HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
“x x x.
B.
Despite the clear text
of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to
acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an
interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is
not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945,
as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court
in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable
interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section
14(1) is that which was adopted inNaguit. The contrary pronouncement
in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits
the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12
June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible
under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially
considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since
the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in
the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of
initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto,
as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of
argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the
Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny
period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was]
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession That statement, in
the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage
as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered
as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal
discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with
respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the
applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fideclaim
of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section
14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We
noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell
v. Court of Appeals[27] since
in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as
the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell,
its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling inRepublic v. Ceniza,[28] which
involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain
land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act
or a statute.
In this case, private
respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo
M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating
that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962
4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was
the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was
filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect
title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the
first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for
they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by
the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before
the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them.[29]
Why
did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b)
of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza,
the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the
land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell,
the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell,
a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
X
x x.”
