HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
“x x x.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It
is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the
Tax Declarations they presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither
can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared
as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that it is
no longer intended for public use or service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the
legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over
the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.
The
informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes
the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so
far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or
free patent, have
proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in
this decision, has considerable limits.
There
are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the
virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the
Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands
as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set
forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two
examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect
of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once
that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It
is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.
X x x.”
Footnotes:
[1]Hernando de
Soto Interview by Reason Magazine dated 30 November 1999, at http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last
visited, 21 April 2009).
[5]The trial court decision
identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the property, notwithstanding the
original allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased the same from
Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent pleadings, including those
before this Court, Malabanan or his heirs stated that the property was
purchased from Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the appellate
court made this observation:
More importantly,
Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his
application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the
subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however, Malabanan
testified that he purchased the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco, which was
corroborated by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who
stated that Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly observed by
the Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A,
executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was
marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision, the court a
quo mentioned of a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in
favor of Malabanan which was allegedly marked as Exhibit I. It appears,
however, that what was provisionally marked as Exhibit I was a photocopy of the
deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and
Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest
his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. Thus, Malabanan has not proved that
Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest. Rollo,
pp. 39-40.
[9]G.R. No. 156117, 26
May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
[11]G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA
442.
[14]G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA
268.
[15]G.R. No. 166865, 2
March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.
[16]G.R. No. 147359, 28
March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
[17]G.R. No. 173088, 25
June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.
[18]G.R. No. 85322, 30
April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.
[19]G.R. No. 154953, 16
June 2008.
[20]Section 6, Com. Act
No. 141, as amended.
[21]Section 9, Com. Act No.
141, as amended.
[22]Section 11, Com. Act No.
141, as amended.
[25]R.
AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1995) at 182.
[28]Also known as Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).
[29]Id. at 710-712.
[30]See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
[31]See e.g., Director of Lands
v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252,
275 (2002).
[32]See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.
[33]See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.
[34]See Article 1117 in
relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also Articles 526, 527, 528 &
529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith required.
[35]See Article 1117, in
relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.
[36]Citing Director
of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar,
438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
[37]Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
immediately before its amendment by Rep. Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
[38]Again, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, was superseded by P.D.
No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning point,
and which was then incorporated in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
[39]See Vllarico v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
[40]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec.7.
[41]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a).
[42]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
[43]Id.
[44]Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
[45]See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.
[46]A.
TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at 26; citing
2 Castan 175.
[47]Memorandum of the OSG,
p. 21.
[48]See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44
(1938).
[49]Act No. 496.
[50]See Section 19, Land
Registration Act, which allowed application for registration of title by person
or persons claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate in fee
simple.
Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under
free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer,
or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years
after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.
