| ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAÑA, Petitioners, - versus - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON, SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES FABIAN, Respondents, | G.R. No. 180917Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 23, 2010 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
X X X.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation[1] to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija[2] issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”[3]
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people.[4] (underscoring supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al.[5] replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.”[6]
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al.[7] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.[8] Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,[9] Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,[10] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[11] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.[12]
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[13] and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica[14] reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners’ theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor[15] where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation:
Lastly, We do not agree with respondent’s contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections,[17] the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge[18] against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of condonation:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
x x x x
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy.
Asserting want of conspiracy, petitioners implore this Court to sift through the evidence and re-assess the factual findings. This the Court cannot do, for being improper and immaterial.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, since the Court is not a trier of facts.[19] As a rule, the Court is not to review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. In the present case, the appellate court affirmed the factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, which rendered the factual questions beyond the province of the Court.
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional.[20] There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence.[21]
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.[22] In the present case, petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides “failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised [the mayor] to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding.”[23] As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on “matters related to upholding the rule of law.”[24] Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection[25] as municipal budget officer.
Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the “capital outlays” that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year.[26]
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Tongson,[27] the Court reminded the therein respondents, who were guilty of simple neglect of duty, that government funds must be disbursed only upon compliance with the requirements provided by law and pertinent rules.
Simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no alleged or established circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for three months justified.
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.[28]
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[29]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that petitioners, Vicente Salumbides, Jr. and Glenda Araña, are suspended from office for three (3) months without pay.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Conducto v. Monzon, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998, 291 SCRA 619, 634 even declared that no ruling to the contrary had even rippled this doctrine.
[2] 106 Phil. 406 (1959).
[3] Id. at 471.
[4] Id. at 472.
[5] 123 Phil. 916 (1966).
[6] Id. at 919.
[7] 129 Phil. 553 (1967).
[8] Id. at 556. It was held that “a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a pubic officer is concerned. Also, under our Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.”
[9] 138 Phil. 546 (1969). Aside from the lack of distinction as to time of commission under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Court pointed out that one of the imposable penalties was perpetual disqualification from public office, which extends beyond a particular term of office. It remarked that an official may amass wealth through graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and thereby launder his evil acts. The Court further ruled that the suspension under said statute is not self-operative as it needs to be ordered by the court in which the criminal case is filed.
[10] 156 Phil. 137 (1974). It was held that since the criminal prosecution is not abated by the fact of reelection, the pendency of a criminal case under a valid Information under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act supplies the legal basis for the suspension from office in the subsequent term in the event of reelection. It added, however, that the suspension order issued during one term does not automatically apply or extend to the new term to which the suspended official had been reelected, in which case the trial court needs to issue anew a supplemental order of suspension.
[11] G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
[12] Vide Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350, 361; Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 471, 488; Cabrera v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 157419-20, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 207, 216-217; People v. Judge Toledano, 387 Phil. 957, 964 (2000); People v. Jalosjos, 381 Phil. 690, 702-703 (2000).
[13] 326 Phil. 847 (1996). Citing sound public policy, the Court added that to rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts allegedly committed during his prior term, such that his second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in those cases to the detriment of public service.
[14] 372 Phil. 892 (1999). The Court stated that there is the presumption that the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character, precisely to eliminate the need to determine in factual terms the extent of this knowledge, which is an obviously impossible undertaking.
[15] G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160.
[16] Id. at 179-180.
[17] G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
[18] Id., citing People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939). The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.
[19] Office of the Ombudsman v. Lazaro-Baldazo, G.R. No. 170815, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 141.
[20] Compare with gross neglect of duty (vide Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 8). In Civil Service Commission v. Rabang, (G.R. No. 167763, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 540, 547), gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to “negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.” In Report on the Alleged Spurious Bailbonds and Release Orders Issued by the RTC, Br. 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. 04-6-332-RTC, April 5, 2006, 486 SCRA 500, 518, the Court ruled that “[n]eglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect, on the other hand, is such neglect from the gravity of the case, or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. The term does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing.”
[21] Vide U.S. v. Mitlof [165 F. Supp. 2d 558 (Dist. Court, S.D.N.Y. 2001)] observes that US federal courts have dismissed as a logical impossibility the idea that one can conspire to act unintentionally; Sackman v. Liggett Group Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391, 394 (Dist. Court E.D.N.Y. 1997) states that there can be no conspiracy to be negligent– that is, to intend to act negligently; Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc. [929 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996)] recognizes that a conspiracy to commit negligence is a non sequitur; Rogers v. Furlow [699 F. Supp. 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1988)] declares that a conspiracy to commit negligence is a paradox at best.
[22] Galero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151121, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 11.
[23] Rollo, p. 66.
[24] Republic Act No. 7610, Sec. 481(b)(4).
[25] Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 342. Liability for Acts Done Upon Direction of Superior Officer, or Upon Participation of Other Department Heads or Officers of Equivalent Rank. - Unless he registers his objection in writing, the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer shall not be relieved of liability for illegal or improper use or application or deposit of government funds or property by reason of his having acted upon the direction of a superior officer, elective or appointive, or upon participation of other department heads or officers of equivalent rank. The superior officer directing, or the department head participating in such illegal or improper use or application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited. (underscoring supplied); cf. Frias, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 171437, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 654, as applied in criminal cases.
[26] Rollo, p. 67, citing Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 306 (d) & (f).
[27] G.R. No. 169029, August 22, 2006, 499 SCRA 567.
[28] Vide Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 168, 177-178.
[29] Galero v. Court of Appeals, supra at 24.
