page five of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.
[8] 35 Phil 944, 951 (1916)
[9] A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8 August 2008, 561 SCRA 395.
[10] 61 Phil 724, G.R. No. 42992, 8 August 1935.
[11] 82 Phil. 595, 21 January 1949.
[12] 248 Phil. 542, 7 October 1988.
[13] G.R. No. L-27654. 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
[14] Pacuribot v. Judge Lim, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-97-1382, 17 July 1997.
[15] 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 45.
[16] Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. CA, G.R. Nos. 135180-81, 16 August 2000, 338 SCRA 282, 299, citing Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 313 SCRA 739 [1999], citing Dee v. SEC, 199 SCRA 238 (1991).
[17] Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; Peo. v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265.
[18] A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 12 December 1995.
[19] Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, at 2.
[20] William Howard Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Am. L. Rev. 641, 642 (1895)
[21] Michael Abramowicz and Thomas Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decision-Making, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 965 (2009) at 983
[22] Thomas Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 745
[23] Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976)
[24] Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, 19 June 2008, 555 SCRA 217, 235.
[25] Ariosa v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798, 15 November 2000.
[26] Torcende v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238, 24 January 2003.
[27] Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 218, 227-229.
[28] Supra note 19.
[29] In Areopagitica, John Milton’s philosophical defense of free speech, cited by Justice Isagani Cruz (Dissenting Opinion), National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, 5 March 1992, 207 SCRA 1.
[30] Adopted by the Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.
[31] Phoebe Haddon, Academic Freedom and Governance: A Call for Increased Dialogue and Diversity, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1561
