HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009
“x
x x.
III.
We
next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).
The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
The Court in Naguit offered
the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the
Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of
the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]]
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]]
With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and
exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the
application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based
their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence
definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It
is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in
Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it
is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation
for the application. It reads:
All things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the
Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are
timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private
ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact
several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or
through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34] as
well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for
the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that
needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration
proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had
adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[36] Yet
if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities
relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep.
Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
x x x
x x x x x x
(b) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was
repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12
June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the
30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is
Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the
rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under
the Civil Code, ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first
source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application
for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property
should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement,[38] similar
to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b),
which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of
Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period
is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true
with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1),
Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section
14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical
qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following
things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other
property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It
is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man.[39] Lands
of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let
us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty
of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as
long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it
is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects
the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to
the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to
be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of
the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their
language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of
the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated
by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale
of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
Manila, including FortBonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For
purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA)[40] which
in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42] Accordingly,
the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such
purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national
wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as
alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA
law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and
cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that
they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such
public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive
period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The
limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public
dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was
still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section
14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
In
the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under
the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while
the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code.
It
may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not
apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil
Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the
Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with
the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One
of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The
Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
There
are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under
Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is
nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as
Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45]provisions
that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of
prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act
which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery,
exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The
OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession.[47] It
is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in
Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange,
donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding
the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted
for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted
into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed
under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the
Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the
registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of
the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration
system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of
possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep.
Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was
noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude
such registration.[50] Still,
the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof
expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We
synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1)
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section
48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to
register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2)
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And
only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial
property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two
kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at
least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.
X x x.”
